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Introduction
The separation of ownership and control is a distinctive feature of a public corporation
(Berle and Means (1932)). This organizational form describes a situation where a group of
individuals - managers - specialize on making decisions and another group - investors - hold
the residual claims of the firm and thus bear the risk associated with the firm’s uncertain
cash flows. The separation of ownership and control yields several economic benefits.
Shareholders do not have any active role in the firm. The continuation of the firm’s
operation is decoupled from the question of whether a certain individual wants to continue
to hold the stock. Hence, claims are transferable. This property enables investors to
diversify risk by holding many small claims in different firms. Further, investors are able to
quickly respond to changes in market conditions or individual preferences and constraints
by adjusting their personal portfolio accordingly. The benefits from the perspective of the
investors directly translate into benefits for the firm: They can raise capital to finance
investment opportunities much faster and at lower costs. Further, due to the fact that
a firm can be owned by a large number of shareholders, firms can grow to a very large
size. A larger firm size yields additional economic benefits due to economies of scale in
production and decision making.
However, there are also costs associated with this form of organization. Asymmetric
information is a key characteristic of the separation of ownership and control (see Berle and
Means (1932) who were among the first to note this implication). Asymmetric information
refers to the condition that managers are better informed about the true value of the
firm and investment opportunities as compared to shareholders, since shareholders do
not have any active role in running the firm. This causes two main problems: First,
it is difficult for shareholders to monitor and control managers and thereby ensure that
managers maximize shareholder value. Second, shareholders might lose money against
better informed individuals when trading their claims. The first phenomenon is referred
to as agency cost (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). These cost denote the loss in value borne
1
by shareholders as a result of non-value maximizing behavior of managers.1 The interests
of managers may deviate from those of shareholders. Shareholders fear that the resources
owned by them are not necessarily used in the most productive way. E.g., managers
may invest funds in prestigious investment projects from which they derive non-monetary
benefits as opposed to investing in the opportunities which maximize shareholder value.
Asymmetric information makes it very difficult for shareholders to observe, evaluate and
control the behavior of managers.
The second phenomenon also describes a situation where shareholders lose on their in-
vestment because they are poorly informed. Individuals with private information can
profitably trade on their information advantage. These profits come at the expense of un-
informed traders (e.g., Kyle (1985) or Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). The expected loss by
trading against informed counterparties is referred to as adverse selection cost. Exploiting
private information which is not available to the public is referred to as insider trading.
There are two ways in which managers are responsible for adverse selection cost: First,
they can trade on the private information themselves or pass along this information to
family or friends. Second, they can fail in protecting this information and keep it confi-
dential (e.g., in order to serve the interests of large shareholders who can benefit from the
access to private information).
In four self-contained essays, this thesis aims at empirically exploring phenomena which
emerge as a result of the asymmetric information stemming from the separation of owner-
ship and control. Chapter 1 deals with the traditional agency conflict topic. When in-
vestors fear that managers do not act in their best interest and fail to collectively organize
and control managers appropriately, is there an opportunity for professional investors to
step in and reduce agency cost? In particular, are the activities of hedge funds and private
equity funds in the German equity market driven by the reduction of agency costs?
The remaining three chapters deal with the second implication of asymmetric information:
the phenomenon of insider trading. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 investigate the trading
of so called ’corporate insiders’. Corporate insiders are individuals associated with the
firm and having obvious access to private information about the firm, that is, high rank-
ing managers, board members or larger shareholders. The U.S. regulator requires them
to disclose their transactions. Both chapters explore the trading behavior of corporate
1These cost include the direct losses due to inefficient investment but also the indirect losses due to costly
monitoring.
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insiders using data on transactions from the U.S. regulator, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Chapter 2 investigates whether corporate insiders exploit short-term
information advantages. Chapter 3 deals with the interaction of regulation and corpo-
rate insider trading. The chapter analyzes whether corporate insiders exploit leeway in
reporting their transactions.
Chapter 4 deals with a different dimension of insider trading. The analysis in this chapter
focuses on illegal insider trading - the trading on material, non-public information in vio-
lation of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Most developed countries
prohibit trading on material, non-public information based on the premise that it harms
other investors. Illegal trading is to be distinguished from ’legal’ insider trades by corpo-
rate insiders which have to be registered with the SEC. Legal insider trades are disclosed
to the public and are not necessarily based on material, non-public information. Chapter
4 investigates the extent to which the phenomenon of illegal insider trading responds to
the detection and sanctioning of insider trading by the regulator.
The four chapters are summarized in the following. Chapter 1 explores whether hedge
funds (HFs) and private equity funds (PEs)2 aim at reducing agency cost.3 Against the
background of their organizational set-up and business model, both HFs and PEs are likely
to have incentives to create shareholder value from agency cost reductions, which sets
them apart from traditional investors. Monitoring incentives are generated by increased
effective ownership that stems from performance-oriented remuneration for fund managers
and, usually, high use of leverage. The present paper contributes to the existing literature
in two primary respects: (i) With a particular focus on agency conflicts, this study is the
first to directly compare the characteristics of HF and PE investment styles in public equity
and (ii) it analyzes the interplay of HF and PE investments with the distinct features of
a Continental European corporate governance system.
Based on a sample of 96 HF and 57 PE entries in German firms between 1998 and 2007,
we study HF and PE investment behavior by analyzing the characteristics of target firms
using binomial logistic regressions. We document empirical evidence that both HF and
PE investments are driven by corporate governance improvements, but seem to address
different types of agency conflicts. Whereas HFs focus on firms with no controlling share-
2We speak of PEs in the narrow sense, that is, later-stage investments. The wide sense of PEs includes
both early-stage (i.e., venture capital) and later-stage investments.
3This chapter is based on joint work with Ann-Kristin Achleitner and André Betzer (Achleitner et al.
(2010)).
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holder, particularly no family shareholders, PEs invest in firms that exhibit the potential
to align manager-shareholder interests due to low managerial ownership. Both HFs and
PEs appear to address free cash flow problems differently. Aiming at increasing dividends,
HFs tend to use commitment devices that can be implemented over a short horizon. In
contrast, PEs are inclined to target firms that are particularly well suited for leverage
increases because of low expected financial distress costs. This strategy requires a suffi-
ciently long investment horizon. The difference in the time horizons over which corporate
governance is improved can be traced to the distinct lock-up periods and compensation
schemes of HFs and PEs.
Chapter 2 tests the hypothesis that corporate insiders time their trades to exploit short-
term information advantages over uninformed market participants using data on 646,411
U.S. insider transactions reported to the SEC between 1986 and 2009.4 This study is, to
the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate the timing of corporate insider trading
with respect to a market data based measure of time-varying information asymmetry.
Knowledge about the way insiders time their trades can help to better understand their
trading motives and shed light on the welfare implications of insider trading.
Several empirical studies (e.g., Seyhun (1986), Chang and Suk (1998) or Jeng et al. (2003))
document that corporate insiders are able to generate significant abnormal returns from
trading. This evidence indicates that they use their advantage for profitable trading
strategies. Moreover, it is likely that the information asymmetry between informed and
uninformed investors and consequently the information advantage of insiders varies over
time. The question then arises whether corporate insiders time their transactions in such
a way that they exploit high peaks of information asymmetry.
The paper adds to the literature on corporate insider trading and presents the first study
to analyze the likelihood of corporate insider trading. Its main innovation is to use a
time-variant proxy for asymmetric information: idiosyncratic volatility relative to a firm’s
recent mean (henceforth relivol). This proxy allows for addressing the question of whether
corporate insiders time their transactions according to variations in asymmetric informa-
tion.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the empirical findings suggest that corporate insiders try
to exploit short-term informational advantages. They tend to buy stocks more frequently
4This chapter is based on joint work with Christian Westheide (Gider and Westheide (2012)).
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when relivol is high, i.e., at times during which it can be expected that private information
is impounded into stock prices. The effect of relivol on the likelihood of insider trading
is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in relivol increases
the probability of insider trading by 2.9%. The effect of relivol on purchases is robust
to controlling for endogeneity and cannot be explained by trading on market uncertainty
or contrarian trading. We do not find robust evidence that corporate insiders time their
sales. In our basic specification we find a slightly negative impact, but once we control for
previous transactions, the effect becomes slightly positive (0.3%). This may be because
sales are in general less likely to be driven by information, since sales are also motivated by
other reasons than profit seeking, e.g., diversification or liquidation needs. Furthermore,
there may be a trade-off between trading profits on the one hand and concerns about
litigation and reputation risks. These risks are likely to be asymmetrically higher with
respect to insider sales (see Jargolinzer and Roulstone (2009)).
Our findings also lend support to the notion that timing is profitable for insiders. We find
that insiders can increase their trading profits for purchases substantially with timing. A
one standard deviation increase in relivol increases the abnormal returns over a period of
six months by 2.1%. We do not find any significant effect of timing on sales. The effect
of relivol on profits remains robust when we control for alternative explanations, or use
alternative model specifications. We also show that the effect cannot be explained by the
notion that relivol is a priced risk factor.
Chapter 3 explores the trading behavior of corporate insiders in the pre Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) era in which they enjoyed considerable flexibility to disclose their transactions.5
The U.S. and many other countries have adopted regulations that require corporate in-
siders to report their trades.6 The model of Huddart et al. (2001) provides a theoretical
justification for these regulations. The authors show that information is reflected more
rapidly in prices when insiders have to disclose their trades. Several empirical papers (e.g.,
Chang and Suk (1998), Betzer and Theissen (2009)) have shown that share price reactions
occur on both the trading and reporting dates. Thus, without this reporting, the market is
unable to infer the full information content of the trade, which implies that market prices
are distorted in the period between the trading and reporting dates. Delayed reporting,
5This chapter is based on joint work with André Betzer, Daniel Metzger and Erik Theissen (Betzer et al.
(2012)).
6Some countries (e.g., the UK) even prohibit trading by corporate insiders in certain circumstances.
Similarly, many listed firms in the U.S. have adopted policies restricting trading by insiders (Bettis
et al. (2000)).
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then, may impede the price adjustment to information revealed by the insider trade.
In the era prior to SOX, Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act required corporate
insiders in the U.S. to report their trades by the 10th of the month following the trade.
Thus, the maximum time allowed between the trade and the report was 40 days, allowing
corporate insiders considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports. This flexibility
could be used strategically. An insider wishing to trade a large quantity could split up
the order into several smaller chunks. Splitting up a large order reduces the order’s price
impact and thus results in reduced execution costs (e.g., Kyle (1985), Chordia and Sub-
rahmanyam (2004)). However, if the insider reported each individual trade immediately,
the share price reaction on the reporting date would move the price against the insider,
and subsequent trades would occur at less favorable prices. Consequently, the insider has
an incentive to delay the reporting of a series of trades until after the last transaction.
By doing so, insiders can benefit from the reduced price impacts of split-up trades while
avoiding the adverse price reaction that immediate reports would trigger. The present pa-
per analyzes incidences of strategically timed SEC filings. We identify a trade as strategic
whenever it is either followed by another trade by the same insider before it is reported
or executed after another trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported.
Our results can be summarized as follows: First, reporting delays were substantial in the
pre-SOX period. We further find clear evidence of strategic trading. Logit models reveal
that the occurrence of both late filings and strategic trades is systematically related to
firm, trade, and trader characteristics. In particular, the results are consistent with the
notion that insiders who are more closely monitored (and who therefore may be facing
higher litigation risks) are less likely to file their trades late. Consistent with previous
findings, our event study results show that share prices react to the reporting of insider
trades. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 10- and 20-day windows are larger
after purchases than after sales. In cross-sectional regressions we find that the magnitude
of the price reaction decreases only slowly in the reporting delay (after insider sales),
or not at all (after purchases). Thus, our results support the notion that market prices
are distorted in the period between a trade and its report. Finally, event study CARs
are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar
nonstrategic trades. Thus, market participants apparently believe that insiders acting
strategically are more likely to possess private information.
Chapter 4 investigates the consequences of the detection of illegal insider trading by the
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SEC.7 We hypothesize that detection has an impact on future insider trading: Individuals
with access to material, non-public information update their subjective probabilities of
getting caught when they observe a detection event in their vicinity and are less likely to
exploit private information. Using a unique hand-collected dataset of 398 insider trading
episodes detected by the SEC between 1995 and 2011 this paper analyzes whether the
detection of insider trading by the SEC deters insider trading activities in the same stock
and stocks of industry peers. Insider trading is difficult to measure because it is not
directly observable. In order to measure trading ahead of price-sensitive announcements
we look at abnormal runups prior to earnings announcements. This measure is likely to
be monotonically linked to variations in the ’true’ level of insider trading. We analyze a
firm-quarter panel of 43,646 earnings announcements of detection targets, their industry
peers and control firms in remote industries using a difference-in-differences approach.
The chapter contributes to the existing literature on insider trading and regulation. It
is the first paper to analyze the consequences of the detection of insider trading and is,
hence, complementary to the international studies which analyze the impact of regulation.
Moreover, the paper contributes to the economic literature on criminality: We investigate
the extent to which personal experiences and experiences in the vicinity of individuals
affect their subjective probabilities of detection. Thereby, we contribute to the debate on
the effect of risk perceptions of detection on criminal behavior.
We test whether runups prior to earnings announcements are lower after there has been
a detection event in the firm while controlling for alternative determinants. We use a
difference-in-differences approach and compare runup changes in the post detection period
of detection targets, their industry peers and firms in remote industries. A detection event
is the first day on which the market has learned from the detection of the case by the
SEC. In a nutshell, we obtain the following results: SEC detection significantly reduces
the runup prior to earnings announcements for firms with a detection event and their
industry peers. More concretely, the runup over the time window of t-5 to t-1 around the
earnings announcement is reduced by 0.7%. The effect on industry peers, the spillover
effect, is strong and statistically indistinguishable from the effect on the detection target
itself. We find weak evidence that the deterrent effect for the detection targets is slightly
more pronounced for episodes which involve information leakage from within of the firm.
These findings remain robust to an alternative measure of insider trading, over different
7This chapter is based on sole-authored work (Gider (2012)).
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time windows for the runup calculation and over different subsamples. One may object
that the observed effect is mechanical, because the pre detection runups for treatment
firms include the runup of the insider trading episode. We rule out that the observed
relationship is purely mechanical. We also discuss the limitations of the present analysis.
In sum, the empirical findings lend support to the notion that detection discourages the
exploitation of inside information in the vicinity of the detection target.
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Chapter 1
Do Corporate Governance
Motives Drive Hedge Fund and
Private Equity Fund Activities?
1.1 Introduction
Hedge funds (HFs) and private equity funds (PEs),1 which belong to the alternative in-
vestment class, have been receiving increasing media and academic attention for their
public equity market activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they have been gaining
influence over managers and interfering with corporate policy. Prominent cases include
The Children’s Investment Fund, which pressured Deutsche Börse to cancel its planned
acquisition of the London Stock Exchange and forced the resignation of then-CEO Werner
Seifert, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. investing in RJR Nabisco, one of the all-time
largest PE transactions.
Against the background of their organizational set-up and business model, both HFs and
PEs are likely to have incentives to create shareholder value from agency cost reductions,
which sets them apart from traditional investors. Monitoring incentives are generated
by increased effective ownership that stems from performance-oriented remuneration for
fund managers and, usually, high use of leverage. Previous empirical studies reveal a
link between HF and PE investment decisions and the motive of agency cost reduction
(for HFs, see e.g., Brav et al. (2008); Clifford (2008); Klein and Zur (2009); for PEs,
1We speak of PEs in the narrow sense, that is, later-stage investments. The wide sense of PEs includes
both early-stage (i.e., venture capital) and later-stage investments.
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see e.g., Halpern et al. (1999); Opler and Titman (1993); Renneboog et al. (2007); Weir
et al. (2005)). Whether they solve the same or different agency conflicts is, however, an
empirical question.
Furthermore, the regulatory debate perceives the high-profit orientation and alleged short-
termism of HFs and PEs as impairing stakeholders’ interests and the long-term prospects
of target firms. In its 2009 Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers, the European Commission considers a new regulation of HFs and PEs that
addresses these concerns. The European Commission acknowledges that a ’one size fits
all approach’ is not appropriate.2 Against this background, we investigate the different
investment strategies of HFs and PEs in a typical Continental European equity market.
An understanding of the drivers of HF and PE investment choices is crucial to evaluating
whether policy measures should address them jointly or separately.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in two primary respects: (i) With
a particular focus on agency conflicts, this study is the first to directly compare the
characteristics of HF and PE investment styles in public equity and (ii) it analyzes the
interplay of HF and PE investments with the distinct features of a Continental European
corporate governance system. The study of the motives of HFs and PEs is particularly
interesting with respect to Germany. Like many Continental European countries, Germany
exhibits a corporate governance system that differs from the Anglo-Saxon model and that
comprises weaker protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al. (1999)), reduced
exposure of managers to hostile takeovers (Franks and Mayer (1998); Loderer and Peyer
(2002)), and a high degree of ownership concentration (Andres (2008)).3
The first two characteristics imply the potential for investors to pursue governance im-
provement strategies.4 The third characteristic suggests that due to more concentrated
ownership structures, agency conflicts can be dominated by conflicts that do not exist
between shareholders and managers but, rather, between large and small shareholders. In
this case, the investment may be motivated by the intention to discipline large sharehold-
ers that extract private benefits. Until the late 1990s, ownership structures in Germany
were largely characterized by cross-holdings among major German firms, with banks and
2See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, p. 5.
3See Drobetz et al. (2004) and Heiss and Köke (2004) for more information about the German corporate
governance system.
4Croci (2007) is the first study to investigate the corporate governance role of active investors (’corporate
raiders’) in Continental Europe. The author finds a positive market reaction to the entries of these
investors.
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insurance companies at the centre of the shareholding network. This system - referred to
as Deutschland AG - was criticized for impairing effective corporate governance control.
Before the unbundling of Deutschland AG in the late 1990s, corporate control was mainly
exerted by banks and other corporations via supervisory board representation, and the
start of HF and PE activity in the German equity market followed shortly thereafter. This
observation may not be coincidental but may be explained by HFs and PEs aiming at the
profitable exploitation of the control vacuum generated by the unbundling.
Based on a sample of 96 HF and 57 PE entries in German firms between 1998 and 2007,
we study HF and PE investment behaviour by analyzing the characteristics of target firms
using binomial logistic regressions. Our analysis focuses on agency cost reduction as the
main value driver of interest, and the analysis is restricted to the major intersection of
both players, that is, investments in publicly listed firms. Furthermore, the empirical
study is limited to ex ante target characteristics and does not include the consequences
of the involvement of financial investors such as share price developments or changes in
firms’ financials or operations.
We document empirical evidence that both HF and PE investments are driven by corporate
governance improvements but seem to address different types of agency conflicts. Whereas
HFs focus on firms with no controlling shareholder, particularly family shareholders, PEs
invest in firms that exhibit the potential to align manager-shareholder interests due to
low managerial ownership. Both HFs and PEs appear to address free cash flow problems
differently. Aiming at increasing dividends, HFs tend to use commitment devices that can
be implemented over a short horizon. In contrast, PEs are inclined to target firms that
are particularly well suited for leverage increases because of low expected financial distress
costs. This strategy requires a sufficiently long investment horizon. The difference in the
time horizons over which corporate governance is improved can be traced to the distinct
lock-up periods and compensation schemes of HFs and PEs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 characterizes the distinct
business models of HFs and PEs. We argue that they are expected to solve agency prob-
lems, as opposed to traditional financial investors. Section 3 develops hypotheses about
the typical target characteristics of HFs and PEs. Section 4 describes the empirical design
and comments on summary statistics. Subsequently, the empirical results are presented
and interpreted in Section 5. Section 6 draws our conclusions.
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1.2 Business model comparison
Several commonalities exist between HFs and PEs: Both are privately organized invest-
ment firms equipped with large capital resources and employ professional fund managers
to maximize investment returns. They both belong to the alternative investment class,
which is to be distinguished from traditional institutional investors such as asset manage-
ment firms. Generally, their direct client base consists of sophisticated investors and, as
a consequence, they are exempt from several regulatory obligations that usually apply to
investment firms. For instance, HFs and PEs are allowed to strongly tie fund manager
compensation to investment performance. Moreover, due to the reduced degree of regu-
lation, they are allowed to make heavy use of debt financing.5 This strategy can enhance
returns and increase effective ownership. The greater degree of flexibility resulting from
the incentives for fund managers and leverage can allow HFs and PEs to pursue invest-
ment strategies that are not open to traditional shareholders. Against this background,
improving corporate governance may be a profitable strategy for HFs and PEs, but not
for traditional funds. Empirical evidence supports this view by indicating that traditional
asset managers fail in trying to benefit from agency cost reduction (e.g., Gilian and Starks
(2007)).
There are substantial differences between the business models of HFs and PEs (see Table
1.1 for a summary): HFs engage in a variety of asset classes, such as equity and debt,
commodities, options, futures, and foreign exchange, of which activities related to publicly
listed firms represent only a few among numerous strategies;6 in contrast, PEs focus
their investment activities on equity investments. This difference is also reflected in the
personnel pool from which both types recruit their investment professionals. While HFs
mainly recruit employees with financial market expertise (e.g., from proprietary trading),
PEs additionally recruit personnel with substantial operational expertise, for example,
former management consultants and industrial top managers (Cressy et al. (2007)). These
differences in the degree of equity specialisation suggest that PEs are likely to have superior
abilities in understanding and evaluating a target’s business and identifying potential levers
to improve shareholder value.
One of the most striking differences lies in the time horizons of the two types of funds linked
5Often PEs use debt at the level of the target firm, whereas HFs often use leverage at the fund level.
6For a short overview of the different HF investment strategies, see, for example, the appendix of Gibson
and Gyger (2007).
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Table 1.1: General characteristics of HFs and PEs
Characteristic HFs PEs
Investment focus Variety of financial instruments:
e.g., public equity, fixed income,
options, futures, convertible se-
curities, commodities
Public and private equity
Expertise Focus on financial Both financial and industrial
Investment horizon Average initial lock-up period of
10 months
Average period of 10 years
Performance-based com-
pensation
High High
Determination of perfor-
mance
Periodically, based on the net
asset value of the portfolio via
marking to market
At liquidation, based on the fi-
nal cash flow from the invest-
ment portfolio
Redemption On a periodic basis At liquidation
Admittance of new in-
vestors
On a periodic basis No
This table reports characteristics of hedge funds (HFs) and private equity funds (PEs).
up to their organizational set-ups. After their initial investment in HFs, investors must
wait for an average of 10 months before they can withdraw their capital and, after this
lock-up period, another four months on average until they can take back their invested
funds (Agarwal et al. (2009)). The performance of HFs is evaluated on a marking-to-
market basis. The fees are periodically determined according to the net asset value of
the fund, mostly on an annual basis. This implies a relatively short investment horizon
and a preference for liquid securities such that the value can easily be determined from
observing market prices.
In contrast to HFs, which in principle have an infinite life, PE funds are set up for a finite
period of, on average, 10 years (Sahlman (1990)). During this time, existing investors
cannot withdraw their capital and the fund is closed to new investors. This condition
is likely to commit PEs to maximize fund value over a long horizon. Unlike an HF, the
fund’s value is not evaluated on a periodical basis but, instead, at the end of the holding
period, that is, when all investments are realized. Investors cannot withdraw their capital
before the fund’s final liquidation. As a consequence, PEs are relatively patient investors
that are able and willing to hold illiquid assets. These organizational differences are likely
to be a key determinant of investment strategies with respect to public equity.
In sum, both HFs and PEs are flexible investment firms with high incentives for investment
managers. These characteristics allow them to draw value from corporate governance
improvements. How fundamental differences in their business models and, in particular,
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their investment horizons are reflected in their pursuit to reduce agency conflicts remains
an empirical question.
1.3 Corporate governance related investment motives
We argue that HF and PE activities are driven by corporate governance improvements. To
test this hypothesis and analyze potential differences among HF and PE investment styles,
we study target characteristics that proxy for the existence of agency conflicts. We focus
on two different groups of indicators for the potential to reduce agency costs: free cash
flow and financial distress, as well as ownership structure. See Table 1.2 for a summary.
Table 1.2: Summary of hypotheses
Hypothesis Variable Expected sign
Free cash flow Cash +
Debt –
Dividend yield –
Tobin’s Q –
Research –
Ownership structure Management ownership –
Family ownership –
Free float +
Private benefits +
This table reports the expectations regarding the empirical tests of the hypotheses. Cash denotes cash and cash
equivalents scaled by sales. Debt is (short-term debt + long-term debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets.
Dividend yield is defined as the cash dividend scaled by the market value of equity. Tobin’s Q is defined as (market
value of equity + book value of total liabilities)/total assets divided by the equivalent measure of the average of
all firms in DAX and MDAX in the respective year. Research is set to 1 if the firm has research and development
expenditures, and 0 otherwise. Management ownership denotes the stake held by members of the management
board. Family ownership is defined as the stake held by family members who are neither members of the executive
board nor related to them. Free float is defined as the sum of shareholdings below 5%. Private benefits is a dummy
set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more than 25% and the second largest holds less than 5% of the shares.
1.3.1 Free cash flow and financial distress
According to the free cash flow theory (Jensen (1986)), firms with excess cash positions
are likely to exhibit agency problems. It is argued that cash richness creates opportunities
for inefficient investment behavior. Managers can use readily available resources to pursue
their own interests rather than those of their shareholders. Instead of piling up cash,
managers should return excess resources to shareholders via share buybacks or dividends
if high liquidity is not needed for further positive net present value investments. Agency
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costs stemming from free cash flow are most likely to occur in mature and stable businesses
with few growth opportunities. If a mature firm needs additional liquid resources, it should
address equity or debt markets that would then scrutinize the project’s efficiency.
Therefore, dividends can serve as a bonding mechanism and, hence, as a substitute for
other internal governance mechanisms (Da Silva et al. (2004)). A high dividend payment
forces managers to generate sufficient cash flows and to pursue shareholder value maxi-
mization. This can reduce the monitoring efforts of the board of directors or shareholders
and hence mitigate agency costs arising from financial slack.
Jensen (1986) argues that debt financing presents another instrument for committing man-
agers not to waste cash on potentially inefficient investment projects. Taking on additional
debt reduces financial slack since managers are bound to use cash from operations to re-
deem the debt. According to this view, debt financing is more binding than dividends,
since the latter can be cut more easily compared to the cancellation of debt contracts.
Thus, firms with unused debt capacity offer disciplinary potential. Margaritis and Psillaki
(2007) present empirical support for the hypothesis that leverage can serve as a disci-
plinary tool to mitigate the agency costs of outside ownership and lead to an improvement
in efficiency.
Following Jensen (1986), problems associated with free cash flows are more pronounced
in firms that do not have attractive growth opportunities. Growing firms need liquid
resources for investments, which is why they have to turn to equity and debt markets on
a regular basis. Requesting new capital entails a monitoring mechanism, since investors
will scrutinize the investment project prior to the supply of capital. As a consequence,
large cash positions in growing firms are less likely to lead to managerial discretion. High
growth opportunities are also related to information asymmetries. A mature firm with
stable cash flows is less risky since a substantial part of its profit potential has already
materialized. The value of a high-growth firm largely consists of the anticipation of future
profits. Hence, debt financing is more easily obtainable for stable and mature firms, since
they have more collateralizable assets (Opler and Titman (1993); Weir et al. (2008)).
Implementing commitment devices that reduce financial slack can have the downside of
increasing expected financial distress costs, as brought forward by Opler and Titman
(1993). Therefore, the potential to reduce financial slack is likely to be inversely linked to
expected financial distress costs. We hypothesize that HFs and PEs can create value by
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resolving excess cash positions or establishing commitment devices that reduce the free
cash flow available through managerial discretion. They can thereby reduce agency costs
stemming from financial slack. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the firm’s cash position,
the actual level of debt financing as a proxy for debt potential, growth perspectives, and
proxies for financial distress such as research and development (R&D) expenditures and
the collateralization of assets.
1.3.2 Ownership structure
Shareholder size and identity are the main determinants of monitoring incentives (Gross-
man and Hart (1980); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). The lower the shareholders’ incentives
to monitor, the more likely the firm will exhibit agency problems. We argue that a firm
whose ownership structure fails to reduce conflicts between managers and shareholders,
on the one hand, and conflicts between small and large shareholders, on the other hand, is
likely to become involved with an active investor. We hypothesize that HFs and PEs aim
at aligning interests between managers and shareholders and at reducing private benefits
extracted by dominating shareholders.
Managerial ownership is recognized as an important mechanism for aligning the interests
of owners and managers. Empirical evidence documents the success of managerial owner-
ship in reducing agency costs (Beiner et al. (2006)). Therefore, the potential to reduce
agency costs is likely to be limited in the presence of high managerial ownership. Family
ownership, a phenomenon that is less prevalent in Anglo-Saxon markets, is a distinct fea-
ture of the German equity landscape. There is empirical evidence that family owners are
successful in dealing with agency conflicts (Andres (2008)). This finding can be explained
by families usually holding a large fraction of their wealth invested in a firm. This large
and non-diversified exposure generates high monitoring incentives. Furthermore, families
are generally invested over a long time horizon. Their knowledge and expertise regard-
ing a firm’s operations as well as the reputation they have built with other shareholders
positively affect their ability to effectively monitor managers.7
Ownership concentration is another typical feature of the German equity market. Typ-
ically, ownership structure is considered to be an indicator of monitoring efficiency:
7There are also arguments for a negative impact of family shareholders: Families are likely to have
interests that are not necessarily shared by other shareholders, such as concerns about the firm’s image
or reputation and debt aversion (Mishra and McConaughy (1999)).
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Manager-shareholder conflicts are likely to be more prevalent in the presence of dispersed
ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that dispersed ownership can produce a free-
riding situation with respect to investments in monitoring technologies. A shareholder
undertaking monitoring activities bears the entire costs, while all other shareholders free
ride. In the U.S., agency problems are claimed to arise predominantly because of dis-
persed ownership and the resulting weak monitoring incentives. However, due to the high
degree of ownership concentration, the more relevant conflict in Germany is not between
managers and shareholders but, rather, between large and small shareholders (Gugler and
Yurtoglu (2003)). This is because large shareholders can extract private benefits at the
expense of small shareholder wealth. Private benefits are defined as the extraction of
disproportionally large rents relative to the size of cash flow rights.
1.4 Empirical design and descriptive statistics
1.4.1 Methodology and dataset construction
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to develop an understanding of how target
characteristics affect the odds of a firm becoming involved with HFs or PEs. The standard
technique used for takeover prediction is binomial logistic regression analysis. This model
tests the direction and extent to which firm characteristics affect the likelihood of a firm
becoming a target. To construct the control group, a choice must be made between two
sampling procedures: random sampling and matched sampling. There are good reasons
for and against the use of a matched sample. Several authors argue in favour of matching
because financial ratios such as leverage, operating profitability, and investment volume
differ largely across industries, size categories, and growth perspectives. Against this
background, matching can make the control group more comparable to the target group
(Song and Walkling (1993)).
There are also compelling arguments against the use of matching (Halpern et al. (1999)).
First, industry membership, size, and growth opportunities are variables of interest for our
purposes. The use of matching does not allow one to determine whether these character-
istics make a difference in the odds of becoming a target. Second, there are inaccuracies
in the definition of an industry (Clarke (1989)), and it is therefore questionable whether
industry membership is a meaningful measure. Consequently, industry matching may
not necessarily result in obtaining a comparable control sample. In addition, there are
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two pragmatic reasons for the use of a random rather than a matched control sample:
Since the German equity market is relatively small compared to the U.S. market, the
number of comparable firms is also relatively small, and it would therefore be difficult to
obtain a good match for some targets. Moreover, because the distribution of targets and
non-targets across industries is similar in the present sample (see Table 1.3), concerns of
over-representing one industry over others do not apply. There is no empirical evidence
that matching significantly changes the test results (Song and Walkling (1993)). Overall,
the literature has not concluded whether or not matching is superior from a methodolog-
ical perspective. Due to the reasons given above, this paper employs a random control
sample.
As suggested by Halpern et al. (1999), we use a temporal matching procedure to account
for economy-wide influences. Temporal matching is implemented as follows: We randomly
select announcement dates from the target samples to determine the dates for the collection
of control sample data. As a result, the distribution of control firms over time broadly
resembles that of target firms (see Table 1.4).
Table 1.3: Industry distribution
HF PE Control
Industry No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Consumer goods 6 6.3 13 22.8 9 9.4
Media 13 13.5 5 8.8 8 8.3
Industrials 27 28.1 12 21.1 18 18.8
Pharmaceuticals and healthcare 10 10.4 3 5.3 9 9.4
Telecommunication 4 4.2 3 5.3 2 2.1
Technology 8 8.3 2 3.5 8 8.3
Software 15 15.6 9 15.8 15 15.6
Utilities 0 0.0 1 1.8 3 3.1
Chemicals 5 5.2 2 3.5 3 3.1
Construction 1 1.0 1 1.8 3 3.1
Automobile 2 2.1 6 10.5 4 4.2
Basic resources 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 5.2
Retail 3 3.1 0 0.0 5 5.2
Transportation and logistics 2 2.1 0 0.0 4 4.2
N 96 57 96
This table reports the distribution of hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) target and control firms
across industries. No. denotes the absolute number of target firms in the respective industry and (%) denotes the
percentage as of all HF or PE targets. The industry classification is obtained from Deutsche Börse.
The dataset underlying the present empirical analysis comprises 96 HF targets, 57 PE
targets, and 96 non-targets serving as control firms. The HF and PE samples were collected
from a database provided by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin),
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Table 1.4: Distribution of entries over time
HF PE Control
Year No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
1998 0 0.0 1 1.8 1 1.0
1999 0 0.0 3 5.3 3 3.1
2000 0 0.0 8 14.0 5 5.2
2001 1 1.0 2 3.5 0 0.0
2002 1 1.0 3 5.3 3 3.1
2003 2 2.1 9 15.8 11 11.5
2004 6 6.3 6 10.5 10 10.4
2005 19 19.8 13 22.8 24 25.0
2006 28 29.2 9 15.8 20 20.8
2007 39 40.6 3 5.3 19 19.8
N 96 57 96
This table reports the entry dates of hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) targets. No. denotes the
absolute number of target firms in the respective year and (%) denotes the percentage as of all HF or PE. The years
for which data on the control sample were collected were randomly drawn from the entry dates of HFs and PEs.
the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. The database comprises all reported
shareholdings according to Section 21 of the German Securities Trading Act. According
to this rule, an institution or person must report shareholding to BaFin and the issuer
if the shares held exceeds or falls below certain threshold values of 3%, 5%, 10%, 25%,
50%, and 75%. BaFin and the issuing firm then publicize this information. The database
lists the underlying share, the reporting date of the transaction, the shareholder’s identity
and location of incorporation, and the fraction of shares held after the transaction. The
BaFin database includes the name of the investor, but no information about type, that is,
whether the reporting institution is an HF, PE, mutual fund, industrial firm, individual,
and so forth. Hence, further work is required to identify those PEs and HFs that acquire
visible stakes in publicly listed firms. The fact that there is no legal definition for an HF
or PE further complicates the identification of investments.
We proceeded as follows: The entire database was screened for reporting institutions that
were neither individuals, industrial firms, banks, nor insurance companies. The existence
of each remaining reporting institution was then verified by using Factiva, LexisNexis,
mergermarket, Google, and investor magazines. To qualify as an HF (PE), the institution
had to fulfill one of the following criteria: (i) be classified as an HF (PE) in the financial
press or an investor magazine or (ii) define itself as an HF (PE) on its webpage. Several
traditional asset managers, such as UBS, have set up funds whose investment strategies
resemble those of HFs, for example, through the use of derivatives. It is not possible to
distinguish whether the financial institution holds the equity stake as part of their HF
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or their traditional business, and we excluded those ambiguous cases. Furthermore, only
the first entries of HFs (PEs) into a firm were included in the sample. The relevant entry
dates were cross-checked with the financial press, since BaFin reports usually involve a
considerable time lag.
Targets in the financial sector were excluded from both the HF and PE samples for the
following reasons: (i) Financial statements are difficult to compare with the statements
of industrial firms and (ii) other motivations for these investments may exist, such as
strategic cooperation with the targets. A total of 96 control firms were randomly selected
from CDAX firms, excluding all HF and PE targets, as well as financial firms. Firm data
for the control sample were chosen from the entry years of the targets to avoid biases
due to potential macro-wide influences particular to a certain year. The exact dates
were randomly chosen from the target sample. To avoid potential survivorship bias, we
randomly chose firms from the CDAX list of the respective year. Accounting information
at the firm level refers to the figures in the fiscal year before the announcement of investor
entry.
1.4.2 Summary statistics
In 1998, German publicly listed firms started to become involved with PEs (see Table
1.4). The year 2005 boasts the highest number of entries, with 13 investments. HFs
assumed activity in Germany with a lag: The first HF investment detectable by the
sample selection procedure described below was observed in 2001. Nearly 90% of all
entries were observed between 2005 and 2007, with a peak of 40% of all HF events in
2007. This difference in distribution over time requires temporal matching, as discussed
above. In the U.S., PEs existed as early as the 1980s and HF investments have been
observed since the mid-1990s. Germany’s time lag can be first attributed to the fact that
most HFs and PEs are U.S.-based firms and they test their strategies in the domestic
market before competition pushes them to expand internationally. Second, the German
market became more attractive to foreign investors due to the unbundling of Deutschland
AG and the concomitant reorientation of how German firms should be governed. It was
argued that the complex cross-shareholdings and the mutual control of supervisory boards
among German corporations impaired effective corporate governance control. Discussions
in the late 1990s on the need for action resulted in the enactment of a new law allowing
corporations to sell their equity stakes in other firms, tax exempt. Following the new
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tax rule, many key players at the center of Deutschland AG, such as Deutsche Bank AG,
Allianz AG, and Münchener Rück AG, committed to sell their numerous equity stakes.
The coincidence of the unbundling and the start of HF and PE activities can be interpreted
as the reorientation generating the potential for investment strategies aimed at improving
corporate governance.
In 2007, only three PE transactions were publicly announced, all of which occurred in
the first half of the year. This could be traced to the subprime crisis, which started in
mid-2007 and made it difficult to obtain debt financing at attractive terms. Table 3 shows
the distribution of target and non-target firms across industries. Overall, the distribu-
tion across industries exhibits weak patterns, but no industry is clearly overrepresented.
The most common HF investments are observed in the industrial, software, and media
industries. The most common sectors of PE targets are consumer goods, industrials, and
software. There are noticeable differences between HFs and PEs in pharmaceuticals and
healthcare (preferred by HFs) and consumer goods (preferred by PEs). This difference
may reflect the general preference of PEs to invest in stable businesses that exhibit a low
degree of uncertainty. The distribution of financial investor targets grossly resembles the
industry distribution of the firms randomly selected from CDAX.
The HF and PE targets significantly differ with respect to the size of the acquired stakes
(see Table 1.5). Relative to HFs, PEs hold much more concentrated positions in the euro
volume of stakes. Consistent with the statement in Section 2, HF investors almost always
(95.8%) acquire minority stakes. We only observe three cases in which an HF acquired
a controlling stake, that is, a stake in excess of 25%. All HF stakes remained below
the threshold of 30%, which triggers a mandatory takeover offer according to Sections
29 and 35 of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. In contrast, PEs
acquire controlling stakes in 91.2% of events. A total of 80.7% of the stakes are above the
mandatory takeover threshold of 30%. In more than half of cases, PEs acquire more than
75% of the stakes. This finding is consistent with the initial assumptions that PE aim at
full control, whereas HF intend to induce only small changes. The threshold of 75% is
relevant under the assumption that PEs aim at increasing leverage, because it enables PEs
to set up a control and profit transfer agreement according to Section 291 of the German
Securities Act, which is likely to improve the financing terms for the transaction. Nearly
half of the PE targets in our sample were delisted subsequent to PE entry. With respect
to HFs, the delisted targets only account for 10% of the sample.
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Table 1.5: Stake sizes
HF PE
In millions of euros
Average stake size 22.6 151.2
Median stake size 7.9 44.5
Standard deviation 35.9 241.3
Fraction of shares outstanding (%)
Average stake size 8.2 71.6
Median stake size 5.6 82.3
Standard deviation 6.1 30.7
By stake type (%)
Minority stake 95.8 8.8
Controlling stake 4.2 91.2
Stake over 30% 0.0 80.7
Stake over 75% 0.0 54.4
Delisting 8.3 47.4
This table reports the summary statistics on the stakes acquired by hedge funds (HFs) and private equity funds
(PEs). The euro volume is calculated as the maximum stake size multiplied by the market value of equity 20
trading days before the entry of the investor. The stake size (as a percentage) refers to the maximum stake that
has been held over the time horizon under consideration. A minority stake is defined as a stake smaller than 25%,
and a controlling stake is defined as a stake greater than 25%. If acquiring a stake greater than 30%, an investor is
obliged to make a public offer to the remaining shareholders, which is why we include information on this threshold.
Delisting denotes the percentage of HF and PE targets that have been delisted after the entry.
Table 1.6 summarizes the descriptive statistics of target and non-target firms and Table 1.7
shows the correlations among the variables. The univariate results suggest that HF targets
differ significantly from PE targets. The ownership structure summary statistics suggest
that HFs target firms with large free float. This may be due to marginal control of their
small stakes being higher with increasing free float, and also their preference for holding
liquid positions that can be sold quickly and at low cost. Large positions cannot be exited
as easily, since this would have a considerable price impact. As opposed to evidence on the
U.S. market (Klein and Zur (2009)), we do not find any support for the hypothesis that
target size is particularly small compared to randomly selected CDAX firms. However,
only 14% of PE targets and 19.8% of HF targets are members of HDAX. Membership in
HDAX is expected to be positively related to market visibility and, accordingly, inversely
related to information asymmetry.
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics
Mean Median Difference in mean
HF PE Control HF PE Control HF PE HF vs. PE
Free float (%) 58.01 43.20 47.13 56.20 42.00 48.64 10.89*** -3.93 14.82***
Family (%) 3.54 15.84 13.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 -9.58*** 2.72 -12.30***
Management (%) 7.98 4.06 11.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.8 -7.72*** 3.92*
Private benefits (d) 33.33 57.89 52.08 0.00 100.00 100.00 -18.75*** 5.81 -24.56***
Acquisition (d) 35.42 15.79 28.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.29 -12.34* 19.63***
Target (d) 22.92 28.07 4.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.75*** 23.90*** -5.15
Size (MV, millions of euros) 130.73 84.09 95.27 121.24 56.00 61.01 35.46 -11.18 46.63*
Size (sales, millions of euros) 159.21 248.21 163.50 143.12 248.05 120.52 -4.29 84.71 -89.00*
Risk (%) 2.79 2.66 3.18 2.55 2.41 2.71 -0.39** -0.52** 0.13
Prior stock performance (%) 99.89 102.20 98.66 96.97 101.33 96.29 1.23 3.54 -2.31
Tobin’s Q (%) 109.47 78.90 89.40 89.32 72.90 77.42 20.06*** -10.51* 30.57***
Debt (%) 22.29 20.68 18.61 18.30 18.31 18.78 3.68 2.07 1.61
Net debt (%) 3.85 8.26 1.10 7.02 8.58 5.30 2.75 7.16 -4.41
Cash (%) 13.93 10.38 13.38 10.83 7.06 8.08 0.55 -2.99 3.55*
Dividend yield (%) 0.88 2.43 2.12 0.00 1.25 0.02 -1.24*** 0.3 -1.55**
Research (d) 50.00 24.56 35.42 50.00 0.00 0.00 14.58*** -10.86 25.44***
Tax (%) 2.46 1.90 2.29 1.59 1.01 1.75 -0.39 -0.39 0.56
This table reports the summary statistics for hedge fund (HF) and private equity fund (PE) targets and control firms. Free float is defined as the sum of shareholdings below 5%.
Family is defined as the stake held by family members who are neither members of the executive board nor related to them. Management denotes the stake held by members of the
management board. The private benefits dummy is set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more than 25% and the second largest holds less than 5% of the shares. Acquisition (target)
refers to rumors that the firm plans an acquisition (is subject to takeover speculation). Executed acquisition refers to the firm having executed an acquisition during the two years prior
to entry. Size in terms of market value refers to the value of equity, and size in terms of sales refers to the annual volume of sales. Risk denotes the standard deviation of returns over
250 trading days up to 20 days before entry. Prior stock performance is defined as the market-adjusted share price 20 trading days before entry divided by the market-adjusted average
share price of the previous 250 days. Tobin’s Q is defined as (market value of equity + book value of total liabilities)/total assets divided by the equivalent measure of the average of
all firms in DAX and MDAX in the respective year. Net debt is (short-term debt + long-term debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents
scaled by sales. Dividend yield is defined as the cash dividend scaled by the market value of equity. Research is set to 1 if the firm has research and development expenditures, and 0
otherwise. Tax denotes tax expenses scaled by sales. In this table (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy variable. The columns under difference in means indicate the differences
of HF and PE targets to control firms, and HF to PE targets. We perform t-tests for the significance of the difference (Pearson’s chi-squared tests for dummies). Here, *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The data are winsorized at the 3% level.
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Table 1.7: Spearman correlation
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Fam 1.00
2 Mgmt -0.16* 1.00
3 Freefloat -0.15* -0.03 1.00
4 PB (d) -0.05 0.02 -0.29* 1.00
5 Res (d) 0.08 -0.03 0.14* 0.02 1.00
6 Risk 0.02 0.19* 0.09 0.00 -0.12* 1.00
7 Perf 0.13* -0.07 -0.12* -0.05 0.03 -0.11* 1.00
8 Size 0.00 -0.26* -0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.57* 0.22* 1.00
9 Q -0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.12* -0.05 -0.14* -0.16* 1.00
10 Cash -0.01 0.07 0.15* -0.02 0.09 0.24* -0.01 -0.37* 0.22* 1.00
11 Debt 0.07 -0.12* 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 0.29* -0.18* -0.46* 1.00
12 Dvd 0.06 -0.09 -0.14* 0.12* 0.06 -0.60* 0.15* 0.55* -0.15* -0.24* 0.01 1.00
13 Tax 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.14* -0.19* 0.24* 0.16* 0.17* 0.06 -0.19* 0.21* 1.00
14 Acq (d) 0.11* -0.07 0.15* -0.05 0.17* -0.25* 0.01 0.28* -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.19* 0.04 1.00
15 Tar (d) -0.10 -0.16* -0.15* 0.03 -0.07 -0.18* 0.24* 0.20* -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.09 1.00
This table reports the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of the variables. Fam is defined as the stake held by family members who are neither members of the executive board nor
related to them. Mgmt denotes the stake held by members of the management board. Free float is defined as the sum of shareholdings below 5%. The variable PB is a dummy variable
set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more than 25% and the second-largest holds less than 5% of shares. Res is set to 1 if the firm has research and development expenditures, and
0 otherwise. Risk denotes the standard deviation of returns over 250 trading days, up to 20 days before the entry. Perf is defined as the market-adjusted share price 20 trading days
before entry, divided by the market-adjusted average share price of the previous 250 days. Size is defined as the annual volume of sales. Q is defined as (market value of equity + book
value of total liabilities)/total assets divided by the equivalent measure of the average of all firms in DAX and MDAX in the respective year. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents
scaled by sales. Debt is (short-term debt + long-term debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. Here, DvD is defined as the cash dividend scaled by the market value of equity.
Tax denotes tax expenses scaled by the sales. Acq (tar) refers to rumors that the firm plans an acquisition (is subject to takeover speculation), and (d) indicates that the variable is a
dummy variable. * denotes significant correlation at the 10% level. The data are winsorized at the 3% level.
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1.5 Empirical results
In the following, we use binomial logistic regressions to analyze the investment motives
in a multivariate context. We employ several additional variables to control for alter-
native investment motives that are not necessarily associated with corporate governance
improvements but which may yet drive investment decisions.
1.5.1 HF investment motives
Table 1.8 shows the regression results for HF investment motives. We find support for
the hypothesis that HFs aim to reduce agency costs stemming from free cash flow. The
dividend yield is inversely related to the odds of becoming an HF target: The negative
coefficient is significant at the 5% level. These findings can be interpreted as support
for the hypothesis that HFs push to raise dividends. However, the observation of a low
dividend yield can be attributed to the measure’s construction: HFs invest in growth firms
and, since the market value of equity is in the denominator of the dividend yield measure,
the measure is very small. This suggests that there may be a negative relation between
dividend payout and HF targets because growth firms per se do not pay out much and
prefer to reinvest the cash from operations into the expansion of their businesses. If this
were the case, then the conclusion that HFs aim at pushing for dividend increases would be
inappropriate. This objection cannot be upheld because, by including Q in the regression,
we already control for growth perspectives. Additionally, the results remain robust with
respect to the use of the retention rate, defined as 1 minus the cash dividend, divided
by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), and 0 if the
dividends are larger than EBITDA.
Buybacks are an alternative to return cash. The results above may be subject to the
omitted variable bias: If HF targets tend to prefer buybacks over dividends, it would be
inappropriate to classify HF targets as firms with low cash payouts. However, the results
remain robust if we use a dummy variable for the announcement or the proceeding of
share buybacks in the two years prior to HF entry. Even in terms of buybacks, HF targets
distribute significantly less cash to shareholders.
We do not find any evidence for the hypothesis that HFs aim to invest in firms with the
intention of making them pay out excess cash. The insignificance of cash holdings is still
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Table 1.8: Binomial logistic regression: HF targets versus non-targets
(1) (2)
Variable beta/z-stat beta/z-stat
Family -0.04*** -0.04***
(-2.60) (-2.63)
Management 0.00 0.00
(0.13) (-0.47)
Private benefits (d) -1.27***
(-2.84)
Free float 0.02**
(2.19)
Cash -0.59 -0.16
(-0.31) (-0.09)
Net debt 1.50* 1.62*
(1.84) (1.76)
Tobin’s Q 1.00** 1.04**
(2.27) (2.42)
Research (d) 9.91*** 6.46***
(2.67) (2.80)
Dividend yield -27.32** -28.13**
(-2.41) (-2.07)
Size -0.15 -0.13
(-1.15) (-1.07)
Prior stock performance 0.92 1.18
(1.01) (1.34)
Acquisition rumors (d) 0.82* 0.75*
(1.85) (1.76)
Takeover rumors (d) 2.1*** 1.86***
(3.12) (2.89)
Tax -3.24 -3.47
(-0.55) (-0.61)
Risk -35 -37.04
(0.97) (-1.32)
Intercept 0.63 -0.3
(0.32) (-0.16)
Number of observations 192 192
Chi-squared 76.76*** 68.17***
Pseudo R-squared 0.29 0.26
The table reports the results of the logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is set to 1 for hedge fund
(HF) targets, and 0 for non-targets. Family is defined as the stake held by family members who are neither members
of the executive board nor related to them. Management denotes the stake held by members of the management
board. The private benefits dummy is set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more than 25% and the second-largest
holds less than 5% of shares. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents scaled by sales. Net debt is (short-term debt
+ long-term debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as (market value of equity + book
value of total liabilities)/total assets divided by the equivalent measure of the average of all firms in DAX and MDAX
in the respective year. Research is set to 1 if the firm has research and development expenditures, and 0 otherwise.
Free float is defined as the sum of shareholdings below 5%. Dividend yield is defined as the cash dividend scaled
by the market value of equity. Size is defined as the annual volume of sales. Prior stock performance is defined as
the market-adjusted share price 20 trading days before entry divided by the market-adjusted average share price of
the previous 250 days. Acquisition (takeover) rumors refer to rumors that the firm plans an acquisition (is subject
to takeover speculation). Risk denotes the standard deviation of return over 250 trading days up to 20 days before
entry. Tax denotes tax expenses scaled by total assets. (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy variable. The
data are winsorized at the 3% level. Here, Chi-squared denotes the value for the likelihood chi squared, z denotes
the value for the z-statistics, and *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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maintained when testing for several modified cash proxies, such as cash scaled by market
value, the absolute size of cash, and several interaction terms with growth perspectives.
Accordingly, the prominent case of The Children’s Investment Fund urging Deutsche Börse
to return cash to shareholders does not seem to be representative. Moreover, HF targets
do not seem to be underleveraged; in fact, quite the reverse: HF targets seem to have
slightly more net debt. This finding is only significant at the 10% level. Moreover, Tobin’s
Q significantly and positively affects the likelihood of HF entry. Tobin’s Q being positively
linked to the costs of financial distress suggests that HF targets do not have debt potential.
The positive and significant coefficient of the R&D measure provides further evidence
of HF targets not being likely to have debt capacity under the assumption that R&D
is a proxy for expected costs of financial distress. Overall, the claim that HFs invest
in firms to burden them with additional debt is not supported by the empirical results.
This observation is consistent with the view that HFs do not seek the target’s financial
turnaround. The positive influence of R&D on the odds of becoming an HF target appears
puzzling. Investors with operational expertise have the ability to evaluate the efficiency
of R&D projects. Due to the high technical complexity of the firm’s business, R&D is
acknowledged as a proxy for information asymmetry. Usually R&D projects are unique
and their outcomes highly uncertain, features that make it difficult for market participants
to value the firm (Aboody and Lev (2000)). Chan et al. (2001) find empirical support
for the claim that the market has difficulties in sufficiently appreciating the value of R&D
projects. Investors with operational expertise can invest in undervalued R&D firms and
thereby make other market participants aware of the undervaluation. Furthermore, it can
be argued that investors knowledgeable in R&D could cut inefficient R&D projects and
thereby increase shareholder value. Against the background of HFs not being equipped
with operational expertise, these investment motives are unlikely. However, there exists
an alternative explanation: Free cash flow is highly sensitive to R&D expenditures. HFs
can call for cuts in R&D to increase free cash flow, which can result in higher analyst
valuations. This strategy is also in line with the short investment horizons of HFs. Cuts
in R&D can have adverse effects on shareholder value in the long run. Further empirical
investigations on the consequences of HF investment are required for a more comprehensive
understanding of the role of R&D.
In general, the positive relation between financial distress proxies such as R&D and To-
bin’s Q can be traced to the HF preference for rather risky investments that is due to
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their compensation structure: Higher risk enables them to generate large returns over a
short horizon. Family ownership is inversely related to the likelihood of becoming an HF
target. Empirical evidence in Germany (Andres (2008)) suggests that families are able
to successfully solve agency conflicts. As a consequence, the negative impact of family
ownership on HF investment can be interpreted as support for the incentive alignment
hypothesis.
To test the private benefits hypotheses, we need to empirically disentangle the degree of
ownership concentration and private benefits. In general, these variables should be cor-
related to a certain degree, since the potential for private benefits extraction presupposes
the existence of a dominant shareholder that is positively associated with ownership con-
centration. The size of the second largest shareholder is considered a proxy for shareholder
power and the ability to prevent the largest shareholder from extracting private benefits.
A more comprehensive measure should account for the difference in power between the
largest and second-largest shareholders, and thus reflect an interaction between the two
variables. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) propose the following measure: If the second-largest
shareholder owns less than 5% of shares, this firm is labeled ’unchecked’, meaning that
no other powerful shareholder can reduce the private benefits extraction of the largest
shareholder. The authors suggest that the private benefits potential is even greater if
there exists a controlling shareholder (i.e., a shareholder that owns more than 25%) and
the firm is unchecked. In line with this conjecture, we construct the following dummy
variable: Private benefits is set equal to 1 if there is a controlling shareholder and the
second-largest stake is smaller than 5%. To check for robustness, we additionally include
continuous variables to test for the potential power of the largest shareholder to extract
private rents: We use the ratio of the largest to the second-largest stake, as well as their
difference. According to the empirical results, HFs eschew firms with potential private
benefits issues: The private benefits variable has a negative coefficient, with statistical
significance at the 1% level. This finding is robust with respect to the use of various
alternative proxies and provides clear evidence that HFs do not aim to reduce private
benefits problems. They do not build up a sufficiently large stake to control or outvote
the dominating shareholder.
The involvement of a firm with mergers and acquisitions significantly affects the odds
of becoming an HF target, as suggested by the positive and significant coefficients of the
acquisition and target variables. Speculation in mergers and acquisitions can be profitable:
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Investing in potential acquirers is attractive if HFs successfully conjecture the settlement
or cancellation of the planned acquisition. Investment in potential targets can reflect the
HF’s belief that the takeover bid will be increased. Alternatively, this can be interpreted
as the HFs being active in corporate control and investing in acquirers because they want
to prevent management from a potentially inefficient acquisition, or investing in takeover
targets to make reluctant managers agree to the takeover. Given the present data, it is not
possible to distinguish between the merger arbitrage and the corporate control hypotheses.
The ex post information about the success of the alleged merger is not sufficient to assess
whether HFs are passive merger arbitrageurs or active corporate control agents. For
example, if a target is finally being taken over, we cannot be sure whether this is due to
the HF or not. Concrete information about potential HF interference is difficult to obtain
from publicly available data because much of the influence happens behind the scenes.
This gap could be filled by a survey approach.
Model 2 includes free float. We estimate a separate model when analyzing the role of free
float to avoid multicollinearity, since free float is highly correlated with the private benefits
variable (see Table 1.7). The results indicate that HFs prefer to invest in firms with large
free float, which may be due to higher liquidity and higher marginal control. This finding
is also in line with the assumption that HFs only assume a monitoring function if little
control over the management is in place. We include prior stock performance and size
as control variables. The results do not yield any evidence that HFs invest in firms that
suffer from poor prior stock performance. Under the efficient market hypothesis, a poor
prior stock performance indicates managerial inefficiency. Thus, in terms of prior stock
performance, HFs do not seem to seek the operational turnaround of unprofitable firms.
We do not find any indications of HFs investing in undervalued firms as measured by
poor prior stock performance under relaxation of the efficient market assumption. Size is
generally acknowledged as a proxy for information asymmetry (Frankel and Li (2004)).
Small firms receive less attention in capital markets (e.g., Renneboog et al. (2007)). In
particular, small firms are less interesting investment objects for traditional institutional
investors because of the minimum investment sizes for these investors. As a consequence,
there is little trading activity in the shares of small firms, which decreases the information
content of the share price. Testing size as a proxy for information asymmetry, we cannot
find any evidence that HFs target small firms. The strategy of investment in undervalued
securities due to information asymmetry does not seem to be a representative investment
motive of HFs.
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In a nutshell, the empirical results indicate that HF investments are related to corporate
governance improvements: They seem to aim at reducing agency problems associated
with free cash flow by dividend increases. Furthermore, they appear to align incentives by
investing in firms whose ownership structure does not generate high monitoring incentives.
1.5.2 PE investment motives
Table 1.9 shows the results that compare the characteristics of PE targets and non-targets.
In contrast to other studies (e.g., Opler and Titman (1993)), we do not find that PE
targets are cash rich. The cash variable and the interaction terms of cash and growth (not
reported here) are insignificant. Furthermore, the empirical results do not document that
PE targets are underleveraged. The coefficient of the debt variable fails to be significant.
The coefficient of Tobin’s Q is negative but not statistically significant, which indicates
that PE targets do not have substantially low growth opportunities. However, we do
find alternative support for the hypothesis that targets feature characteristics that make
them attractive for an increase in leverage. As a proxy for expected financial distress costs,
R&D is significantly inversely associated with the odds of PE entry. Previous studies (e.g.,
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990)) document that PEs implement higher operational efficiency.
The superior industry expertise of PEs may allow them to evaluate the efficiency of R&D
projects. According to the empirical findings of Sorensen et al. (2011), PEs increase
the efficiency of patents in non-listed companies; however, the negative sign of the R&D
variable suggests that the motive for cutting R&D expenditures as part of operational
engineering aimed at shareholder value maximization is unlikely. The financial distress
aspect seems to dominate.
The significant and negative coefficient of risk suggests that PE targets in our sample
have stable earnings, which also indicates low financial distress costs and thus makes
them attractive for leverage increases. Overall, we find evidence for the potential of PE
target firms to increase the use of debt financing, which potentially reduces agency costs
associated with free cash flow. Compared to HFs, PEs seem to address free cash flow
problems more fundamentally. Whereas dividend increases can be carried out over a short
horizon, debt restructurings require a longer time horizon and also cannot be quickly
reversed.
Furthermore, the results document support for the hypothesis that PEs create value from
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Table 1.9: Binomial logistic regression: PE targets versus non-targets
(1) (2) (3)
Variable beta/z-stat beta/z-stat beta/z-stat
Family 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.33) (0.33) (-0.08)
Management -0.03** -0.03** -0.03**
(-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.21)
Private benefits (d) -0.06 -0.93*
(-0.15) (-1.94)
Free float 0.00
(-0.50)
Cash -1.34 -1.34 -1.09
(-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.40)
Net debt 0.13 0.13 0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.08)
Tobin’s Q -1.11* -1.12* -1.24*
(1.70) (1.71) (-1.80)
Research (d) -7.79** -7.76** -8.20**
(-2.10) (-2.03) (-1.98)
Dividend yield -6.48 -6.51 -5.02
(-1.31) (-1.32) (-0.91)
Size -0.18 -0.18 -0.16
(-1.51) (-1.52) (-1.24)
Prior stock performance 0.93 0.92 1.06
(0.92) (0.92) (0.93)
Acquisition rumors (d) -1.19 -1.19 -1.06*
(1.14) (1.23) (-1.93)
Takeover rumors (d) -0.02 -0.02 -0.19
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.35)
Tax 4.96 5.38 4.96
(1.11) (1.09) (1.11)
Risk -40.99** -34.85*** -41.30**
(-2.10) (-2.67) (2.13)
Intercept 3.82* 3.80 3.28
(1.81) 0.07 (1.38)
Number of observations 153 153 135
Chi-squared 43.12*** 42.92*** 40.74***
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.15
The table reports the results of the logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is set to 1 for private
equity fund (PE) targets, and 0 for non-targets. Family is defined as the stake held by family members who are
neither members of the executive board nor related to them. Management denotes the stake held by members of
the management board. The private benefits dummy is set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more than 25% and
the second-largest holds less than 5% of shares. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents scaled by sales. Net debt is
(short-term debt + long-term debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. Tobin’s Q is defined as (market value
of equity + book value of total liabilities)/total assets divided by the equivalent measure of the average of all firms in
DAX and MDAX in the respective year. Research is set to 1 if the firm has research and development expenditures,
and 0 otherwise. Free float is defined as the sum of shareholdings below 5%. Dividend yield is defined as the cash
dividend scaled by the market value of equity. Size is defined as the annual volume of sales. Prior stock performance
is defined as the market-adjusted share price 20 trading days before entry, divided by the market-adjusted average
share price of the previous 250 days. Acquisition (takeover) rumors refer to rumors that the firm plans an acquisition
(is subject to takeover speculation). Risk denotes the standard deviation of return over 250 trading days up to 20
days before entry. Tax denotes tax expenses scaled by total assets. (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy
variable. Model 3 refers to a subsample of PE targets and excludes observations where PEs purchase the stake
from the dominating shareholder. The data are winsorized at the 3% level, Chi-squared denotes the value for the
likelihood chi square, and z denotes the value for the z-statistics. Here, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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incentive alignment. PEs invest in firms with low prior managerial equity. Apparently, PEs
aim at aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Managerial incentives can be
aligned by compensation contracts that are strongly linked to firm performance. Changes
in compensation structures are difficult to implement on an ad hoc basis and are therefore
consistent with the longer investment horizon of PEs. Moreover, establishing a more
performance-oriented managerial compensation is likely to require substantial industry
expertise, which is also more likely to be found with PEs.
In robustness checks, we control for a potential non-monotonic relation testing the square
of managerial ownership. Several authors (e.g., Morck et al. (1988)) argue that larger
managerial stakes lead to managerial entrenchment rather than the alignment of interests.
However, the present results do not establish a significant relation between the odds of
becoming a PE target and the square of managerial shareholdings. Further empirical re-
sults of Weir et al. (2005) document additional support for the undervaluation hypothesis:
Targets are significantly younger and smaller and have poor prior stock performance. We
do not find any support for the undervaluation hypothesis in terms of these variables. In
contrast to the findings of Weir et al. (2005), who analyze UK targets, the incentive and
undervaluation effects do not explain PE investment choices in Germany.
The empirical results suggest that PE entry is not driven by private benefits if we use the
unchecked proxy. For the private benefits reduction strategy to be profitable, an investor
has to build a ’counter-stake’ to the dominating and rent-extracting shareholder. The
dominating shareholder that extracts private benefits only tenders its stake to a PE if the
offer price compensates the shareholder for the loss of private benefits. As a consequence,
buying out shareholders that are extracting private benefits is an unprofitable strategy.
Based on information from the BaFin database and financial press, we exclude all cases
in which PEs purchase a stake from the dominating shareholder. Those cases make up
for about one-third of the sample (18 targets). We hypothesize that, if anything, the
reduction of private benefits can only be profitable in those cases. We estimate the logit
regression again, using the reduced sample, which excludes cases where PEs buy from the
dominating shareholder in Model 3. The results show that private benefits are unlikely
to drive PE investments, because the coefficient of the private benefits proxy still fails
to be significant. The explanatory power of this model specification is very limited: The
chi-squared test rejects the hypothesis that all tested variables are jointly insignificant
only at the 10% level.
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We control for various alternative investment motives. Increasing leverage can also be
attractive because of tax benefits. The coefficient is opposite to the hypothesized direction
and insignificant. This finding is replicated when using tax expenses divided by the market
value of equity as an alternative measure. Hence, we do not find any support for PE targets
having high tax liabilities. This finding is in line with the results of Weir et al. (2005)
and Weir et al. (2008), who do not find that high tax liabilities significantly increase the
likelihood of PE investment in the UK. The value drivers of PE activities in Germany seem
to stem from sources other than tax arbitrage. This finding is not necessarily inconsistent
with the results of Achleitner et al. (2011), who find that the market reaction to PE
entries is driven by tax motives: Increased use of a debt tax shield may indeed increase
shareholder wealth, but the tax advantage still does not represent an original investment
motive.
Size and prior stock performance fail to be significantly related to the likelihood of PE
entries. Both variables are related to information asymmetries. Hence, the reduction
of information asymmetries does not seem to motivate PE investments. In sum, PE
strategies are characterized as follows: With stable cash flows and little R&D, PE targets
are particularly well suited for increases in leverage. Moreover, they invest in firms that
are likely to exhibit agency costs due to low managerial equity and, hence, a great degree
of ownership control separation.
1.6 Conclusion
The present paper analyzes HF and PE target characteristics to investigate whether their
investment strategies are driven by corporate governance improvements. Table 1.10 sum-
marizes the main results. In total, the findings indicate that the investment motives of
HFs and PEs are both linked to free cash flow problems and incentive alignment poten-
tial. However, they pursue distinct investment strategies, which can be explained by their
particular business models.
HFs acquire minority stakes in public companies. They are likely to aim at increasing divi-
dends and thereby mitigate free cash flow problems. Moreover, HF investments seem to be
motivated by monitoring deficits, focusing on firms with a lack of controlling shareholders,
in particular a lack of family ownership. In contrast, PEs often acquire controlling stakes
and aim to take the target private, accompanied by an increase in leverage. PE targets
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Table 1.10: Summary of results
Hypothesis Variable Expected sign HF PE
Free cash flow Cash +
Debt –
Dividend yield – –
Tobin’s Q – +
Research – + –
Ownership structure Management ownership – –
Family ownership – –
Free float + +
Private benefits +
This table reports the expectations regarding the empirical tests of the hypotheses and compares them to the
empirical results. Cash denotes cash and cash equivalents scaled by sales. Debt is (short-term debt + long-term
debt – cash and cash equivalents)/total assets. Dividend yield is defined as the cash dividend scaled by the market
value of equity. Tobin’s Q is defined as (market value of equity + book value of total liabilities)/total assets divided
by the equivalent measure of the average of all firms in DAX and MDAX in the respective year. Research and
development is set to 1 if the firm has research and development expenditures, and 0 otherwise. Management
ownership denotes the stake held by members of the management board. Family ownership is defined as the stake
held by family members who are neither members of the executive board nor related to them. Free float is defined
as the sum of shareholdings below 5%. Private benefits is a dummy is set to 1 if the largest shareholder holds more
than 25% and the second largest holds less than 5% of the shares.
are well suited for leverage increases because they are likely to have low expected financial
distress costs. They also appear to draw value from incentive alignments by targeting
firms with low managerial shareholdings. Neither HFs nor PEs seem to be motivated by
the reduction of private benefits.
In summary, our findings indicate that HFs implement measures that mitigate agency
problems and hence create wealth in the short run; PEs mitigate agency problems and
hence create wealth in the long run. These findings are consistent with the organizational
set-ups of HFs and PEs, which imply joint incentives to improve corporate governance,
but differences in the time horizons and depth of changes that can be implemented. The
findings that HF and PE activities are driven by corporate governance improvements
suggest a positive role from a welfare perspective. However, in the following respects, HFs
and PEs may be detrimental to long-term welfare: HF strategies aim to create shareholder
value in the short run which can come at the expense of long-run shareholder value if one
assumes that markets are not efficient. Increasing leverage seems to be an important
driver of the PE investment decision. The potential wealth transfer from stakeholders,
particularly debtholders and employees, seems to be the most likely problem with respect
to PEs. A more comprehensive assessment therefore necessitates an analysis of the long-
term consequences.
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Chapter 2
Idiosyncratic Volatility and the
Timing of Corporate Insider
Trading
2.1 Introduction
This paper tests the hypothesis that corporate insiders time their trades to exploit short-
term information advantages over uninformed market participants using data on 646,411
U.S. insider transactions reported to the SEC between 1986 and 2009. This study is, to
the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate the timing of corporate insider trading
with respect to a market data based measure of time-varying information asymmetry.
Knowledge about the way insiders time their trades can help to better understand their
trading motives and shed light on the welfare implications of insider trading.
Corporate insiders, i.e., executive directors, board members or large shareholders, are
likely to possess superior information about the true value of their firm compared to
outside investors. They are involved in decision making processes that affect the value
of the firm such as investment or merger decisions, and they receive notice about major
events in advance of official public announcements. Several empirical studies (e.g., Seyhun
(1986), Chang and Suk (1998) or Jeng et al. (2003)) document that corporate insiders
are able to generate significant abnormal returns from trading. This evidence indicates
that they use their advantage for profitable trading strategies. Moreover, it is likely that
the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors and consequently
the information advantage of insiders varies over time. The question then arises whether
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corporate insiders time their transactions in such a way that they exploit high peaks of
information asymmetry.
The welfare implications of corporate insider trading are ambiguous. On the one hand it
is argued that insider trading leads to more informative prices. The model by Kyle (1985),
for instance, presents a situation in which market makers adjust prices according to the
combined order flow of insiders and uninformed noise traders. On the other hand insider
trading may prevent outsiders from trading in the stock because it imposes adverse selec-
tion costs (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991)). The question is whether corporate
insiders trade on the foreknowledge of announcements or whether their transactions make
prices more informative because their trading is based on information that would otherwise
not be reflected in prices. If insiders trade on a short-term information advantage, then
the positive welfare effects may be only small and the negative welfare effects are likely
to dominate as the information will be incorporated into prices soon anyways. This idea
is also brought forward by Hirshleifer (1971). He distinguishes two types of information:
foreknowledge and discovery. While foreknowledge will be revealed to all in due time,
discovery is the ’correct recognition of something that possibly already exists, through
hidden from view’ (p. 562) and will not be entirely revealed in due time. Hirshleifer
argues that the protection of foreknowledge - the equivalent in our case would be trading
on foreknowledge - does not have any social value. On this account, our analysis con-
tributes to the evaluation of the welfare implications of corporate insider trading because
it addresses the question of whether corporate insiders trade on short-term information.
The paper adds to the literature on corporate insider trading and presents the first study
to analyze the likelihood of corporate insider trading. Further, its main innovation is to use
a time-variant proxy for asymmetric information and link it to insider trading. This proxy
allows for addressing the question of whether corporate insiders time their transactions
according to variations in asymmetric information.
We use idiosyncratic volatility relative to a firm’s recent mean (henceforth relivol) as a
proxy for asymmetric information. Under the assumption that variations in our measure of
information asymmetry over time are due to changes in short-term information asymmetry,
we analyze whether corporate insiders exploit their temporary informational advantage.
To do so, we link up the likelihood of observing an insider transaction in a given stock
with relivol.
36
Our main goal is to test the hypothesis whether the prevalence of a short-term information
advantage drives the trading decision of a corporate insider. If we were to design an
ideal experiment, we would exogenously shock the information set of an insider and leave
the information set of other market participants constant. That shock would create an
information advantage of insiders over outsiders. Since such an experiment is difficult to
conduct in the real world, we need a proxy to identify the points in time when there is a
wedge between the knowledge of insiders and the knowledge of market participants.
The main approach that has been taken so far is to use corporate announcements as a
proxy. Studies following this approach investigate whether insiders use the foreknowledge
of corporate announcements that are empirically found to have a significant price impact,
such as dividend announcements, corporate bankruptcy, seasoned equity offerings, stock
repurchases, and takeover bids (e.g., Elliott et al. (1984), Noe (1999), Ke et al. (2003),
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005)). These studies share the assumption that insiders have
foreknowledge of these events or announcements, and upon announcement this private
information advantage vanishes as it is turned into public information. If insiders traded
on early access to corporate news, one would observe insider buying activity before good
news and insider selling activity before bad news. The extant empirical literature does not
arrive at a conclusive result of whether corporate insiders exploit short-term information
or not.
The existing approach to use corporate announcements suffers from several shortcomings,
which may serve as a potential explanation for the inconclusiveness of the results. First,
this approach necessitates an ex-ante selection of corporate news types. It is difficult to
produce an exhaustive list of corporate news types. There may be types of temporary
information advantages of insiders not covered by the events which have been considered
so far. To be able to infer the absence of timing, one would have to collect information
about every announcement the firm makes or at least obtain an unbiased representative
selection of all those announcements. Second, with the exception of earnings and divi-
dend announcements for which analysts’ estimates may exist, it is in general difficult to
measure the surprise component of corporate announcements. It is, hence, difficult to
distinguish informative announcements from uninformative ones, i.e., those which reduce
the wedge between insider and outsider information and those that do not. Third, the
risk of litigation and adverse publicity is likely to be higher shortly prior to such dis-
closure types because the prevalence of such events is easily verifiable. This is likely to
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prevent corporate insiders from blatantly exploiting this kind of information. Many firms
even have self-imposed compliance guidelines which prevent insiders from trading before
such events. Using relivol as a more direct measure of time-variant information asymme-
try, we propose an alternative approach which does not suffer from these shortcomings.
Idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of asymmetric information is motivated by the idea
that informed traders act when significant private information exists and that trading on
private information causes stock price movements to deviate from those predicted by the
assumed return generating process.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one other paper that links up corporate in-
sider trading and idiosyncratic volatility. Ben-David and Roulstone (2009) analyze the
effect of idiosyncratic volatility on the profitability of corporate transactions, i.e., insider
purchases, insider sales, repurchases and seasoned equity offerings. They find that insider
profits are positively linked to idiosyncratic volatility. They investigate the cause of this
empirical relationship further and argue that the higher trading gains rather stem from
mispricing and weak arbitrage forces than from private information. Ben-David and Roul-
stone recognize that the distinction between mispricing and private information is weak
as private information makes it more likely to detect mispricing.
Our paper differs from the one by Ben-David and Roulstone in the following respects:
First, we analyze the effect of idiosyncratic volatility on the likelihood of insider trading,
in an attempt to learn about the motives of insider trading, whereas Ben-David and
Roulstone (2009) only analyze the profitability of insider trades. Second, the concept
of our measure is different from the one by Ben-David and Roulstone, which is why we
capture a different effect. They use a long-term measure of idiosyncratic volatility which
is calculated from 60 to 12 months before the trade, whereas we use a short-term measure
of idiosyncratic volatility that is based on the period between 21 days to 1 day prior to
the insider trade. Most importantly, while we look at within-firm variation, they look at
a cross-section of firms. Our variable is a relative measure of idiosyncratic volatility, as
opposed to the overall level. Thereby, Ben-David and Roulstone address an alternative
research question, namely: Is insider trading more profitable with respect to firms with
large overall information asymmetries? Our main focus lies on shedding light on the
trading decision of an insider. In contrast to Ben-David and Roulstone, we raise the
question of whether insiders exploit high peaks of asymmetric information. The insider
has hardly any control over the overall level of idiosyncratic volatility. However, an insider
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- up to a certain extent - has control over when to trade. As an auxiliary analysis, we
test whether insiders that time transactions are rewarded with higher trading profits.
Our analysis is therefore to be viewed as complementary to the one by Ben-David and
Roulstone (2009).
A potential objection regarding to our approach is the allegation that we jointly test two
hypotheses: (1) Insiders time their trades to exploit peaks of asymmetric information and
(2) relivol is an appropriate measure for short-term variations in asymmetric information.
We address these concerns using appropriate controls, or robustness checks respectively.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the empirical findings suggest that corporate insiders try
to exploit short-term informational advantages. They tend to buy stocks more frequently
when relivol is high, i.e., at times during which it can be expected that private information
is impounded into stock prices. The effect of relivol on the likelihood of insider trading
is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in relivol increases
the probability of insider trading by 2.9%. The effect of relivol on purchases is robust to
controlling for endogeneity and cannot be explained by trading on market uncertainty or
contrarian trading.
We do not find robust evidence that corporate insiders time their sales. In our basic
specification we find a slightly negative impact, but once we control for previous transac-
tions, the effect becomes slightly positive (0.3%). This may be because sales are in general
less likely to be driven by information, since sales are also motivated by other reasons
than profit seeking, e.g., diversification or liquidation needs. Furthermore, there may be
a trade-off between trading profits on the one hand and concerns about litigation and
reputation risks. These risks are likely to be asymmetrically higher with respect to insider
sales (see Jargolinzer and Roulstone (2009)).
Our findings also lend support to the notion that timing is profitable for insiders. We find
that insiders can increase their trading profits for purchases substantially with timing. A
one standard deviation increase in relivol increases the abnormal returns over a period
of 6 months by 2.1%. We do not find any significant effect of timing on sales. The effect
of relivol on profits remains robust when we control for alternative explanations, or use
alternative model specifications. We also show that the effect cannot be explained by the
notion that relivol is a priced risk factor.
The paper is structured as follows: The hypotheses tested in the paper are summarized in
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Section 2. Section 3 introduces relivol as a proxy of asymmetric information. Section 4
describes the data. Section 5 presents the results of the logit regression where we analyze
the effects of relivol on the likelihood of insider trading. Section 6 deals with the analysis
of the relationship of profitability and relivol. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses
In the present study, we aim at investigating the factors that drive the trading decision of
an insider. We assume that because insiders are better informed about the true value of
the firm, they can also observe the asymmetry between the information of outsiders and
insiders. During such periods, there is a wedge between the market price of the stock and
the true value of the stock conditional on the insiders’ superior information set. This is
because the private information of the insider has not yet been incorporated into market
prices. Relative to the potentially publicly available information set which includes the
private information, the stock is mispriced. Exploiting such mispricing by buying stock if
market prices are too low or selling stock if market prices are too high, can be profitable
for the insider. We therefore hypothesize that insiders time their trades during periods of
high asymmetric information, i.e.,
H1: The likelihood of insider trading is higher if the degree of asymmetric information is
high.
We further claim:
H2: The effect of asymmetric information on the likelihood of insider trading is stronger
for purchases than for sales.
Sales are less likely to be information-driven as compared to purchases. First, there are
alternative trading motives for sales which do not apply to purchases (see, e.g., Lakonishok
and Lee (2001), Friederich et al. (2002) or Fidrmuc et al. (2006)). Corporate insiders
often have considerable stakes in the firm, often receive stock-based compensation and, if
they are employed by the firm as an executive, they have human capital invested in the
firm. Against the background of their high exposure to the firm’s share price, corporate
insiders are likely to sell shares for diversification purposes. Further, liquidity (e.g., when
considering to buying a house) is another typical trading motive when selling shares.
Second, as argued by Jargolinzer and Roulstone (2009) litigation risks are higher for sales
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than for purchases.
As mentioned above, we hypothesize that insiders who time their trades, i.e., they execute
transactions when information asymmetry is high, generate significantly larger trading
profits.
H3: Insider trading profits are higher if the trade occurs when information asymmetry is
high.
2.3 Idiosyncratic volatility
2.3.1 Computation
Our measure of idiosyncratic stock returns volatility is defined as the standard deviation of
residual returns unexplained by return models. We compute idiosyncratic volatility with
respect to the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart (1997)). The Carhart four-factor model
is the Fama-French three-factor model augmented by the momentum factor. Accordingly,
the four-factor model assumes that returns are determined by sensitivities with respect to
the following risk factors: market factor, size factor, market-to-book factor and momentum
factor. The firms’ coefficients are estimated using rolling five year windows of monthly
returns. As usual in the literature, we require at least 24 return observations within the
past five years.
There is a trade-off which we have to take into account when choosing the estimation
window for relivol. We seek to measure short-term variations in asymmetric information
and would like to measure the degree of asymmetric information just before an insider trade
occurs, which suggests to use a very short estimation window. However, short estimation
windows are subject to larger estimation errors. Our idiosyncratic volatility measure is
estimated over a period of the last 21 trading days, i.e., the idiosyncratic volatility used
to estimate the probability and profitability of trades on day t is based on data from days
t − 21, . . . , t − 1. While such a short window renders the estimates inexact, these errors
can be expected to even out over our whole sample of insider transactions. We consider
this choice an appropriate compromise.
We compute a measure of relative idiosyncratic volatility, i.e., the ratio of a firm’s idio-
syncratic volatility at a point in time to its mean idiosyncratic volatility during the prior
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calendar year. This serves the analysis of the effect of short-term asymmetric information
as it corresponds to the abnormal idiosyncratic volatility in a firm’s stock. Our main focus
is not the question of whether insider trading is more likely in firms with high idiosyncra-
tic volatility but whether insider trading is more likely when idiosyncratic volatility for a
given firm peaks.
2.3.2 Interpretation
We use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for information asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders. The measure is based on the argument that a predominance of noise
trading, resulting from high information costs, induces volatility. Kelly (2007) shows
that low return synchronicity reflects a poor information environment and is related to
high information asymmetry. Bartram et al. (2012) find a negative relation between
idiosyncratic risk and the quality of corporate disclosure. Relatedly, Jiang et al. (2009)
find evidence concerning a relation between idiosyncratic volatility and selective disclosure.
Furthermore, there is evidence that opaque (Hutton et al. (2009)), poorly governed firms
(Khanna and Thomas (2009)) feature high levels of idiosyncratic volatility. These studies
all analyze cross-sections of stocks or markets whereas we look at short-term variation in
idiosyncratic volatility.
Our key assumption is that variation in idiosyncratic volatility captures variation in infor-
mation asymmetry over time. We argue that private information activities are positively
associated with the level of information asymmetry between informed and uninformed
traders. When informed traders with the lowest information cost begin to trade against
noise traders, volatility is increased. This relationship is corroborated by theoretical mod-
els (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)) and empirical evidence (French and Roll (1986)). Trad-
ing on private information is likely to take place with respect to information about an
individual firm rather than general market information, which is typically publicly avail-
able. As a consequence, informed trading is expected to affect the idiosyncratic part of
volatility which has to be distinguished from market volatility.
Further, Berrada and Hugonnier (2011) theoretically analyze the relationship between
incomplete information and idiosyncratic volatility. They find that incomplete information
is positively related to idiosyncratic volatility. Using analyst forecasts as a proxy, they find
empirical support for their prediction. Dasgupta et al. (2010) give theoretical and empirical
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evidence that price informativeness decreases with idiosyncratic volatility. Arena et al.
(2008) arrive at the same conclusion when considering the relation between idiosyncratic
volatility and momentum profits.
Our paper follows several existing studies which use idiosyncratic volatility as a measure
of asymmetric information. Dierkens (1991) analyzes the relevance of asymmetric infor-
mation for the issuance of new equity. She finds that idiosyncratic volatility is high before
new equity issues and drops after the equity issue is announced. Her results are consistent
with the notion that managers time equity issues in order to exploit asymmetric infor-
mation. Ferreira and Laux (2007) use idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of stock price
informativeness which they relate to corporate governance. Krishnaswami and Subrama-
niam (1999) test the hypothesis that corporate spin-offs reduce asymmetric information,
using idiosyncratic volatility as a measure among other proxies such as the precision or
the diversion of analyst forecast errors. They find that idiosyncratic volatility is posi-
tively related to the likelihood of a spin-off and that idiosyncratic volatility drops after
the spin-off.
There is also empirical evidence pointing towards an inverse relationship between idiosyn-
cratic volatility and asymmetric information. In an international study Kim and Shi (2010)
find that the adoption of IFRS by a firm is related to a greater degree of idiosyncratic
volatility. However, this effect prevails in countries with poor institutional infrastructures.
These opposite findings may be reconciled by the argument of Gao and Liang (2011) that
’by making private information public, disclosure reduces private information acquisition
and levels the playing field’. This implies that in a situation of high opaqueness, e.g., in
countries with poor institution and lax regulations, an increase in disclosure quality may
increase information acquisition by enabling it in the first place and thereby increasing
idiosyncratic volatility. This would explain why some studies find an opposite relation
between asymmetric information and idiosyncratic volatility. In the present paper we an-
alyze data from the U.S., a highly regulated, liquid and rather transparent market. As
the studies cited above suggest, in such a market asymmetric information is likely to be
positively linked to asymmetric information.
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2.4 Data
2.4.1 Dataset construction
Our analysis is based on a sample of U.S. corporate insider trades from the Thomson
Financial (TFN) insider trading database. The database includes trades by corporate
insiders which Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act requires them to file via Form
4. Our sample starts in 1986, as from that year on details on insider transactions begin
to be reported in the TFN database, and extends up to 2009. The database includes the
trading date, the reporting date, the firm, the position of the insider within the firm, the
number of shares traded, the transaction price and the direction of the trade (purchase or
sale). We avoid double counting due to several insiders trading on the same day, by only
counting one trade per day and per firm. When there were both purchases and sales on
the same day, we classify the trade as a purchase (sale), when the net amount of shares
bought is positive (negative).
Daily stock returns are from CRSP. For the return models we use the monthly Fama-French
factors, momentum and the riskfree rate from Kenneth French’s data library. Based on
the stock returns and the factors, we compute idiosyncratic volatility for each firm and day
in our sample. We use annual accounting information from the firms’ balance sheets and
profit and loss statements as well as earnings announcement dates from COMPUSTAT.
Information on the number of analysts following a firm is taken from IBES. While the other
firm characteristics are used as control variables in our empirical analyses, we compute
book equity in order to remove stocks with a negative one, as it is frequently done in
the literature. Also, we remove financial companies, because of their usually atypical
firm characteristics compared to other firms, and regulated utilities, whose informational
environment is likely to be different from that of other firms.
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
We merge the data and obtain a sample of 646,411 insider transactions, 185,613 of which
are purchases and 460,798 sales. The distribution of purchases and sales over years are
tabulated in Table 2.1. Our independent variables in the following analysis regarding the
likelihood of insider trading, that is relivol, stock or market characteristics vary at a daily
or quarterly frequency, where available. Firm characteristics are on an annual basis. Our
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sample covers 6,975 firms.
We construct two samples: a likelihood sample and a profit sample. The likelihood sample
consists of daily firm observations. We define a dummy variable purchase (sale) which is
set to 1 if there was a purchase (sale) by a corporate insider in the respective stock on the
given day and to 0 otherwise. In total our likelihood sample consists of over 16.7 million
firm days. Insider purchases occur on 0.7% of all trading days and insider sales on 2.1% of
all trading days. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics of the independent variables for the
firm day observations with purchases, sales, no trades and the entire firm-day sample.1
Our second sample, the profit sample, consists of all insider trades or purchases and the
respective independent variables (stock, market, or firm characteristics) at the given date.
Table 2.1: Distribution of insider transactions over years
Year Purchases % of all purch. Sales % of all sales Total in % of all trades
1986 1,701 0.92% 3,887 0.84% 5,588 0.86%
1987 8,227 4.43% 10,398 2.26% 18,625 2.88%
1988 5,845 3.15% 8,667 1.88% 14,512 2.25%
1989 5,544 2.99% 10,018 2.17% 15,562 2.41%
1990 8,432 4.54% 8,805 1.91% 17,237 2.67%
1991 5,024 2.71% 15,366 3.33% 20,390 3.15%
1992 4,777 2.57% 16,068 3.49% 20,845 3.22%
1993 5,209 2.81% 16,440 3.57% 21,649 3.35%
1994 6,826 3.68% 14,081 3.06% 20,907 3.23%
1995 6,761 3.64% 18,436 4.00% 25,197 3.90%
1996 8,213 4.42% 21,003 4.56% 29,216 4.52%
1997 8,872 4.78% 21,576 4.68% 30,448 4.71%
1998 14,160 7.63% 18,402 3.99% 32,562 5.04%
1999 13,942 7.51% 18,195 3.95% 32,137 4.97%
2000 12,455 6.71% 22,548 4.89% 35,003 5.41%
2001 9,416 5.07% 24,282 5.27% 33,698 5.21%
2002 10,091 5.44% 24,382 5.29% 34,473 5.33%
2003 6,073 3.27% 29,987 6.51% 36,060 5.58%
2004 5,905 3.18% 34,335 7.45% 40,240 6.23%
2005 6,460 3.48% 30,544 6.63% 37,004 5.72%
2006 5,957 3.21% 28,834 6.26% 34,791 5.38%
2007 6,642 3.58% 27,911 6.06% 34,553 5.35%
2008 11,856 6.39% 17,750 3.85% 29,606 4.58%
2009 7,225 3.89% 18,883 4.10% 26,108 4.04%
Total 185,613 100.00% 460,798 100.00% 646,411 100.00%
This table shows the distribution of insider purchases or sales over years between 1986 and 2009. It only includes
the transactions for which data in CRSP or COMPUSTAT were available.
1For the mean value of relivol for all days we expect a value close to 1. The actual mean is 1.027 and
therefore slightly larger than 1. However, according to a simple t-test, this difference (0.027) fails to
be statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics for firm-day observations
Indicator Variable Mean Median Std. dev. 5% quantile 95% quantile
Purchases relivol 1.165 1.038 0.542 0.532 2.313
bhar+ 0.053 0 0.114 0 0.290
bhar− -0.084 -0.036 0.110 -0.334 0.000
volatility index 24.190 22.790 9.831 11.720 46.53
analystfollowing 5.216 2.833 6.022 1 18.667
bookleverage 0.322 0.302 0.260 0 0.794
returnonequity -0.260 0.051 1.190 -1.604 0.286
market capitalization 1,055.703 102.620 3,618.677 6.594 4,407.974
q 1.887 1.358 1.604 0.776 4.837
blackout (d) 0.482 0 0.500 0 1
Sales relivol 1.014 0.933 0.419 0.512 1.798
bhar+ 0.075 0.025 0.118 0.000 0.315
bhar− -0.035 0 0.068 -0.178 0.000
volatility index 20.062 19.150 7.442 11 33.32
analystfollowing 9.194 6.833 7.720 1 26.583
bookleverage 0.250 0.204 0.242 0 0.715
returnonequity -0.064 0.103 0.846 -0.784 0.322
market capitalization 2,534.584 471.363 5,593.147 18.527 16,180.050
q 2.497 1.821 1.978 0.920 6.732
blackout (d) 0.468 0 0.499 0 1
No trade relivol 1.027 0.931 0.468 0.471 1.927
bhar+ 0.056 0 0.110 0 0.280
bhar− -0.057 -0.008 0.088 -0.248 0
volatility index 21.322 20.230 8.055 11.370 36.900
analystfollowing 5.361 2.667 6.254 1 19.500
bookleverage 0.302 0.271 0.257 0.000 0.787
returnonequity -0.237 0.062 1.123 -1.627 0.287
market capitalization 1,052.564 94.436 3508.155 3.681 4,612.091
q 1.948 1.384 1.678 0.764 5.172
blackout (d) 0.704 1 0.456 0 1
All relivol 1.027 0.932 0.468 0.472 1.927
bhar+ 0.057 0 0.111 0 0.281
bhar− -0.056 -0.008 0.088 -0.248 0.000
volatility index 21.316 20.230 8.063 11.360 36.900
analystfollowing 5.430 2.667 6.303 1 19.667
bookleverage 0.301 0.270 0.257 0 0.786
returnonequity -0.234 0.063 1.120 -1.614 0.288
market capitalization 1,079.754 97.374 3,563.639 3.751 4,774.901
q 1.958 1.390 1.685 0.766 5.203
blackout (d) 0.698 1 0.459 0 1
This table shows the summary statistics of our main independent variables for the firm days with purchases, sales
and no trades. Relivol is the stock price’s idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior
calendar year’s mean. Bhar+ (bhar−) is the stock’s BHAR over the 21 trading days prior to the insider trade for
a positive (negative) value of this variable. V olatility index is the S&P Volatility Index. Bookleverage is the book
value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing
indicates the number of analysts following the firm. Market capitalization is market value of equity. Q denotes
Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income scaled by the book value of equity.
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2.5 Relivol and the likelihood of insider trading
2.5.1 Empirical strategy
The objective of the following analysis is to link up the likelihood of observing an insider
trade with relative idiosyncratic volatility. We estimate logistic regressions with firm- and
year-fixed effects where the dependent variable is a binary variable that is set to 1 if there
was an insider trade (purchase or sale respectively) and to 0 if there was no such trade on
the respective day. We estimate the following model:
(2.5.1)ln( pi,t1− pi,t ) = constant+ ci + yt + β0 · relivoli,t + β1 ·Xi,t,
where pi,t is the probability of an insider trade in the stock of firm i on day t. ci is a firm
constant, yt is a year constant. X stands for the vector of firm- and time-specific control
variables. We include several control variables in the analysis that account for firm and
time specific characteristics, which are also likely to affect the likelihood of insider trading.
We thereby control for the overall level of private information activities in a firm’s stock,
since our goal is to capture the effect of the deviation of idiosyncratic volatility from its
permanent level.
We also include the S&P Volatility Index VXO as a measure of market-wide volatility
(volatility index). The measure is calculated using 30-day S&P 100 index at-the-money
options.2 Hereby, we control for the possible objection that idiosyncratic volatility simply
reflects changes in the level of overall volatility. Further, we control for the buy and
hold abnormal returns over the last 21 trading days to ensure that an apparent effect
of idiosyncratic volatility does not merely reflect trading as a response to past abnormal
returns. We separate these into positive and negative returns in order to account for
possible asymmetric effects on insiders’ decision making (bhar+ and bhar−).
Quarterly earnings announcements represent a channel through which information about
firm value is communicated to investors. On this account, many U.S. firms have self-
imposed insider trading restrictions in place, according to which most of them allow insider
trading only in the 30 days following the quarterly earnings announcement and prohibit
2VIX measures the implied volatility based on the S&P 500. We choose VXO over VIX, because VIX is
only available from 1990 and, hence, not available for the entire sample.
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trading in the 60 days preceding the next earnings announcement which represents the
so called ’blackout period’ (see Bettis et al. (2000) or Roulstone (2003)). This restriction
aims at preventing corporate insiders from exploiting asymmetric information that will
be reduced by the following earnings announcement. When such trading restrictions are
in place and enforced, insider trading is certainly more likely to occur outside blackout
periods. We therefore control for blackout periods. We assume that firms have a blackout
period in place that restricts insider trading such that it is allowed to trade only during
the 30 days following an earnings announcement. The dummy variable blackout is 0 for
the 30 days following the earnings announcement and 1 for the remaining days.
We include size in terms of the natural logarithm of market capitalization (size) and the
natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering the firm plus one (analystfollowing)
as control variables that proxy for the firms’ permanent information asymmetry between
insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, we include bookleverage defined as the book value
of debt divided by the value of total assets, returnonequity defined as net profit divided
by the book value of equity and Tobin’s Q (q) proxied by the sum of the market value of
equity and the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of equity and the
book value of debt.
2.5.2 The impact of relivol on the likelihood of insider trading
Table 2.3 reports the result for our basic model specification. We find that the likelihood
of an insider purchase is significantly positively related to relivol. The effect is economi-
cally significant: A one standard deviation increase in relivol increases the probability of
observing an insider purchase by 2.9%. Apparently, insiders purchase stock during times
where asymmetric information is relatively high. The likelihood of an insider purchase
is inversely related to prior abnormal returns. Corporate insiders seem to buy after the
stock has performed poorly. We confirm that purchases are less likely to occur during
alleged blackout periods. Further, insiders seem to time their trades during periods of
high market volatility.
The results with respect to sales do not confirm the timing hypothesis. The likelihood
of observing an insider sale is significantly inversely related to relivol. A one standard
deviation decrease in relivol increases the probability of observing an insider sale by
0.8%. Apparently, insiders time their sales during times of low asymmetric information.
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This finding is consistent with the existing evidence that sales are less informative than
purchases. First, sales are also motivated by non-information driven purposes such as
liquidity needs or diversification. Corporate insiders may save on transaction costs if
they trade during periods of low asymmetric information. Second, corporate insiders
may choose to time their sales during periods of low asymmetric information because of
litigation risks which are assumed to be higher with respect to sales. Empirically, the two
alternative explanations for the inverse relationship - alternative trading motives or high
litigation risk - cannot be disentangled. Further, we find that sales are more likely to occur
after abnormal performance as suggested by the positive coefficient for the prior abnormal
returns. Insider sales are also less likely to occur during blackout periods. Insiders are
more inclined to sell their shares during periods of low market-wide volatility.
2.5.3 Controlling for endogeneity
We recognize the potential existence of an endogeneity problem. There is empirical ev-
idence that trading occurs in clusters, i.e., insiders transact multiple times during short
time horizons (see, e.g., Lebedeva et al. (2009)). If insider trading affects idiosyncratic
volatility and insider trading occurs in clusters, a significant relationship between insider
trading and idiosyncratic volatility may simply reflect the effects of insider trading on
idiosyncratic volatility.
Hence, when we observe a positive empirical relationship between relivol and insider trad-
ing, timing may not be the original cause. We use two approaches in order to address
this concern. First, for each stock considered we eliminate all trades from the sample that
occur in the 21 trading days subsequent to a trade from our sample. This serves to demon-
strate that the possible objection that our results might be driven by the contamination
of relivol with past trades executed during the estimation period is not valid. Second, we
directly control for previous trades and their impact on the relationship between relivol
and the likelihood of a trade.
Models (1) and (2) in Table 2.4 report the results with respect to this subsample. For
both purchases and sales, our previous results remain robust in this subsample. A one
standard deviation increase in relivol increases the probability of an insider purchase by
2.7%, while a one standard deviation decrease increases the probability of an insider sale
by 0.4%. The findings suggest that the relationship between relivol and the likelihood
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Table 2.3: Relivol and the likelihood of insider trading
(1) (2)
Purchases Sales
beta/z beta/z
Relivol 0.029*** -0.007***
(43.52 ) (-10.55)
Bhar+ -0.006*** 0.037***
(-7.43) (50.91)
Bhar− -0.050*** 0.048***
(-67.51) (47.31)
Blackout (d) -0.209*** -0.216***
(-109.86) (-95.92)
Volatility index 0.054*** -0.069***
(83.63) (-56.79)
Analystfollowing -0.017*** 0.069***
(-9.39) (38.69)
Bookleverage 0.002* -0.009***
(1.71) (-7.35)
Size 0.010*** 0.025***
(4.23) (10.36)
Q -0.012*** 0.035***
(-8.46) (31.82)
Return on equity -0.006*** 0.013***
(-5.86) (10.01)
Obs 16,687,810 6,562,588
LR chi-squared 60,237.76 62314.97
Prob > chi-squared 0.00 0.00
Log-Likelihood -721,767.58 -649,675.87
This table shows the results of the logistic regression of the dependent variable insider trading which is set to 1
if there was an insider trade on a given day, and to 0 otherwise. For Model (2) we employ random sampling with
40% of the observations, where each observation has an equal probability to be included in the regression. The
regressions include year and firm fixed effects. The table reports beta coefficients and z-statistics in parentheses. *,
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s
idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean. Bhar+ (bhar−) is
the stock’s BHAR over the 21 trading days prior to the insider trade for a positive (negative) value of this variable.
V olatility index is the S&P Volatility Index. Bookleverage is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the
market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing indicates the natural logarithm of (number
of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Q denotes Tobin’s q.
Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income scaled by the book value of equity. All independent variables except
for dummy variables are standardized such that the beta coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable
for a one standard deviation change of the independent variable.
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of insider trading is not driven by a potential effect of previous insider transactions on
relivol.
We now control for changes in relative idiosyncratic volatility which stem from the effects
of previous trades on idiosyncratic volatility. To this end, we include an interaction term
between a dummy for previous trades and relative idiosyncratic volatility. We also include
a dummy for the occurrence of previous trades in the ivol estimation window. This aims
at controlling for the fact that insider trades are often split across several days such that
days with insider trading cluster. Also, insider trades may increase idiosyncratic volatility
and the interaction term serves to ensure that any effects of idiosyncratic volatility on the
probability of insider trading do not merely reflect the clustering of trades. We estimate
the following regression:
ln( pi,t1− pi,t ) = constant+ ci + yt + β0 · relivoli,t + β1 · past purchasesi,t + β2 · past salesi,t
+ β3 · relivoli,t · past purchasesi,t + β4 · relivoli,t · past salesi,t + β5 ·Xi,t,
(2.5.2)
where pi,t is the probability of an insider trade in the stock of firm i on day t. ci is a
firm constant, yt is a year constant, past purchases (past sales) is a dummy variable set
to 1 if there was an insider purchase (sale) in the estimation window of relivol, and to
0 otherwise. X stands for the vector of firm- and time-specific control variables. The
coefficients β3 and β4 capture the extent to which the observed relationship between the
likelihood of insider trading and relivol may be due to clustering and reverse causality.
If insider transactions cluster, we expect that the coefficient of the dummy variable
past purchases is positive. If the endogeneity concern holds, i.e., the positive impact
of relivol is due to the effect of clustering and previous transactions driving up relivol we
expect the following result: The interaction term past purchases ∗ relivol is positive and
significant, while the coefficient of relivol becomes insignificant.
The Models (3) and (4) in the Table 2.4 show the results. We find evidence which supports
the clustering hypothesis. If there were insider purchases in the previous 21 days, it is
more likely that we observe another insider purchase in the same stock. If we observe a
sale before, it is less likely that we observe an insider purchase. However, we do not find
any evidence that the relationship of relivol on the likelihood of insider trading is driven
by the impact of previous purchases on relivol. The coefficient of the interaction term
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Table 2.4: Relivol and the likelihood of insider trading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No overlaps Entire sample
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
beta/z beta/z beta/z beta/z
Relivol 0.027*** -0.004*** 0.027*** 0.003**
(26.09) (-4.39) (26.81) (1.97)
Past purchases (d) 0.502*** -0.032***
(214.95) (-4.44)
Past sales (d) -0.028*** 0.520***
(-13.14) (-4.74)
Past purchases*relivol -0.026*** -0.011***
(-20.23) (-12.74)
Past sales*relivol 0.004* -0.007***
(1.91) (163.70)
Bhar+ -0.017*** 0.041*** -0.007*** 0.031***
(-12.30) (45.21) (-8.22) (41.20)
Bhar− -0.060*** 0.056*** -0.048*** 0.036***
(-54.54) (44.17) (-65.63) (35.68)
Blackout (d) -0.242*** -0.304*** -0.198*** -0.219***
(-99.64) (-154.60) (-121.95) (-118.67)
Volatility index 0.049*** -0.055*** 0.046*** -0.047***
(53.35) (-40.26) (70.67) (-39.98)
Analystfollowing 0.006*** 0.086 -0.015*** 0.033***
(2.08) (37.19) (-8.05) (17.29)
Bookleverage 0.003 -0.008*** >0.001 -0.006***
(1.52) (-5.05) (0.18) (-4.28)
Size 0.015*** 0.031*** 0.001 0.014***
(3.95) (9.36) (0.53) (5.09)
Q -0.013*** 0.032*** -0.007*** 0.023***
(-5.88) (19.99) (-4.73) (19.49)
Return on equity -0.001 0.013*** -0.004*** 0.007***
(-0.83) (7.41) (-3.66) (5.06)
Obs 15,043,225 13,733,921 16,687,810 6,562,588
LR chi-squared 27685.84 51826.36 176838.93 197255.53
Prob > chi-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log-likelihood -364,219.76 -513,218.91 -663,467.00 -582,205.59
This table shows the results of the logistic regression of the dependent variable insider trading which is set to 1
if there was an insider trade on a given day, and to 0 otherwise. In Models (1) and (2) we exclude all insider
transactions which have a distance of less than 21 trading days to the previous transaction in the same stock.
For Model (4) we employ random sampling with 40% of the observations, where each observation has an equal
probability to be included in the regression. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects. The table reports
beta coefficients and z-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided
by its prior calendar year’s mean. Past purchases (past sales) is set to 1 if there was a purchase (sale) in the 21
trading days prior to the insider transaction. Bhar+ (bhar−) is the stock’s BHAR over the 21 trading days prior
to the insider trade for a positive (negative) value of this variable. V olatility index is the S&P Volatility Index.
Bookleverage is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of
debt. Analystfollowing indicates the natural logarithm of (number of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the
natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Q denotes Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income
scaled by the book value of equity. All independent variables except for dummy variables are standardized such
that the beta coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation change of the
independent variable.
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past purchases ∗ relivol is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. When
there were previous purchases, then the effect of relivol on the likelihood of an insider
purchase decreases drastically: If there were purchases in the 21 trading days before, a
one standard deviation increase in relivol increases the probability of an insider purchase
by only 0.1% (summing up the coefficients of relivol and past purchases ∗ relivol). Clus-
tered trades seem to be less driven by the exploitation of short-term peaks in asymmetric
information. If the endogeneity concern holds, we expect that the coefficient of relivol
is insignificant. However, the empirical results in Model (3) show that the coefficient of
relivol is significant. In total, the results suggest that the effect of relivol on the likelihood
of insider purchases is not driven by endogeneity.
We also confirm clustering for insider sales. If there was an insider sale before, we are more
likely to observe another sale as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient of the
dummy past sales. The occurrence of previous purchases reduce the likelihood to observe
a sale. We find weak evidence that sales which are not preceded by any other trades are
timed: When there was no preceding transaction in the stock, relivol has a positive and
significant impact on the probability of an insider sale. A one standard deviation increase
in relivol then increases the probability by 0.3%. The economic magnitude of the effect is
substantially smaller than the effect with respect to purchases. When there was a previous
purchase, relivol is inversely linked to the likelihood of observing a sale. A one standard
deviation increase decreases the probability by 0.8% (the sum of the coefficients of relivol
and past purchases ∗ relivol). When there was a previous sale, the effect of relivol is also
negative, but slightly less with a decrease of 0.4% in the probability. Clustered trades in
the same direction or in the opposite direction are less likely to be driven by the motive
to exploit short-term asymmetric information.
2.5.4 Trading aggressiveness and the impact of relivol on the likelihood of
insider trading
A trader who seeks to exploit a short-term variation in asymmetric information is likely to
be impatient. We measure the impatience of a trader with the dummy variable aggressive
which is set to 1 if the transaction price of a purchase (sale) is above (below) the closing
price on the trading day, or 0 otherwise. The rationale behind this variable is to capture
the trader’s preference for immediacy: A trader who transacts at a price which is worse
than the closing price is likely to care more about trading immediately than about trading
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at a good price.
The volume-weighted average share price would actually present a better benchmark than
the closing price, as it is more informative about the prices that have prevailed throughout
the trading day. However, the availability of the volume-weighted average share price is
restricted to the availability on the TAQ database which does not cover our entire sample
period. By using the closing price instead of the volume-weighted average share price we
follow a more conservative approach to measure impatience. The closing price is more
likely to contain the share price impact of the insider trade which might have pushed up
prices slightly for purchases (or downwards for sales). Accordingly, the transaction price
is likely to exceed (or fall below for sales) the closing price in fewer cases as compared to
the volume-weighted average. As a result, we identify less trades as impatient if we use
the closing price.
Table 2.5 reports the results. There is only a slight difference between aggressive and
non-aggressive trades with respect to the impact of relivol on the likelihood (2.6% in
Model (1) versus 2.8% in Model (3)). We do not find any significant impact of relivol
on the likelihood of an aggressive insider sale (see Model (2)). Surprisingly, we find a
significant impact with respect to non-aggressive sales. However, the impact of relivol on
the likelihood of insider sales is economically small with 0.7%. Apparently, selling shares
aggressively seems to be motivated by other reasons, such as urgent liquidity needs, than
timing to exploit short-term asymmetric information.
2.5.5 Discussion of alternative interpretations of relivol
The main goal of this paper is to analyze whether corporate insiders exploit advance
knowledge on short-term private information. In the introduction we have mentioned that
our analysis is a joint test of the hypothesis that corporate insiders exploit short-term
information asymmetry and the extent to which relivol captures variations in short-term
information asymmetries. In this subsection, we discuss alternative explanations for our
findings.
One may object that relivol does not capture variations in short-term asymmetric in-
formation, but instead it proxies for the general level of asymmetric information. First,
we control for characteristics of the general information environment of the firm such as
size, analyst following, or Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we include firm-fixed effects in our
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Table 2.5: Trading aggressiveness and the likelihood of insider trading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggressive Non-aggressive
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
beta/z beta/z beta/z beta/z
Relivol 0.028*** 0.002 0.026*** 0.006***
(19.84) (1.26) (18.56) (3.13)
Past purchases (d) 0.495*** -0.028*** 0.507*** -0.040***
(176.53) (-8.06) (112.80) (-10.95)
Past sales (d) -0.029*** 0.497*** -0.027*** 0.519***
(-9.64) (86.98) (-9.44) (84.77)
Past purchases*relivol -0.026*** -0.012*** -0.025*** -0.012***
(-14.81) (-3.27) (-14.55) (-3.39)
Past sales*relivol 0.001 -0.010*** 0.006*** -0.006***
(0.41) (-4.86) (2.15) (-3.00)
Bhar+ -0.008*** 0.031*** -0.006*** 0.029***
(-6.99) (29.25) (-4.79) (26.90)
Bhar− -0.048*** 0.040*** -0.047*** 0.031***
(-47.17) (27.51) (-45.12) (21.70)
Blackout (d) -0.201*** -0.213*** -0.193*** -0.212***
(-92.24) (-70.47) (-75.60) (-67.89)
Volatility index 0.052*** -0.065*** 0.040*** -0.026***
(59.15) (-36.28) (42.13) (-17.04)
Analystfollowing -0.009*** 0.037*** -0.021*** 0.031***
(-3.40) (14.08) (-8.19) (11.22)
Bookleverage 0.002 -0.008*** -0.002 -0.007***
(1.01) (-4.10) (-0.97) (-3.43)
Size 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.022***
(0.42) (0.69) (0.75) (5.72)
Q -0.005*** 0.023*** -0.010*** 0.023***
(-2.31) (14.41) (-4.93) (13.56)
Return on equity -0.006*** 0.014*** -0.001 0.002
(-4.46) (6.86) (-0.63) (1.25)
Obs 16,010,483 6,014,232 15,676,692 6,030,575
LR chi-squared 86749.02 99046.21 92759.94 93623.28
Prob > chi-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log-likelihood -370,116.73 -328,207.15 -371,040.26 -305,302.15
This table shows the results of the logistic regression of the dependent variable insider trading which is set to 1 if
there was an insider trade on a given day, and to 0 otherwise. In Models (1) and (2) we exclude all non-aggressive
insider trades, while in Models (3) and (4) we excludes all aggressive trades. For Models (2) and (4), we employ
random sampling with 40% of the observations, where each observation has an equal probability to be included in
the regression. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects. The table reports beta coefficients and z-statistics
in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol
is the stock price’s idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean.
Past purchases (past sales) is set to 1 if there was a purchase (sale) in the 21 trading days prior to the insider
transaction. Bhar+ (bhar−) is the stock’s BHAR over the 21 trading days prior to the insider trade for a positive
(negative) value of this variable. V olatility index is the S&P Volatility Index. Bookleverage is the book value of
debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing indicates the
natural logarithm of (number of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the market value
of equity. Q denotes Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income scaled by the book value of equity.
All independent variables except for dummy variables are standardized such that the beta coefficient indicates the
change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation change of the independent variable.
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regressions. In addition, we focus on deviations of idiosyncratic volatility from an average
level. As a consequence, it is not the level of asymmetric information which is captured
by relivol but the deviation from the average level. If these deviations were random, we
would not expect to find any significant impact.
A further objection could be that insiders trade on market-wide uncertainty. We observe a
significant relationship between the likelihood of insider trading and relivol because relivol
is correlated with market-wide uncertainty. We control for market-wide uncertainty using
the S&P volatility index as a measure. The effect of relivol is still significant. This
observation suggests that our main result is not driven by correlation of relivol with
market-wide uncertainty.
Previous research (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone (2005)) documents evidence that insiders
pursue contrarian trading strategies in order to exploit short-term misvaluations. By
controlling for previous abnormal returns (using bhar+ and bhar−) we show that our
main result is not driven by contrarian trading.
One might still cast doubt on the appropriateness of our measure. One may further object
that our measure does not capture variations in private information, but variation in
liquidity. First, this assumption is not corroborated by neither the existing theoretical
nor empirical literature on idiosyncratic volatility. Second, the objection is inconsistent
with the documented difference with respect to purchases and sales. If relivol measures
liquidity, we would expect that the coefficient is positive and significant for sales, since in
particular sales are less information-driven. Third, the empirical evidence in the following
section shows that timing increases trading profits. This finding also provides support
for the notion that relivol indeed captures short-term information advantages and not
liquidity.
2.6 Relivol and the profitability of insider trading
2.6.1 Empirical strategy
In the following, we test whether insiders have an incentive to time their trades. We
hypothesize that insiders increase their profits by trading during times of high information
asymmetry. We expect that long-term profits of insiders are higher if they trade during
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periods of high relative idiosyncratic volatility.
In order to obtain a proxy for the profits accruing to the insider, we construct buy and
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) subsequent to the insider transaction over periods of 1,
3, 6 and 12 months. The 6-month period is the most important as it is motivated by the
short-swing rule according to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
rule intends to prevent corporate insiders from making short-term profits at the expense
of outside shareholders. It mandates that profits made within less than six months have
to be returned to the firm (see Jeng et al. (2003)). The period for the abnormal return
calculation starts on the day after the insider trading day. We calculate the abnormal
return with respect to the Carhart four-factor model, i.e., by adjusting for market risk,
size risk, book-to-market risk and momentum risk. We then regress the abnormal return
on our proxy for timing (relivol) and several control variables that are expected to affect
the size of the abnormal return. We estimate the following regression:
(2.6.1)BHARi,t = constant+ ci + yt + β0 · relivoli,t + β1 ·Xi,t,
where BHARi,t is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock subsequent to the insider trade
i on day t. ci is a firm constant, yt is a year constant. X stands for the vector of firm-
and time-specific control variables. As control variables we use firm size, book leverage,
Tobin’s Q and return on equity. We include year and firm-fixed effects in the regression.
Further, we cluster standard errors at the firm level.
2.6.2 The impact of relivol on profits
Table 2.6 reports the results of the regressions for the 6 month abnormal returns for
purchases and sales. Model (1) is the basic specification and Model (2) adds a measure
for market volatility and firm characteristics as independent variables. If the trade occurs
during a period of relatively high idiosyncratic volatility, the abnormal return is greater.
The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and also economically significant:
For purchases we find an effect between 1.7% (Model (1)) and 2.1% (Model (2)) when
controlling for firm characteristics for a one standard deviation increase in relivol. The
S&P volatility index is positively associated with trading profits. A one standard deviation
increase in the volatility index increases trading profits by 1.7%. The fact that the effect
of relivol remains robust to the inclusion of a measure for market wide uncertainty again
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supports our hypothesis that relivol captures the exploitation of firm-specific asymmetric
information. In sum, the results for purchases are consistent with our hypothesis that
trading during periods of high asymmetric information increases trading profits.
Table 2.6: The impact of relivol on profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Purchases Purchases Sales Sales
Dep. var.: 6m BHAR beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t
Relivol 0.017*** 0.021*** -0.003 -0.003
(3.28) (3.36) (-0.56) (-0.63)
Volatility index 0.017*** -0.002
(3.99) (-0.72)
Bookleverage 0.020 -0.007
(0.91) (-0.96)
Analystfollowing -0.061*** -0.058***
(-4.49) (-5.51)
Size -0.220*** -0.228***
(-4.94) (-16.62)
Q 0.010 -0.005
(0.59) (-1.32)
Returnonequity 0.005 -0.000
(1.37) (-0.34)
Obs 195126 185613 477489 460798
Adj. R-squared 0.473 0.482 0.645 0.659
This table shows the results of the regressions of 6 months post-insider trading buy and hold abnormal returns
(6m BHAR) with respect to the Carhart four-factor model. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The table reports beta coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s
idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean. V olatility index is
the S&P Volatility Index. Bookleverage is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity
and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing indicates the natural logarithm of (number of analysts following the
firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. q denotes Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes
the firms’ net income scaled by the book value of equity. All independent variables except for dummy variables
are standardized such that the beta coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable for a one standard
deviation change of the independent variable.
Model (3) and (4) present the regression results for sales. For sales, we expect opposite
signs for the coefficients as trading profits carry opposite signs of the abnormal returns.
The coefficient of relivol is negative but fails to be statistically significant. Insiders who
sell shares do not increase their trading profits by trading during times of high asymmetric
information. This is consistent with the existing evidence in the literature that sales are
less information-driven as they are also motivated by diversification and liquidity needs.
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2.6.3 Trading aggressiveness and profits
Next, we analyze how the aggressiveness of a trader is related to trading profits and
the influence of relivol on trading profits. Table 2.7 reports our results. We find that
aggressive has a statistically and economically significant effect. The abnormal returns
subsequent to aggressive trades exceed those of patient traders by 1.2% for purchases
and by 0.6% for sales. Trade aggressiveness seems to be a strong predictor of subsequent
abnormal returns. In Models (3) and (4) we also include the interaction term aggressive∗
relivol to analyze whether aggressive traders are able to increase their profits more by
timing. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant for purchases.
While non-aggressive traders increase their profits by 1.7% for a one standard deviation
of relivol, aggressive traders are able to increase their profits slightly, by 2.1% (sum of the
coefficients of relivol and aggressive ∗ relivol). This difference is statistically significant
at the 5% level. The interaction term is insignificant for sales.
In several cases, transaction prices are not reported in the Insider Filings. In those cases,
Thomson Reuters sets the transaction price equal to the closing price. As a consequence,
we do not have information about the impatience in this subsample. In a robustness check,
we exclude the cases in which transaction prices are equal to the closing prices. The results
are reported in Models (5) and (6). For purchases we have to exclude 11.7% of the cases,
for sales we have to exclude 7.4%. The results are robust in this subsample.
2.6.4 Discussion and robustness
Relivol as a priced risk factor
One might object that the observed relationship between relivol and profits is due to a
pricing effect. The significance of relivol in explaining abnormal returns could be the
attributed to the possibility that relivol is a priced risk factor which is not taken into
account by our expected return model, the Carhart model.
We argue that this is not the case for two reasons. First, if relivol was a priced risk
factor, we would expect that the sign of the coefficient for purchases and sales is the same.
However, we find that relivol is positively related to the abnormal returns after purchases,
while there is no significant relationship of relivol and the abnormal returns after sales.
These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that relivol is a priced risk factor. If
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Table 2.7: Trading aggressiveness and the impact of relivol on profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Excl. tprice=closing price
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Dep. var.: 6m BHAR beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t
Relivol 0.021*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.005 0.017*** -0.006
(3.36) (-0.58) (3.04) (-0.88) (3.01) (-0.87)
Aggressive (d) 0.012*** -0.006*** 0.011*** -0.006*** 0.012*** -0.005***
(6.63) (-5.83) (6.35) (-5.67) (6.00) (-4.57)
Aggressive*relivol 0.005** 0.004 0.005* 0.004
(2.00) (1.12) (1.73) (1.03)
Volatility index 0.017*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.003 0.019*** -0.003
(3.89) (-0.84) (3.88) (-0.85) (4.17) (-0.80)
Bookleverage 0.020 -0.007 0.020 -0.007 0.022 -0.009
(0.92) (-0.98) (0.92) (-0.98) (0.98) (-1.27)
Analystfollowing -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.059***
(-4.55) (-5.47) (-4.56) (-5.47) (-4.30) (-5.67)
Size -0.219*** -0.228*** -0.219*** -0.228*** -0.220*** -0.218***
(-4.91) (-16.67) (-4.91) (-16.66) (-4.58) (-15.96)
Q 0.011 -0.005 0.011 -0.005 0.012 -0.006
(0.62) (-1.27) (0.62) (-1.28) (0.69) (-1.41)
Returnonequity 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.000
(1.55) (-0.33) (1.55) (-0.32) (1.34) (-0.23)
Obs 184835 460199 184835 460199 163226 426165
Adj. R-squared 0.484 0.660 0.484 0.660 0.465 0.673
This table shows the results of the regressions of 6 months post-insider trading buy and hold abnormal returns (6m
BHAR) with respect to the Carhart four-factor model. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. The table reports beta coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s idiosyncratic
volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean. V olatility index is the S&P
Volatility Index. Aggressive is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for purchases (sales) if the transaction price is
greater (smaller) than the closing price, and to 0 otherwise. Bookleverage is the book value of debt divided by the
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing indicates the natural logarithm of
(number of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Q denotes
Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income scaled by the book value of equity. All independent
variables except for dummy variables are standardized such that the beta coefficient indicates the change in the
dependent variable for a one standard deviation change of the independent variable.
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relivol were unrelated to timing with respect to information asymmetry and affects profits
for other reasons than timing by corporate insiders, we would not expect that there is a
difference between purchases and sales.
Second, if there is any relation between future stock returns and idiosyncratic risk mea-
sured using the previous month’s daily returns, the existing literature suggests that this
effect is negative. This implies that any significant results showing that abnormal returns
subsequent to insider buying increase with the previous 21 trading days’ idiosyncratic
volatility could only be understated because of possible asset pricing effects.
Several authors find that the past month’s idiosyncratic volatility is a negative predictor
of future abnormal returns (Ang et al. (2006), Ang et al. (2009), Fink et al. (2011),
Malagon et al. (2011), Peterson and Smedema (2011)). Huang et al. (2010) show that this
predictability disappears once one corrects for the previous month’s stock returns. Han
and Lesmond (2011) provide evidence that the pricing becomes insignificant if the mid
quotes instead of final trade prices are used for the computation of daily returns.
Contrarian strategies
The existing literature has documented that corporate insiders seem to pursue contrarian
strategies, i.e., they buy after periods of poor performance and sell after periods of good
performance (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone (2005)). We control for contrarian strategies
by including a variable that measures recent returns. Our goal is to test whether the
timing effect can be explained by the exploitation of misvaluations.
We construct the measure as follows: Based on the Carhart model, we compute deviations
between actual and expected returns for the period of 21 days prior to the trade. We then
split negative and positive recent returns, i.e., we build separate variables for positive
recent returns and one for negative recent returns. Table 2.8 reports the results from
these regressions. We find that insider trading profits are inversely related to the prior
performance. For purchases, insider trading profits are greater when there were negative
abnormal returns and lower when there was a positive abnormal returns. For sales, we
find the reverse result which is also consistent with contrarian trading. For purchases, the
effect of relivol on returns is still large (1.6% for a one standard deviation increase) and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The timing effect can apparently not be solely
explained by trading on contrarian motives. For sales, we confirm the insignificance of
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relivol for trading profits.
Table 2.8: Contrarian trading strategies
(1) (2)
Purchases Sales
Dep. var.: 6m BHAR beta/t beta/t
Relivol 0.016** 0.006
(2.48) (1.26)
Bhar+ -0.010** -0.028***
(-1.98) (-3.03)
Bhar− -0.026*** -0.018**
(-5.47) (-2.35)
Aggressive (d) 0.012*** -0.006***
(6.57) (-5.72)
Volatility index 0.017*** -0.005
(3.84) (-1.60)
Bookleverage 0.020 -0.008
(0.89) (-1.02)
Analystfollowing -0.065*** -0.058***
(-4.66) (-5.52)
Size -0.226*** -0.235***
(-5.20) (-16.79)
Q 0.011 -0.005
(0.60) (-1.28)
Returnonequity 0.006 -0.000
(1.58) (-0.32)
Obs 184835 460199
Adj. R-squared 0.485 0.661
This table shows the results of the regressions of 6 months post-insider trading buy and hold abnormal returns
(6m BHAR) with respect to the Carhart four-factor model. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The table reports beta coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s
idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean. V olatility index is
the S&P Volatility Index. Aggressive is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for purchases (sales) if the transaction
price is greater (smaller) than the closing price, and to 0 otherwise. Bhar+ (bhar−) is the stock’s BHAR over
the 21 trading days prior to the insider trade for a positive (negative) value of this variable. Bookleverage is the
book value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing
indicates the natural logarithm of (number of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity. Q denotes Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income scaled by the book
value of equity. All independent variables except for dummy variables and prior return measures are standardized
such that the beta coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation change of
the independent variable.
Large versus small variations in relivol
It may be the case that our results are mainly driven by firms with large variations in
asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders and only managers in those firms
actually time their trades. We put this hypothesis to the data by testing whether there is
a difference in the effects for firms with a large variation in relivol as opposed to a medium
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or low variation. We sort the firms into terciles according to their standard deviation of
relivol. The dummy variable highsd (lowsd) is set to 1 if the firm lies within the top
(bottom) tercile.
The variables highsd and lowsd are collinear to the firm-fixed effects. Hence, we cannot
estimate a model which includes the dummy variables highsd or lowsd and firm-fixed
effects. When we run the model without fixed effects (results available upon request), the
R-squared drops below 1%. This suggests that the model is not informative. Instead, we
run the regression on separate subsamples for firms with high, low, or medium variation
in relivol.
The results in Table 2.9 show that for purchases the effect of relivol on profits is strongest
for the tercile of firms with a high variation in relivol (2.6% in Model (1)). The profitability
effect of 1.5% is smaller with respect to firms with a medium variation in relivol. For firms
with the most stable level of relivol, the sample of firms with a low variation the coefficient
of relivol is of similar magnitude though insignificant at conventional levels. These results
document a cross-sectional difference with respect to the profitability of timing. The effect
of timing on profits apparently is most pronounced for firms with substantial variations
in the degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders.
With respect to sales, the impact of relivol on profits remains insignificant for all subsam-
ples. We repeat the analysis sorting the firms into quintiles instead of terciles in terms of
the standard deviation of relivol as a further robustness check. The results are comparable
to the ones above.
Alternative trading horizons
We test whether the effect of relivol on profits remains robust to the use of alternative
assumed holding periods. Specifically we look at returns for 1 month, 3 months, and
12 months. Table 2.10 reports the results. For purchases, the coefficient of relivol is
statistically significant at the 1% level for all horizons: 1.3% for the 1 month window,
2.4% for the 3 months window and 2.4% for the 12 months window for a one standard
deviation of relivol. The relatively strong effect for the shorter window of 1 month together
with the fact that the abnormal return does not increase much for longer horizons suggest
that the information advantage was indeed of a rather short-term nature. For sales, we
do not find any significant effect of relivol on returns for any event window.
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Table 2.9: High versus low variation in relivol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High variation Medium variation Low variation
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Dep. var.: 6m BHAR beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t beta/t
Relivol 0.026*** -0.006 0.015** 0.007 0.013 -0.003
(2.74) (-0.82) (2.10) (0.94) (1.47) (-0.38)
Aggressive (d) 0.012*** -0.006*** 0.012*** -0.004 0.014*** -0.013***
(5.21) (-3.54) (3.53) (-1.54) (3.06) (-5.45)
Volatility index 0.016** 0.006 0.018*** -0.012 0.028** -0.019**
(2.31) (1.35) (2.70) (-1.29) (2.53) (-2.11)
Bookleverage 0.042 0.002 0.003 -0.025 -0.014 -0.022
(0.99) (0.15) (0.27) (-1.50) (-0.59) (-1.25)
Analystfollowing -0.068*** -0.041*** -0.046** -0.071*** -0.152*** -0.114***
(-4.03) (-2.85) (-1.97) (-2.62) (-3.95) (-4.15)
Size -0.183*** -0.152*** -0.213*** -0.339*** -0.384*** -0.440***
(-2.77) (-7.79) (-7.21) (-10.03) (-5.74) (-11.80)
Q -0.014 -0.005 0.042 -0.029* 0.022 0.023
(-0.80) (-1.07) (0.97) (-1.85) (0.80) (1.21)
Returnonequity 0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.022*** 0.011 -0.007
(0.97) (1.51) (0.39) (-3.11) (0.90) (-0.63)
Obs 76861 130929 63473 156875 44501 172395
Adj. R-squared 0.430 0.749 0.662 0.288 0.343 0.325
This table shows the results of the regressions of 6 months post-insider trading buy and hold abnormal returns
(6m BHAR) with respect to the Carhart four-factor model. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The table reports beta coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s
idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean. Highsd (lowsd) is
a dummy variable which is set to 1 if the firm is in the bottom (top) tercile in terms of the standard deviation of
relivol. V olatility index is the S&P Volatility Index. Aggressive is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for purchases
(sales) if the transaction price is greater (smaller) than the closing price, and to 0 otherwise. Bookleverage is the
book value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing
indicates the natural logarithm of (number of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity. Q denotes Tobin’s q. Returnonequity denotes the firms’ net income scaled by the book
value of equity. All independent variables except for dummy variables are standardized such that the beta coefficient
indicates the change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation change of the independent variable.
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Table 2.10: Alternative trading horizons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1m BHAR 3m BHAR 12m BHAR
Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
Relivol 0.013*** -0.000 0.024*** -0.004 0.024*** -0.015
(5.55) (-0.16) (4.36) (-1.18) (5.41) (-1.15)
Aggressive (d) 0.012*** -0.003*** 0.012*** -0.004*** 0.010*** -0.002**
(9.12) (-6.85) (6.94) (-5.59) (4.48) (-2.33)
Volatility index -0.009*** -0.003** 0.003 -0.005* 0.017*** 0.004
(-2.85) (-1.96) (0.60) (-1.78) (4.36) (0.98)
Bookleverage 0.009 -0.003 0.011 -0.007 0.011 0.005
(1.40) (-1.35) (0.65) (-1.50) (0.66) (0.60)
Analystfollowing -0.010 -0.010*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.121*** -0.037***
(-1.49) (-2.84) (-3.09) (-2.86) (-6.06) (-3.49)
Size -0.072*** -0.052*** -0.163*** -0.144*** -0.261*** -0.057**
(-5.89) (-11.61) (-4.91) (-16.04) (-10.04) (-2.05)
Q 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.002
(0.73) (-1.61) (-0.10) (-1.32) (0.22) (-0.87)
Returnonequity 0.001 -0.000 0.006* -0.000 0.012* -0.000
(0.58) (-0.59) (1.93) (-0.30) (1.96) (-0.55)
Obs 184835 460199 184835 460199 184832 460199
Adj. R-squared 0.832 0.894 0.600 0.738 0.504 0.178
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the regressions of 1, 3, and 12 months post-insider trading buy and hold abnormal
returns (BHAR) with respect to the Carhart four-factor model. The regressions include year and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The table reports beta coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Relivol is the stock price’s
idiosyncratic volatility over the past 21 trading days divided by its prior calendar year’s mean. V olatility index is
the S&P Volatility Index. Aggressive is a dummy variable which is set to 1 for purchases (sales) if the transaction
price is greater (smaller) than the closing price, and to 0 otherwise. Bookleverage is the book value of debt divided
by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Analystfollowing indicates the natural
logarithm of (number of analysts following the firm+1). Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
Q denotes Tobin’s q. All independent variables except for dummy variables are standardized such that the beta
coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable for a one standard deviation change of the independent
variable.
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2.7 Conclusion
We find empirical evidence that corporate insiders time their purchases during times of
high asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. We offer a novel approach
which is different from the established approach in the literature. The existing approach
focuses on specific corporate events. Instead, we use a market-based measure of short-
term variations in information asymmetry, the variation of idiosyncratic volatility over
time (relivol). Based on a sample of U.S. insider transactions registered to the SEC
between 1986 and 2009, we find that insider purchases are significantly more likely on
a given day when recent idiosyncratic volatility is relatively high. With a probability
increase of 2.9%, the impact is also economically meaningful. However, we do not find
any robust evidence that this effect prevails for insiders sales. This observed difference
between purchases and sales is consistent with the notion of alternative trading motives
such as diversification or liquidity needs as well as with asymmetrically higher litigation
risk for sales.
Our findings also lend support to the notion that timing is profitable for insiders. We find
that insiders can increase their trading profits for purchases substantially with timing.
A one standard deviation increase in relivol raises profits by 2.1%. We do not find any
significant effect of timing on sales. The effect of relivol on profits remains robust when
we control for alternative explanations, or use alternative model specifications. We also
show that the effect cannot be explained by the notion that relivol is a priced risk factor.
These results appear somewhat sobering given the regulatory attempts to avoid trading on
the foreknowledge of information. Insiders seem to profitably exploit short-term variations
in asymmetric information. These profits come at the detriment to uninformed market
participants. Forcing corporate insiders to randomize their trades could present a possible
regulatory strategy to reduce the insiders’ leeway to time their trades. Under such a rule,
they can choose the quantity they want to trade, but not the exact point in time, e.g.,
the trade could be randomly executed during a period of several weeks. This strategy
could preserve the signaling effect of insider trading for a longer horizon, while limiting
the extent of unfair trading on short-term information advantages.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Trading and Trade
Reporting by Corporate Insiders
3.1 Introduction
Corporate insiders arguably know more about the prospects of their firms than other
market participants. This hypothesis is supported by a host of papers documenting that
insider trades, and purchases in particular, convey information to the market (e.g., Seyhun
(1986) and Chang and Suk (1998) for the U.S.; Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Friederich
et al. (2002) for the UK). The U.S. and many other countries have adopted regulations
that require corporate insiders to report their trades.1 The model of Huddart et al.
(2001) provides a theoretical justification for these regulations. The authors show that
information is reflected more rapidly in prices when insiders have to disclose their trades.
Several empirical papers (e.g., Chang and Suk (1998), Betzer and Theissen (2009)) have
shown that share price reactions occur on both the trading and reporting dates. Thus,
without this reporting, the market is unable to infer the full information content of the
trade, which implies that market prices are distorted in the period between the trading and
reporting dates. Delayed reporting, then, may impede the price adjustment to information
revealed by the insider trade.
In the era prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act required corporate insiders in the U.S. to report their trades by the 10th of the
1Some countries (e.g., the UK) even prohibit trading by corporate insiders in certain circumstances.
Similarly, many listed firms in the U.S. have adopted policies restricting trading by insiders (Bettis
et al. (2000)).
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month following the trade. Thus, the maximum time allowed between the trade and the
report was 40 days, allowing corporate insiders considerable flexibility to time their trades
and reports. This flexibility could be used strategically. An insider wishing to trade a
large quantity could split up the order into several smaller chunks. Splitting up a large
order reduces the order’s price impact and thus results in reduced execution costs (e.g.,
Kyle (1985), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)). However, if the insider reported each
individual trade immediately, the share price reaction on the reporting date would move
the price against the insider, and subsequent trades would occur at less favorable prices.
Consequently, the insider has an incentive to delay the reporting of a series of trades
until after the last transaction. By doing so, insiders can benefit from the reduced price
impacts of split-up trades while avoiding the adverse price reaction that immediate reports
would trigger. The present paper analyzes incidences of strategically timed U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. We identify a trade as strategic whenever it is
either followed by another trade by the same insider before it is reported or executed after
another trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported.
Note that the incentive to strategically time trades and reports does not depend on the
assumption that the insider trades on private information. The only assumption necessary
for our argument is that other market participants believe that insiders possess private in-
formation with a positive probability. The stylized fact that prices react to the publication
of insider trades supports this assumption.
This paper asks four related questions. First, how long are reporting delays during the
pre-SOX era? Second, do insiders strategically use their flexibility in choosing the timing
and reporting of their trades, and, if so, is this strategic behavior systematically related to
the characteristics of the insider or the firm? Third, what are the implications of delayed
reporting on the informativeness of prices? Fourth, how does the market react to the
strategic timing of trades and reports?
The first question is important because, as argued above, delayed reporting can impede
the adjustment of prices to the information revealed by the insider trades. The relevance of
the second question derives from the observation that strategic timing benefits the insider
at the expense of other market participants. If each trade were reported immediately, the
second and subsequent trades of a series of insider trades would be executed at prices less
favorable to the insider but more favorable to the insider’s counterparties. The answer to
the third question allows us to assess the relevance of the issues addressed in this paper.
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The fourth question is important because its answer enables us to draw inferences on the
trading motives of insiders engaging in strategic timing. On reporting dates, market par-
ticipants learn whether the strategic delay of reports has occurred. If market participants
believe that insiders possessing private information are more likely to time their trades
and reports, one should observe a larger price reaction than that for an otherwise similar
but nonstrategic trade.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, reporting delays were substantial in the
pre-SOX period. The mean reporting delay was 35 days and the median was 24 days, with
13.2% of all trades in our sample reported later than on the 10th of the month following
the trade. The very large number of violations of the trade reporting requirement implies
that the requirement was apparently not well-enforced. We further find clear evidence
of strategic trading. Only 32.1% of the trades in our sample were nonstrategic trades
(i.e., these trades were reported before the same insider traded again, and they were not
preceded by a trade by the same insider that had not yet been reported).
Logit models reveal that the occurrence of both late filings and strategic trades is sys-
tematically related to firm, trade, and trader characteristics. In particular, the results
are consistent with the notion that insiders who are more closely monitored (and who
therefore may be facing higher litigation risks) are less likely to file their trades late.
Consistent with previous findings, our event study results show that share prices react to
the reporting of insider trades. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 10- and 20-
day windows are larger after purchases than after sales. In cross-sectional regressions we
find that the magnitude of the price reaction decreases only slowly in the reporting delay
(after insider sales), or not at all (after purchases). Thus, our results support the notion
that market prices are distorted in the period between a trade and its report. Finally,
event study CARs are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of
otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Thus, market participants apparently believe that
insiders acting strategically are more likely to possess private information.
Our results clearly support the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by
SOX. They also suggest that countries that currently allow longer reporting delays should
consider revising and/or enforcing their regulations. Recent evidence reported in Fidrmuc
et al. (2009) suggests that some countries do not yet mandate and enforce timely trade
reporting. Using recent samples (ending May 2007), the authors find median reporting
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delays of five days for Italy, seven days for Belgium, and 14 days for France.
Our paper is related to recent papers by Cheng et al. (2007), Betzer and Theissen (2010),
Brochet (2010), Carter et al. (2003), and Lebedeva et al. (2009). Cheng et al. (2007)
exploit the feature that corporate insiders in the U.S. could, in certain circumstances,
delay the reporting of non-open market trades until the end of the fiscal year of the firm
(SEC Form 5 trades). The authors find that insider sales by top executives in Standard
& Poor’s 500 firms disclosed in such a delayed manner predict negative future returns
and lower operating profitability relative to analyst forecasts. Insider purchases, on the
other hand, are hardly predictive of future returns. Cheng et al. (2007) conclude that
’managers in large firms may have used late-disclosure Form 5 sales for information-based
trading’ (p. 1861). Betzer and Theissen (2010) use data from Germany to show that
substantial reporting delays are common, that the delays are systematically related to
firm characteristics, and that abnormal returns after the reporting dates of insider trades
are independent of reporting delays. The latter finding implies that prices are distorted
in the period between the trading and reporting dates. Carter et al. (2003) analyze a
sample of insider buy transactions between 1991 and 1994 and find evidence of substantial
reporting delays. They further report that CARs in the period between the trading and
the reporting date are positively related to the length of the reporting delay. Brochet
(2010) focuses on differences in the information content of insider trades before and after
SOX. The author regresses event study CARs on a set of explanatory variables, including
the reporting delay, and finds that price reactions after purchases are weaker when trades
are reported with longer lags, but that the reverse is true for insider sales. Lebedeva et al.
(2009) find strong evidence that corporate insiders in the U.S. break up larger trades
into series of smaller trades. The authors refer to this as stealth trading. They also
find that liquidity-based explanations for this behavior have more explanatory power than
information-based explanations.
Our paper differs from these papers in that it is the first to systematically document strate-
gic trade reporting and to analyze the determinants and implications of this phenomenon.
It further differs from Cheng et al. (2007) in that we do not analyze the relatively small
sample of non-open market trades eligible for late reporting but, rather, the much larger
sample of all insider trades that were required to be filed on SEC Form 4.2 Betzer and
2The number of Form 5 sales (purchases) for S&P 500 stocks during 1998-2001 amounts to 438 (419).
The corresponding figures for Form 4 trades are 10,166 and 7,217, respectively (Cheng et al. (2007),
Table 1D).
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Theissen (2010) analyze reporting delays in Germany, but have a much smaller sample
(1,977 observations as compared to 314,696 in the present paper), and, more importantly,
the regulatory regime in Germany is distinctly different from that in the U.S. Brochet
(2010) includes a reporting delay variable in his analysis but interprets it as a control vari-
able measuring information leakage between trading and reporting dates. This leakage is
also the focus of the study of Carter et al. (2003). Lebedeva et al. (2009) focus on the
motives for stealth trading, but do not analyze late filings or how reporting delays affect
CARs on the reporting dates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and
presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents evidence on delayed trade reporting.
Section 4 determines whether incidences of strategic trading and trade reporting took
place and also analyzes whether so-called strategic trades are systematically different from
nonstrategic trades. Section 5 uses event study methodology to compare market responses
to strategic and nonstrategic trades. Robustness tests for the analysis of the market
responses are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Data
Our analysis requires data on insider trades, firm characteristics, and stock prices. The
data selection process follows that of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Marin and Olivier
(2008) and merges data from four different sources, namely, the TFN Insider Filing Data
Files, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, the COMPUSTAT
database, and the IBES database. The initial sample consists of insider trades reported
on SEC Form 4 in companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange, or the NASDAQ during 1992-2001. It covers the last 10 calendar years before
the implementation of SOX, which marked a change in regime, since it requires insiders
to report a trade within two working days.
We begin sample construction with the TFN database. We include all open market or
private purchases (transaction code P) and all open market or private sales (transaction
code S) of non-derivative securities whose records were not amended (amendment indicator
’blank’) between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 2001. Of these transactions, we retain
only those filings whose data can be verified by TFN with a high level of confidence (cleanse
indicators R and H). The TFN Insider Filing Data Files contain the following information:
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• Company name and CUSIP
• Transaction date and reporting date (SEC receipt date)
• Transaction code (purchase or sale), number of shares exchanged in the transaction,
and transaction price
• Insider’s position within the firm, which we classify into four groups:
– CEO (also possibly the chairman of the board)
– Chairman (only if not also the CEO)
– Executive directors, excluding the CEO
– Other non-executive officers, affiliates, beneficial owners, or other persons re-
quired to report their trades
We exclude all filings that have no entry for transaction price, number of shares, reporting
date to the SEC, position of insider, or sector fields, leaving 741,653 records remaining. We
also exclude insider transactions whenever the reported transaction price was not within a
20% interval around the CRSP closing price on the insider trading day. We further exclude
trades when the number of shares traded exceeded 20% of total shares outstanding. We
do not attempt to single out Rule 10b5-1 trades, because very few of these pre-planned
trades took place during the pre-SOX era. Brochet (2010), using a sample covering the
period 1997-2002, reports that Rule 10b5-1 trades accounted for only 0.55% of the trades
in his sample.
We complement the data on insider transactions with supplementary data from various
sources. We obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT. All data items are taken from firm
financial statements at the end of the fiscal year preceding the reporting of the insider
trades. We measure book leverage (the variable Leverage) as the ratio of long-term debt
(data item 9) plus debt in current liabilities (item 34) to long-term debt plus debt in
current liabilities plus stockholder equity (item 216). Firm size (Size) is defined as the
natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin’s Q (Q) is calculated as the ratio of
the market value of assets to the book value of total assets (item 6). Following Malmendier
and Tate (2007), we define the market value of assets as total assets plus market equity
(item 25 times item 199) minus book equity. We calculate book equity as the sum of
stockholder equity and balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits (item 35),
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where available, minus the preferred stock liquidating value (item 10) and minus post-
retirement assets (item 336), where available.3
Further, we obtain data on analyst forecasts and announcement dates of quarterly or
annual earnings reports from the IBES and COMPUSTAT. We define variable Numest
as the total number of analysts covering a company in the last available yearly earnings
forecast before the transaction date of the insider trade. We further obtain the dates of
all quarterly earnings announcements. For an observation to be included in our analysis,
all the necessary data items in the CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and IBES databases must be
available. This requirement reduces the sample to 314,696 observations.
In our empirical analysis, we use the following additional variables. The variable delay
is the difference in days between the reporting and transaction dates. We calculate the
variable TradeVolume as the number of shares exchanged in a transaction times the trans-
action price, divided by the market value of equity. We define NumInsider as the total
number of insiders who traded shares in the same company on the same day.
Our analysis uses two different data sets: a ’transaction sample’ and an ’event study
sample’. For the transaction sample, we aggregate all transactions by the same insider
that are a) executed on the same day, and b) jointly reported on the same day. We present
an aggregated transaction as one trade with the net amount traded. The (net) transaction
volume is positive (negative) if the sum of all the individual trades by this particular insider
on the same trading day is positive (negative).4 Following these calculations, we classify
each aggregated transaction as a purchase or a sale. Our final transaction sample consists
of 98,933 purchases and 215,763 sales (314,696 observations in total). These observations
relate to 6,808 different firms and 25,836 distinct firm years. Note that in the transaction
sample, two trades by different insiders are treated as two distinct observations, even if
they are executed and/or reported on the same day.
The announcement date in our event study analysis is the day on which an insider trade
3When stockholder equity was not available as data item 216, we calculated stockholder equity alterna-
tively as common equity (item 60) plus the preferred stock par value (item 130) or total assets minus
total liabilities (item 181). If the preferred stock liquidating value was not available as data item 10,
we calculated the preferred stock liquidating value alternatively as redemption value (item 56) or par
value (item 130). Return on equity (the variable RoE) is net income (item 172) divided by book equity.
4Arguably, a report that includes both purchases and sales made by the same insider provides a weaker
signal than a report that reports only unidirectional trades. However, only 0.51% of the reports in
our sample contain both purchases and sales. This low number is likely to be due to the ’short swing
rule’, which requires insiders to return to the firm all profits from roundtrip trades completed within
six months.
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was filed with the SEC. Therefore, we aggregate all insider trades in the shares of a
given firm that were reported on the same day, irrespective of whether the trades were
reported by the same insider or by different insiders. We refer to this sample as our event
study sample. Again, aggregated transactions are treated as one trade, and the net trade
direction and net volume are as defined above. In our regression analysis we control for
the aggregate trade volume and the number of insiders that traded on a given day. The
final data set for the event study consists of 34,648 purchases and 65,319 sales (99,967
trades in total).
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. Average firm size, as
measured by the market value of equity, is USD 4,544.39 million. Firm size distribution is
heavily skewed. The average Tobin’s Q of sample firms is 3.52, average return on equity
is 8.90%, and mean book leverage is 31.43%. Mean trade size, expressed as a percentage
of the market value of equity, is 0.121%. In 62.10% of cases, only one insider traded
on a given day. In the remaining cases, more than one insider traded on the same day.
The average number of insiders trading on a given day is 2.04, with a maximum of 32.
The average insider trade was executed 57 calendar days before the firm reported its next
annual or quarterly earnings report.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean St. dev. Min Median Max
Market value of equity (USD millions) 4,544.39 21,599.05 0.83 463.78 508,329.50
Tobin’s Q 3.52 6.18 0.21 1.81 105.09
RoE 0.09 0.27 -0.80 0.10 9.89
Leverage 0.31 0.58 0.00 0.25 69.18
TradeVolume 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.58
NumInsider 2.04 2.12 0.00 1.00 32.00
Days to next report 57.00 23.37 0.00 62.00 91.00
Numest 7.57 7.43 1.00 5.00 51.00
Delay (days) 35.00 95.15 0.00 24.00 3,815.00
This table reports summary statistics for the transaction sample. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market
value of assets to the book value of total assets. The variable RoE is net income divided by book equity. We measure
leverage as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities
plus stockholder equity. We define the variable Numest as the total number of analysts covering a company in the
month preceding the reporting date of an insider trade. We calculate the variable TradeVolume as the ratio of
the number of shares exchanged in a transaction times the transaction price to the market equity of the company
whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider trade. We define NumInsider as the total number of insiders who
traded their shares in the same company on the same day. Days to next report denotes the number of days from a
transaction to the next quarterly earnings announcement. Delay indicates the lag in days between the trading and
reporting of a transaction.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of trading dates. Although it appears to follow a weak
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of trading dates by day of the month
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of reporting dates by day of the month
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U-shaped pattern, the general impression from Figure 3.1 is that trades are more or less
evenly distributed over the month. The distribution of reporting dates shown in Figure 3.2
is dramatically different. The daily frequency start low (only 0.81% of trades are reported
on the first day of the month), then increases strongly until the 10th of the month; almost
32% of all trades are reported on this day alone. When we weight the trades by their
volume, this number increases further to 42.7%. After the 10th, the frequency declines
sharply. In the second half of the month, there is no single day on which more than 0.75%
of trades are reported.
There are two not mutually exclusive (and observationally equivalent) explanations for
the strong pattern we document. First, many corporate insiders may routinely report
all trades made during the previous month on the 10th. This practice may delay the
adjustment of prices to the information revealed by the insider trades, and it may be to
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the disadvantage of other traders (although not intentionally). Whenever share prices
react to the reporting of an insider trade, reporting delays imply distorted prices in the
period between the trading and filing dates. If an insider executes several trades on
different days but reports them jointly, the later trades are executed at prices that are
more favorable than they would have been in the case in which each trade had been
reported immediately. This practice is beneficial for the insider but obviously to the
disadvantage of the counterparties to the insider’s trades. Second, some insiders may
intentionally delay the reporting of their trades to avoid the price impact triggered by the
report. By considering only the trading and filing dates, the two cases mentioned cannot
be distinguished from each other. However, the share price reaction on the filing date
can be expected to reflect the market’s beliefs about the insiders’ motives. Therefore,
analyzing the price reaction will allow us to draw inferences about these motives and the
economic significance of strategic trade reporting.
3.3 Reporting delays
This section presents evidence concerning the magnitude of reporting delays and the deter-
minants of late filings. The frequency distributions of trading and reporting dates shown
in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 demonstrate that trades are approximately evenly distributed
over the month, whereas reports cluster around the 10th. If insider trades were indeed
equally distributed over the days of the month and if each trade were reported on the 10th
of the month after the trade (i.e., on the last permissible day), we would expect an average
reporting delay of approximately 25 days. Table 3.2 shows the actual reporting delays.
The median delay (24 days for purchases and sales) corresponds roughly to the benchmark
value derived above. The mean delay is much longer, at 35.0 days.5 Purchases are re-
ported with longer delays than sales (40.4 days, compared to 32.5 days, respectively). This
difference may be indicative of strategic delaying, because previous papers (e.g., Seyhun
(1986) and Brochet (2010) for the U.S., and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for the UK) document
that insider purchases are more informative, as evidenced by larger abnormal returns.
This finding, in turn, implies that insiders who purchase shares are more likely to possess
private information and therefore have greater incentives to conceal their trading activity.
5This figure is greater than that given in Table 1 of Brochet (2010). The author uses a shorter sample
period (starting in 1997) and confines his analysis to trades initiated by the CEO, CFO, COO, board
chairs, and presidents.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of delays
All Purchases Sales
Observations 314696 98933 215763
Mean 35 40.42 32.51
St. dev. 95.15 114.54 84.66
0.25 quantile 15 14 16
Median 24 24 24
0.75 quantile 33 34 33
Percentage of late filings 13.21% 17.48% 11.25%
This table reports summary statistics for the distribution of reporting delays.
The discrepancy between the mean and median reporting delays implies that the distri-
bution of reporting delays is heavily skewed. The magnitude of the average delay further
implies that a significant fraction of trades, particularly the purchases, are reported too
late (i.e., later than the 10th of the month following the trade). In fact, Table 3 reveals
that 13.2% of the trades in our sample were reported too late.6 We use the term late
filings for these cases. Late filings are more common for purchases than for sales (17.5%,
compared to 11.3%, respectively).
The high percentage of late filings is stunning and implies that in the pre-SOX era, report-
ing requirements were not enforced.7 This observation is surprising because violations of
the reporting requirement are easily detectable: SEC filings include trading and reporting
dates, together with a unique person identification number that allows for easy identifica-
tion of the insider.
The percentage of late filings is too large to be explained by accidental omission. Ap-
parently, a substantial fraction of insiders exists who do not care about the reporting
requirements or who deliberately (and possibly strategically) file their reports late. To
shed light on this issue, we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is zero
if a trade was reported on time (i.e., by the 10th of the month following the trade), and
1 if the trade was reported late. The independent variables include firm and trade char-
acteristics. We use the number of analysts following as a proxy for investor attention.8
6These figures take into account the fact that when the 10th of a month is a Saturday or a Sunday, the
trade needs only be reported on the 12th or the 11th of that month, respectively.
7The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 allows penalties against
delinquent filings, and we are aware of several cases in which the SEC filed a complaint in District
Court.
8To avoid multicollinearity, we do not include firm size (the correlation between firm size and number of
analysts following is 0.79 in the transaction sample). We obtain very similar results, however, when we
replace the number of analysts by firm size.
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Trade characteristics include trade volume relative to firm market capitalization and the
number of different insiders trading on the same day. We include three further control
variables: namely, Tobin’s Q as a proxy for valuation of the firm, return on equity as a
measure of operating profitability, and book leverage. We do not have a clear prediction
regarding the sign and significance of the coefficients.
Many firms restrict insider trading by defining a blackout period during which trading is
prohibited. Typically, the blackout period is in effect just prior to an earnings announce-
ment. A common arrangement is to allow trading only within a short period after an
earnings announcement (Bettis et al. (2000), Roulstone (2003)). We include the dummy
variable ’pre-announcement’ in our model, which is set to 1 if a trade was not executed
within a 30-calendar-day window after an earnings announcement, and zero otherwise.9
We further define three dummy variables that describe the insider’s position in the firm.
The first dummy is set to 1 when the CEO is among the traders trading on a given day,
and 0 otherwise.10 The second dummy identifies trades by the chairman of the board
(unless the chairman is simultaneously the CEO), and the third dummy identifies trades
by other executive directors of the firm. Trades by outside directors, beneficial owners,
and others thus constitute the base group.
We estimate a pooled model that includes both purchases and sales and two separate
models including only purchases and sales, respectively. The pooled model includes a
dummy variable that captures differences in the probability of late reporting between
purchases and sales. All models include sector dummies (where we adopt the classification
used in the TFN insider filings) and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. Table 3.3 reports marginal effects (the change in probability of late filing for a
unit change in the explanatory variable, evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory
9Two comments are in place. First, Bettis et al. (2000) survey 663 firms and report that the most
common restriction is to allow insiders to trade only within a short window (e.g., days 3 to 12) after an
earnings announcement. Roulstone (2003) analyzes a large sample of insider trades. From the observed
trading pattern, he deduces whether a firm has a restriction in place. Specifically, he assumes that
a firm has a restriction in place when more than 75% of the insider trades occur in the 20 trading
days (approximately one month) after earnings announcements are made. Since our sample is closer to
Roulstone’s than to the sample of firms surveyed by Bettis et al. (2000), we adopt a one-month period.
Second, data on earnings announcement dates are missing in some cases. We address this by excluding
all observations where the time between the insider trade and the date of the publication of the next
quarterly earnings announcement is more than 91 days. We obtain similar results when we include
all observations. In the latter case, we misclassify insider trades that were executed within a 30-day
window after the publication date of an earnings announcement not included in our data set.
10As a robustness check, we re-estimated the logit model including only trades made by the CEO. The
results are similar to those presented below. The main difference is that for the CEO-only sample, we
do not find that purchases are more likely to be filed late than sales.
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variables) and the respective z-statistics.
The probability of late filings is generally higher for purchases than for sales. This result
is consistent with the earlier finding that average reporting delays are longer for purchases
than for sales. Trades by insiders in firms followed by more analysts are less likely to be
filed late. This finding is intuitive, given that these firms tend to be larger and are under
closer scrutiny by analysts and investors in general. We further find that sales by insiders
in more highly leveraged firms are more likely to be reported late. No such relation is
found for insider purchases.
Considering trade-specific variables, we find that trades executed during the period prior
to earnings announcements are significantly more likely to be reported late. There are
two not mutually exclusive explanations for this finding. First, insiders are more likely to
possess relevant private information prior to an earnings announcement and therefore have
an incentive to strategically delay the reporting of their trades. Second, as noted above,
many firms have adopted policies that allow insider trades only in a window open for a
specified period after the quarterly earnings announcement (Bettis et al. (2000)). Insiders
in these firms are more likely to trade shortly after an earnings announcement and, at the
same time, are more likely to be scrutinized and may therefore tend to file their reports
on time.
The other two trade-specific variables, trade size and the number of insiders trading on
a given day, do not yield significant results. With respect to the position of the insider
within the firm, we find that CEOs, chairmen of the board, and executive directors are
significantly less likely to file late than other corporate insiders (such as, e.g., non-executive
directors and beneficial owners). This finding is again consistent with the notion that
insiders who are under closer scrutiny are more reluctant to file their reports late.
In summary, our results are consistent with the notion that the occurrence of late filings is
not random. In particular, it appears that insiders who are more closely monitored (and
who therefore may be facing higher litigation risk) are less likely to file their trades late.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of late filing
All Purchases Sales
Independent variables dy/dx / z-stat dy/dx / z-stat dy/dx / z-stat
Purchase (d) 0.031**
(5.44)
Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.12) (0.94) (-0.13)
RoE 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.53) (-1.31) (-0.12)
Leverage 0.007 0.003 0.010**
(1.15) (0.85) (2.85)
Numest -0.005** -0.006** -0.004**
(-11.17) (-6.77) (-9.69)
TradeVolume -0.115 0.517 -0.175
(-0.56) (0.84) (-0.92)
NumInsider 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.09) (0.41) (-0.35)
Pre-ann. (d) 0.027** 0.035** 0.022**
(8.62) (5.31) (6.81)
CEO (d) -0.049** -0.074** -0.037**
(-12.23) (-8.41) (-8.90)
Chairman (d) -0.040** -0.059** -0.033**
(-6.15) (-4.60) (-4.55)
Executive (d) -0.048** -0.057** -0.042**
(-11.6) (-6.18) (-10.27)
Predicted prob. 0.121 0.164 0.104
Year dummies Included Included Included
Industry dummies Included Included Included
Observations 314,696 98,933 215,763
McFadden R-squared 0.039 0.035
This table reports the results of a logit regression of the dichotomized variable filed late on the explanatory variables
listed in the first column. A trade is classified as having been filed late when it was reported later than the 10th
of the month following the trade. If the 10th of the month falls on a weekend, the trade is classified as having
been filed late when it was reported later than the following Monday. Purchase is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the (net) transaction volume of the respective insider trade is positive, and zero otherwise. Tobin’s Q is
calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of total assets. RoE is net income divided by
book equity. We measure leverage as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholder equity. We define Numest as the total number of analysts covering a
company in the month preceding the reporting date of the insider trade. We calculate TradeVolume as the number
of shares exchanged in the transaction times the transaction price, divided by the market equity of the company
whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider trade. We define NumInsider as the total number of insiders who
traded their shares in the same company on the same day. Pre-ann. is a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if the trade occurs during the 60-day period preceding the next earnings announcement. We classified all insiders
into four groups (four variables): CEO if the trader was the CEO, chairman if the trader was the chairman but
not the CEO, executive if the trader was an executive director but not the CEO, and reference group other, which
includes all other insiders. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. dy/dx denotes change in probability for
a unit change in the explanatory variable evaluated at the average value of the explanatory variable. With respect
to dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (d) denotes a dummy variable.
Here, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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3.4 Incidences of strategic trading and strategic trade
reporting
Thus far, we have documented that considerable reporting delays exist and that the re-
porting requirement is violated in more than 13% of cases. Delayed reporting per se may
delay the adjustment of prices, but it does not necessarily benefit the insider. An insider
who wants only to execute a single trade has no incentive (beyond convenience) to delay
the filing. This incentive is different, however, when the insider intends to trade more
than once. In this case, delaying the reporting of earlier trades avoids the price reaction
the report would trigger. Thus, later trades are executed at prices that are more favorable
than those that would have prevailed had each trade been reported immediately. Note
that this is true irrespective of whether the insider trades on private information. It is
sufficient that other market participants believe the insider to be informed with positive
probability.
In this section, we search for evidence of strategic trade reporting. We classify a trade as
nonstrategic if it is a) not preceded by another trade that has not been reported until the
trading date, and b) is not followed by another trade before it is reported.11 All other
trades are classified as strategic because they are part of a series of trades in which some
trades were executed while other trades were not yet reported. Figure 3.3 demonstrates two
cases. Trades 1 and 2 in panel A of Figure 3.3 are executed on different days but reported
jointly. According to the definition above, both trades are classified as strategic. Because
they are reported jointly, market participants may infer that the trades are strategic.
Panel B of Figure 3.3 shows a different situation, in which trades 1 and 2 are executed on
different days, as well as reported on different days. Because trade 1 is reported after trade
2 is executed, both trades are strategic according to our definition. However, on the date
on which trade 1 is reported, market participants cannot infer that trade 1 is strategic.
Upon trade 2 being reported, however, it becomes apparent that both trades are strategic.
When we analyze the market response to strategic trades in the next section, we adjust
our definition of strategic trades accordingly. A trade is considered strategic only when
market participants can infer that it was a strategic trade. Consequently, trade 1 in Panel
B of Figure 3.3 is classified as nonstrategic when we analyze the abnormal returns after
11We use an alternative definition as a robustness check. We consider only trades in the same direction
(i.e., only purchases or only sales) and consider a series to be terminated when no further trades took
place for at least 40 days (the maximum admissible reporting delay). This definition, which is similar
to that used in Lebedeva et al. (2009) to identify stealth trading, yields the same conclusions.
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Figure 3.3: Definition of strategic trading
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This figure illustrates our definition of strategic trade reporting. Panel A illustrates the more common case in which
two trades (labeled trade 1 and 2) are executed and then reported jointly. Trade 3 is non-strategic because a) there
is no unreported trade by the same insider on the trading day and b) trade 3 is reported before the insider makes
another trade. Panel B illustrates the case of overlapping reports. Trades 1 and 2 are strategic because trade 1
has not yet been reported on the day on which trade 2 is executed. However, the trades are not reported jointly.
Therefore, on the reporting day of trade 1, market participants cannot infer that trade 1 is strategic.
the filing of insider trades in Section 6. In the current section, however, we stick with our
original definition because here we take the point of view of the insider.
We acknowledge that our classification is conservative. The group of strategic trades does
not contain only trades that were deliberately reported late. As noted previously, it is
likely that some corporate insiders routinely report their trades on the 10th of the following
month. If an insider adhering to this reporting practice trades several times in a month,
our classification scheme will treat these trades as strategic.12 There are two reasons
why we stick to our classification. First, we cannot distinguish why we observe a specific
12Our results are also conservative in a second sense. We classify a trade as strategic only when the same
insider trades several times before reporting the trade. Besides such cases, there are a large number of
cases in which insiders trade while the SEC filing of another insider is still pending. This sequence also
puts the counterparties to the later insider trades at a disadvantage, because they would have traded
at more favorable prices had the insider who traded first reported the trade immediately.
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pattern of trades and reports. Second, even if an insider does not intentionally delay the
reporting of the earlier trades of a series, the delayed report still puts the counterparties to
the later trades at a disadvantage, since they would have traded at more favorable prices
had the insider reported all trades immediately.
The results of a descriptive analysis are reported in Table 3.4. Only 32.1% of the trades
in our sample are categorized as nonstrategic.13 This percentage is larger for purchases
than for sales (38.0% versus 29.4%, respectively). This finding is surprising at first, since
purchases are known to have larger price impacts (which should increase the incentive to
strategically delay the reporting of a trade). Further, we documented earlier that average
reporting delays are larger for purchases. A potential explanation for the result is the
difference in trade size. Table 3.4 reveals that insider sales are, on average, much larger
than insider purchases. The large sizes of sell orders provide an incentive to split up trades
and report individual trades only after all the trades of a sequence have been executed.
A total of 67.9% of trades in our sample are classified as strategic. Each strategic trade
is part of a sequence of trades. The end of a sequence is reached when there are no more
unreported trades. Table 3.4 reveals that 15.0% of trades are classified as the first trade of
a sequence, while 52.9% are classified as second or subsequent trades of a sequence. These
numbers imply that a sequence, on average, consists of 4.5 trades. This number is higher
for purchases than for sales (4.9, compared to 4.4, respectively).
Table 3.4 documents that strategic trade reporting is widely practiced. We therefore now
analyze whether strategic trades are systematically different from nonstrategic trades. To
this end, we estimate logit models in which the dependent variable indicates whether a
trade is classified as strategic or nonstrategic. The independent variables are the trade,
firm, and trader characteristics introduced in the previous section. We add a dummy
variable that identifies trades that were filed late.14 We estimate a pooled model as well
as separate models for purchases and sales. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The results (marginal effects and z-statistics) are reported in Table 3.5. Purchases are
less likely than sales to be classified as strategic, which is consistent with the descriptive
13As one might expect, the percentage of non-strategic trades is lower in the subsample of trades that are
filed late. Only 22% of these trades are classified as non-strategic.
14We obtain similar results when we replace the ’late reporting’ dummy by the reporting delay measured
in days. We prefer the specification that includes the dummy because it is more robust in the presence
of outliers (i.e., trades reported with extremely long delays). As an additional robustness check, we
re-estimated the logit models after excluding all late filings from the data set. The results are similar
to those presented in the text.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of strategic trades
All Purchases Sales
Observations 314,696 140,734 215,763
Fraction Mean volume Fraction Mean volume Fraction Mean volume
Nonstrategic 0.321 1,291,563 0.380 197,628 0.294 1,938,516
Strategic 0.679 1,015,069 0.620 284,504 0.706 1,309,553
First of series 0.150 1,389,175 0.126 213,350 0.161 1,811,510
Serial trades 0.529 909,106 0.494 302,631 0.545 1,161,429
This table presents descriptive statistics for the transactions in our sample sorted by classifying trades into non-
strategic and strategic categories. A trade is classified as strategic when it is followed by at least one additional
trade by the same insider before it is reported, or if it follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been
reported, and nonstrategic otherwise. The strategic category is split into first of series and serial trades. A trade is
classified as first of series if the trade is the first trade in a series of trades in which at least one trade is followed
by at least one additional trade by the same insider before it is reported. A trade is classified as a serial trade if it
follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported. Fraction is the number of trades in the respective
category divided by the number of all transactions, all purchases, or all sales, respectively. Mean volume denotes
the average USD volume of the trade, that is, the number of shares bought or sold multiplied by the transaction
price.
results presented above, and may be related to the fact that insider purchases on average
are much smaller than insider sales. The likelihood of observing strategic trades is lower
in firms followed by more analysts. This finding is intuitive because insiders in these
firms are more closely monitored. We further find the likelihood for strategic trades to be
increased in firms with lower returns on equity. Insider sales in firms with higher Q and in
less leveraged firms are more likely to be classified as strategic, whereas no such relation
is found for insider purchases.
Turning to the trade-specific variables next, we find that larger trades are less likely to be
classified as strategic trades. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that strategic
trades are the result of large orders that have been split up into smaller chunks. We
also find that trades that are filed late are more likely to be classified as strategic. The
dummy variable identifying trades executed in the period prior to publication of an earn-
ings announcement is positive and significant for insider purchases, but insignificant for
sales. Interestingly, the chairman of the board is more likely to engage in strategic trad-
ing, whereas executive directors (excluding the CEO) are less likely to engage in strategic
trading than members of the base group (non-executive directors, beneficial owners, and
others). The results for the CEO are somewhat less clear, with an (insignificant) negative
coefficient for purchases and a (significant) positive coefficient for sales.15
15We re-estimated the logit models including only trades made by the CEO. The conclusions are similar
to those described in the text. The main differences are that a) the probability that a CEO reports a
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Table 3.5: Determinants of strategic trades
All Purchases Sales
Independent variables dy/dx / z-stat dy/dx / z-stat dy/dx / z-stat
Purchase (d) -0.138**
(-17.68)
Tobin’s Q 0.007** -0.002 0.007**
(7.37) (-0.70) (7.39)
RoE -0.001** -0.001 -0.001**
(-2.68) (-1.69) (-2.86)
Leverage 0.002 0.026 -0.006*
(0.80) (1.11) (-1.73)
Numest -0.008** -0.013** -0.006**
(-14.50) (-12.06) (-11.95)
TradeVolume -4.512** -1.304 -4.598**
(-8.91) (-1.33) (-8.92)
NumInsider 0.003 0.003 0.002
(1.05) (0.53) (0.58)
Pre-ann. (d) 0.008* 0.026** -0.001
(2.21) (3.92) (-0.21)
Late (d) 0.106** 0.140** 0.084**
(18.7) (13.9) (15.3)
CEO (d) 0.018* -0.019 0.039**
(2.19) (-1.34) (4.18)
Chairman (d) 0.078** 0.042* 0.089**
(5.81) (1.67) (5.80)
Executive (d) -0.185** -0.246** -0.156**
(-27.76) (-22.53) (-19.94)
Predicted Prob. 0.698 0.632 0.727
Year dummies Included Included Included
Industry dummies Included Included Included
Observations 314,696 98,933 215,763
McFadden R-squared 0.081 0.085 0.080
This table reports the results of a logit regression of the dichotomized variable strategic on the explanatory variables
listed in the first column. A trade is classified as strategic when it is followed by at least one additional trade by
the same insider before it is reported, or if it follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported,
and nonstrategic otherwise. Purchase is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the transaction is a purchase,
and zero if the transaction is a sale. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book
value of total assets. RoE is net income divided by book equity. We measure leverage as the ratio of long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholder equity. We define
Numest as the total number of analysts covering a company in the month preceding the reporting date of the insider
trade. TradeVolume is the number of shares exchanged in the transaction times the transaction price, divided by
the market equity of the company whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider trade. We define NumInsider as
the total number of insiders who traded their shares in the same company on the same day. Pre-ann. is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the trade occurs within 60 days prior to the next quarterly earnings announcement.
Late is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the trade is reported later than the 10th of the month following the trade.
If the 10th of the month falls on a weekend, the trade is classified as illegal if it was reported later than the following
Monday. We classified all insiders into four groups (four variables): CEO if the trader was the CEO, chairman if the
trader was the chairman but not the CEO, executive if the trader was an executive director but not the CEO, and
the reference group other, which includes all other insider groups. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
dy/dx denotes the change in probability for a unit change in the explanatory variable evaluated at the average value
of the explanatory variable. With respect to dummy variables, dy/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1. (d) denotes a dummy variable. Here, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Our results lend support to the hypothesis that insiders strategically time their trades
and make strategic use of pre-SOX reporting rules. The next section addresses whether
market reactions to the reporting of insider trades take this into account.
3.5 Market response to strategic trades
This section analyzes share price reactions after the reporting of insider trades using
standard event study methodology. This analysis serves a dual purpose. First, we want
to test our conjecture that delayed reporting impedes the adjustment of prices to the
information contained in the insider trades. To this end, we analyze whether reporting
day CARs decrease with the length of the reporting delay and, if so, how quickly. The
potential finding that CARs decrease quickly with the length of the delay would provide
evidence that the market is able to learn the information contained in the insider trade
from other sources and thus does not have to rely on the report. If, on the other hand,
we find that the CAR decreases slowly, or not at all, with the length of the delay, this
finding could be interpreted as evidence that market prices are indeed distorted in the
period between the trading and reporting dates. Second, we wish to analyze whether
the CARs are larger after the reporting of strategic trades. The result will allow us to
draw conclusions about the market’s belief about insider trading motives. If the market
reaction after strategic trades is stronger than after otherwise similar nonstrategic trades,
this would constitute evidence that the market attributes higher information content to
these trades.
As noted above, we use standard event study methodology. The event date is defined to be
the day on which an insider trade is filed with the SEC. The analysis is based on the event
study sample introduced in Section 1. This sample is obtained by aggregating all insider
trades in shares of the same firm that were reported on the same day. We must aggregate
reports filed by different insiders because otherwise we would double-count observations.
We estimate the market model over a 255-day estimation window ending 46 days16 prior
to the announcement date. We use the CRSP value-weighted index as our market proxy,
strategic trade decreases in the number of insiders reporting trades on the same day, and b) the dummy
variable identifying trades executed in the period prior to the publication of an earnings announcement
is insignificant.
16We choose a longer delay between the end of the estimation window and the event window because we
do not want the estimation window to be contaminated by the execution of the insider trade. Note
that 46 days is slightly more than the maximum admissible delay for reporting in the pre-SOX era.
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and t-statistics are based on the standardized cross-sectional test proposed by Boehmer
et al. (1991).
The event study results are reported in Table 3.6. We report CARs over four event
windows, namely, (0; 1), (0; 2), (0; 10), and (0; 20), and we report separate results for
insider purchases and insider sales. Consistent with previous research, we find that CARs
over a short event window are small. The CARs over the two-day window (0; 1) amount
to 0.29% for purchases and -0.21% for sales. The CARs increase significantly when the
lengths of the event window are increased. The CARs over the event window (0; 10) are
1.99% for purchases and -0.87% for sales; the corresponding values for the 21-day event
window (0; 20) are 2.97% and -2.05%, respectively. These results confirm previous findings
that the share price reaction is stronger after insider purchases than after insider sales.
Table 3.6: Event study result
Purchases Sales
No. (0; 1) (0; 2) (0; 10) (0; 20) No. (0; 1) (0; 2) (0; 10) (0; 20)
All 34,648 0.29** 0.59** 1.99** 2.97** 65,319 -0.21** -0.29** -0.87** -2.05**
Strategic 13,782 0.36** 0.76** 2.54** 3.75** 34,735 -0.25** -0.38** -1.05** -2.55**
Nonstrategic 20,866 0.25** 0.49** 1.64** 2.45** 30,584 -0.17** -0.21** -0.66** -1.49**
Difference 0.11* 0.27** 0.90** 1.30** -0.07 -0.17** -0.39** -1.06**
Pre-ann. 20,643 0.34** 0.64** 2.16** 3.18** 37,849 -0.19** -0.24** -0.91** -1.99**
Non pre-ann. 14,005 0.22** 0.52** 1.76** 2.66** 27,470 -0.23** -0.35** -0.81** -2.14**
Difference 0.12* 0.12* 0.40** 0.52** 0.04 0.11* -0.10 0.14
Timed 6,472 0.26** 0.40** 1.28** 1.87** 8,793 0.05 0.03 -0.50** -1.21**
Non-timed 28,176 0.30** 0.64** 2.16** 3.22** 56,526 -0.24** -0.33** -0.92** -2.19**
Difference -0.05 -0.23** -0.88** -1.34** 0.30** 0.36** 0.43** 0.98**
Filed late 8,105 0.31** 0.52** 1.65** 2.69** 14,897 -0.22** -0.30** -0.79** -2.04**
Filed in time 25,430 0.27** 0.58** 2.06** 3.02** 47,816 -0.21** -0.29** -0.88** -2.06**
Difference 0.04 -0.06 -0.41** -0.32* -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.02
Delay 0 to 5 1,160 0.92** 1.32** 3.81** 4.52** 780 0.38** 0.35** -0.01 -1.07**
Delay 6 to 10 3,602 0.31** 0.83** 2.31** 3.35** 4,216 -0.26** -0.36** -0.65** -1.71**
Delay 11 to 5 5,402 0.21** 0.51** 2.07** 2.93** 9,068 -0.13** -0.19** -0.86** -2.01**
Delay 16 to 20 4,833 0.40** 0.69** 2.02** 3.35** 9,760 -0.11** -0.20** -0.91** -2.11**
Delay 21 to 25 5,082 0.39** 0.72** 2.23** 3.36** 11,356 -0.22** -0.30** -0.81** -2.04**
Delay 26 to 30 4,781 0.28** 0.54** 1.57** 2.47** 11,135 -0.31** -0.46** -1.05** -2.32**
Delay 31 to 35 3,943 0.08 0.38** 1.95** 3.12** 8,448 -0.24** -0.36** -0.99** -2.29**
Delay 36 to 40 3,788 -0.03 0.22** 1.67** 2.52** 4,570 -0.32** -0.44** -0.80** -2.45**
Delay 41 to 45 669 0.33** 0.75** 1.15** 1.99** 1,068 -0.23** -0.15** -0.69** -1.52**
Delay greater 45 3,202 0.38** 0.55** 1.49** 2.40** 4,918 -0.15** -0.16** -0.71** -1.61**
This table shows the CARs over various event windows and various subsamples. Here, * and ** denote statistical
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The significance levels for the CARs are based on the standardized
cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991), and those for the differences are based on a t-test for equality of means.
We next compare the CARs after strategic and nonstrategic trades. As noted previously,
we categorize a trade as strategic only when, on the filing date, market participants can
infer that the trade was strategic. The results provide clear evidence that market partic-
ipants attribute higher information content to strategic trades. The share price reaction
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after these trades is stronger than that after nonstrategic trades, irrespective of whether
we consider purchases or sales or the length of the event window. Consider the CAR over
the 20-day window (0; 20) as an example: It is 3.75% after strategic purchases but only
2.45% after nonstrategic purchases. The corresponding figures for strategic and nonstrate-
gic sales are -2.55% and -1.49%, respectively. The difference between the price reactions
after both strategic and nonstrategic trades is (based on a t-test for equality of means)
statistically significant in all cases.
Table 3.6 also reports the results of further cross-tabulations. As already noted, many
firms restrict insider trading by defining a blackout period during which trading is prohib-
ited. Typically, the blackout period is the period just prior to an earnings announcement
(often two months; see Bettis et al. (2000) and Roulstone (2003)). Such a restriction is
based on the assumption that the informational asymmetry between corporate insiders and
other market participants is larger prior to earnings announcements. If this assumption
is true, we should observe larger CARs after trades that non-restricted insiders execute
prior to earnings announcements. To test this hypothesis, we define the dummy variable
’pre-announcement’ as set to 1 if at least one of the trades reported on a given day was
executed within a 60-day window prior to an earnings announcement. We find that pur-
chases made during the pre-announcement period result in significantly larger share price
reactions. This finding is consistent with the notion that earnings announcements reduce
informational asymmetries. For insider sales, there are no significant differences between
trades executed during the pre-announcement period and other trades.
We next consider the timing of trades relative to earnings announcement dates. We look
at trades that were executed in the period before an earnings announcement but reported
after the announcement. To this end, we define the dummy variable timed, which is set to
1 if all trades reported on a given day were executed before and reported after the earnings
announcement date. We find that timed trades convey significantly less information to the
market. Considering again the (0; 20) event window as an example, we find a CAR of 3.22%
for non-timed purchases and a CAR of only 1.87% for timed purchases. The corresponding
figures for sales are 2.19% and 1.21%, respectively. These results are consistent with the
notion that earnings announcements reduce the informational asymmetry between insiders
and the market.
Next we compare trades that were reported on time with trades that were filed late. We
define a dummy variable late filing that is set to 1 if all of the trades reported on a given
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day were filed late. The results are inconsistent. Over longer event windows (10 or 20
days), trades reported on time trigger stronger share price reactions (3.02% versus 2.69%
for purchases and 2.06% versus -2.04% for sales). The difference is significant only for
insider purchases, however.
Trades that are filed late are, by definition, reported with longer delays. Thus, finding
that insider purchases that are filed late trigger smaller share price reactions is consistent
with the notion that the market learns some of the information contained in the report
from other sources. To shed more light on this important issue, we next sort the insider
trades in our sample into 10 groups with respect to their weighted average reporting delays
(delay 0 to 5 days, 5 to 10 days, and so on, with trades in the 10th group having a weighted
average delay of more than 45 days). We find that the CARs are significantly different
from zero irrespective of the trading delay. They tend to slightly decrease with the length
of the delay for purchases, but not for sales.17 These results imply that prices are distorted
in the period between the execution and filing of an insider trade.
The results in Table 3.6 suggest that timed trades, that is, trades executed before but
reported after an earnings announcement, and trades executed within a 30-day window
after an earnings announcement trigger smaller share price reactions. The results also
suggest that CAR decreases with the length of the reporting delay for insider purchases
but not for sales. However, up to now, we did not control for other firm and trade
characteristics. Including such controls is important because we have shown previously
that trades that are filed late are systematically different from trades that are filed on time.
Similarly, we have shown that strategic trades are different from nonstrategic trades. In
addition, reporting strategic trades typically involves reporting several trades on the same
day,18 and therefore the total reported volume is larger. It may be the larger volume
rather than the strategic nature of the trade per se that causes the larger CARs.
We therefore estimate cross-sectional regressions that control for the total reported volume
and other potentially relevant variables. The dependent variable is CAR. We report results
for CARs measured over the event window (0; 20). Using the shorter event window (0;
10) yields results that are qualitatively similar.
17Brochet (2010) reports a similar result.
18The typical case is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3.3. Several trades are executed on different days
but reported jointly. The case illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3.3, where strategic trades are reported
individually, is much less common.
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The independent variables include measures of firm characteristics (Tobin’s Q, return on
equity, book leverage, and number of analysts following) and trade characteristics (trad-
ing volume relative to the firm’s market capitalization and aggregated over all trades that
were reported jointly, number of different insiders trading on the same day, and weighted
average reporting delay). We further include dummy variables identifying strategic trades,
trades executed in the period prior to an earnings announcement, and timed trades (i.e.,
those executed in the period prior to an earnings announcement and reported after the
announcement, but prior to the next earnings announcement). We also include the in-
teraction between the timed dummy and the strategic dummy. Three additional dummy
variables control for the position of the insider in the firm (CEO, chairman of the board,
other executive directors19). Finally, we include year and industry dummies.
We estimate separate models for purchases and sales. Note that we expect different signs
for the coefficients in the two regressions, because the CARs after purchases are predomi-
nantly positive while those after sales are predominantly negative. We include firm fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the reporting day level. The results are shown in
Table 3.7. The CARs after insider purchases are smaller for firms with higher values of
Tobin’s Q and for firms with more analysts following. The other firm characteristics are
insignificant. Share price reaction after a purchase does not depend on transaction volume.
It is larger when more than one insider reports trades on the same day. Consistent with
our earlier results, we find that purchases executed during the period prior to an earnings
announcement trigger significantly larger price reactions. Timed purchases - those that
are executed before but reported after an earnings announcement - trigger significantly
smaller share price reactions than other purchases. These results are consistent with the
notion that earnings announcements convey information to the market and reduce infor-
mational asymmetries. Purchases by the CEO, the chairman of the board, and other
executive directors result in higher CARs than purchases by members of the base group
(non-executive directors, affiliates, beneficial owners, and others). This result in general
and the relative sizes of the coefficients in particular are consistent with the informational
hierarchy hypothesis, which posits that trades by insiders with more privileged access to
information convey more information to the market.
The most important results are those with respect to the strategic trading dummy and
19If several insiders report their trades on the same day, we choose the highest insider position; that is,
we set the dummy to 1 if at least one of the insiders is the CEO, the chairman of the board, or an
executive director, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.7: Determinants of CARs (0; 20)
Purchases Sales
Independent variables Coef. Coef.
Tobin’s Q -1.266** -0.635**
(-6.79) (-7.05)
RoE 0.020 -0.016
(0.45) (-0.56)
Leverage 0.417 -0.031
(1.62) (-0.17)
Numest -0.311** -0.299**
(-4.20) (-5.49)
TradeVolume -7.634 -11.083
(-0.63) (-1.47)
NumInsider 0.356** -0.387**
(3.59) (-4.18)
Pre-ann. (d) 0.913** 0.233
(3.62) (1.04)
Timing (d) -0.964* 0.522
(-2.39) (1.42)
Strategic (d) 0.905** -0.615**
(3.05) (-3.35)
Timing*strategic -0.186 0.039
(-0.38) (0.09)
Delay -0.002 0.003*
(-1.55) (2.09)
CEO (d) 2.316** -0.835*
(6.77) (-2.40)
Chairman (d) 1.957** -0.672
(2.96) (-1.73)
Executive (d) 1.040** -0.615**
(3.72) (-2.84)
Constant 2.566 -1.523
(0.96) (-0.55)
Year dummies Included Included
Industry dummies Included Included
Observations 34,648 65,319
Adjusted R-squared 0.111 0.080
This table reports the results of a regression with firm fixed effects of the reporting day CARs (0; 20) on the
explanatory variables listed in the first column. If several transactions in the same stock were reported on the
same day, the transactions count as a single observation. A report is classified as a purchase if the net transaction
volume reported is positive. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value
of total assets. RoE is net income divided by book equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in
current liabilities to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholder equity. We define Numest as the
total number of analysts covering the company in the month preceding the reporting date of the insider trade. We
calculate TradeVolume as the number of shares exchanged in the transaction times the transaction price, divided
by the market equity of the company whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider trade. If several trades were
reported on the same day, we sum the total volume of these trades. We define NumInsider as the total number of
insiders who reported their trades in the same company on the same day. Pre-ann. is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the trade (or at least one trade, if several trades are reported on the same day) occurs during the 60-day
period preceding the next earnings announcement; timing is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the trade
is executed within 60 days prior to the next earnings announcement and is reported after the announcement (but
before the following announcement); and strategic is set to 1 when a) the trade is followed by at least one additional
trade by the same insider before it is reported or if it follows a not-yet-reported trade by the same insider, and
when b) the market can infer on the reporting date that the trade was strategic (see Figure 3.3 for an illustration).
All other trades are classified as nonstrategic. Timing*strategic is an interaction term of the variables timing and
strategic. Delay is the trading-volume-weighted average delay of all insider trades of a firm reported on the same
day. We classified all insiders into four groups (four variables): CEO if the trader is the CEO, chairman if the trader
is the chairman but not the CEO, executive if the trader is an executive director but not the CEO, and the reference
group other, which includes all other insider groups. If there were several trades in the same stock on the same
day, the highest insider position is selected according to rank, i.e., CEO, chairman, executive, and other. Standard
errors are clustered at the reporting day level. (d) denotes a dummy variable. Here, * and ** denote statistical
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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the reporting delay. Strategic purchases trigger a significantly larger share price reaction,
even after controlling for other relevant variables. Note that, on the reporting day (our
event day), market participants observe whether a report contains strategic trades. Our
results thus imply that market participants believe that strategic purchases are more likely
to be motivated by private information than otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Note
that since we control for aggregate trading volume and the number of insiders reporting
their trades on the same day, the effect of the strategic variable does not merely stem
from more trades reported jointly. The additional abnormal return is 0.9%, which is also
economically significant. The coefficient on the reporting delay is insignificant, indicating
that CARs do not decrease when a trade is reported with a longer delay. Thus, once
we control for trade and firm characteristics, the negative relation reported in Table 3.6
disappears. This result supports our conjecture that delayed reporting causes delays in
the adjustment of prices.
The results for insider sales differ from those for purchases in several respects. Trades
by insiders in more highly valued firms (larger Q) trigger stronger (more negative) price
reactions, as do trades by insiders in firms followed by more analysts. Price reactions
after insider sales filings are stronger when more than one insider reports a trade on the
same day. Trading volume, on the other hand, does not have a systematic impact. Trades
by CEOs and other executive directors cause stronger price reactions. The insignificant
coefficients on the pre-announcement and timing dummies indicate that the timing of the
trade itself and of the report relative to earnings announcements do not significantly affect
the abnormal returns.
The coefficient for the reporting delay is significantly positive, though small in magnitude.
Thus, CARs following insider sales tend to decrease when a trade is reported with a longer
delay. The decrease is very slow, however. The coefficient of 0.003 implies that increasing
the reporting delay by one day decreases the reporting day CAR by 0.003%. It would
thus take a reporting delay of 683 days until the average reporting day CAR of -2.05% is
reduced to zero. Therefore, the conclusion that delayed reporting impedes the adjustment
of prices is still valid.
Strategic sales apparently convey more information to the market than nonstrategic trades,
as is evidenced by the significantly negative coefficient on the strategic trade dummy. We
note, though, that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than that of the
corresponding coefficient in the regression for insider purchases. This result, combined
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with our findings that CARs after insider sales are generally smaller and that the timing
of the trade and of the report does not affect the magnitude of the price reaction, is
consistent with the view that insider sales are generally less likely to be motivated by
private information than insider purchases.
3.6 Robustness
3.6.1 Routine reporting
As noted earlier, many insiders appear to routinely file their reports on the 10th of the
month following their trades. Consequently, a large fraction of insiders report their trades
on the same date (see Figure 3.2 for evidence). The stronger market response to strategic
trading we identified could simply be the result of many insiders reporting trades on the
same day. In the baseline regression above we have addressed this issue by controlling for
the aggregate trading volume and for the number of insiders who report their trade on the
same day.
It is conceivable that routine reports are less informative than reports filed on other days.
Therefore, we re-estimate the regression with two additional dummy variables. The first
identifies reports filed on the 10th of a month, the second interacts this dummy with the
dummy identifying strategic trades. For purchases we find that, indeed, reports filed on
the 10th of a month trigger smaller CARs. However, the coefficient on the interaction term
is positive and significant. Thus, the result that strategic trades trigger larger abnormal
returns also holds for those reports filed on the 10th of a month. When we run the same
regression for sales, none of the additional coefficient estimates is significant.
3.6.2 Weak rules vs. weak enforcement
In this paper we have addressed two distinct phenomena. First, the lax reporting re-
quirements in the pre-SOX era which allowed insiders to time their reports strategically
without violating the rules, and second, the apparent lack of enforcement which is likely
to be responsible for the long reporting delays and the substantial fraction of late filings.
The question thus arises whether our results are driven by those cases in which the rules
were violated (i.e., the late filings as defined previously).
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To address this issue, we re-estimate both regressions (those for purchases and sales)
including only trades that were reported within the legal boundaries. The coefficient of
the variable delay in the sales regression is insignificant. All other results are unchanged.
Additionally, we re-estimate the regressions with all observations but include a dummy
that identifies late filings. Again, our conclusions remain unchanged. Thus, our main
findings are not simply driven by the lax enforcement in the pre-SOX era.
As a final robustness check, we include a dummy variable that identifies trades made
during the first five days of a month and reported between the 9th and the 13th of the
following month. The timing of execution and reporting of these trades is such that the
reporting delay is maximized within the legal boundaries. The results are again similar
to those reported in section 5. We thus conclude that our results are not driven by a
small sub-sample of cases in which insiders maximized the reporting delay within the legal
boundaries.
3.6.3 Other robustness checks
One potential problem with our variable delay lies in the fact that there are obvious
outliers in the sample. This is evidenced by a maximum reporting delay in excess of 10
years. We address this issue by estimating three alternative versions of the model. We use
a) a delay variable that is winsorized at 42 (the maximum delay allowed in the pre-SOX
era), b) the log of 1 plus the delay, and c) a dummy variable that identifies trades that
were filed late. All three specifications reduce the impact of outliers on the results. They
all yield results similar to those reported earlier. We thus conclude that our results are
not driven by outliers.
To avoid multicollinearity, we do not include firm size in our baseline regression (the
correlation between firm size and number of analysts following is 0.80 in our event study
sample). When we replace the number of analysts with firm size we obtain very similar
results. We also estimate versions of our models that include additional firm characteristics
(a measure of asset tangibility as defined in Almeida and Campello 2007 and the standard
deviations of returns in the 60 days prior to the event date). Tangibility turned out to be
insignificant, return volatility was positive and significant for purchases but not for sales.
In those cases in which several different insiders traded shares of the same firm it may
make a difference whether all insiders traded in the same direction or whether some of
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them traded in the opposite direction. Therefore, we re-estimate our model including a
continuous variable measuring aggregate trade direction. It is defined as (number of buys
– number of sells) / (number of buys + number of sells). The coefficient on this variable
has the expected sign and is significant. The other results are similar to those presented
in Table 8.
3.7 Conclusion
In the pre-SOX era, corporate insiders in the U.S. were required to report their trades by
the 10th of the month following the trade. Thus, the maximum time allowed between the
trade and the report was 40 days, giving corporate insiders considerable flexibility to time
their trades and reports. This flexibility may be used strategically. An insider wishing
to trade a large quantity may split up an order into several smaller chunks. Splitting up
a large order reduces its price impact and thus results in reduced execution costs. By
delaying the reporting of the trades of a series until after the last transaction, an insider
can avoid the price impact caused by the reports.
This paper asks four related questions. First, how long are the reporting delays in the
pre-SOX era? Second, do insiders strategically use their flexibility in choosing the timing
of their trades and reports? If so, is strategic behavior systematically related to the
characteristics of the insider or the firm? Third, what are the implications of delayed
reporting on the informativeness of prices? Fourth, how does the market react to the
strategic timing of trades and reports?
Our results demonstrate that substantial reporting delays exist. The mean reporting delay
was 35 days. More than 13% of the trades in our sample were filed late (i.e., later than
on the 10th of the month following the trade). The very large number of violations of the
trade reporting requirement implies that the requirement was not enforced in the pre-SOX
era. Corporate insiders apparently used their discretion to time their reports. More than
two-thirds of the trades in our sample are part of a sequence of trades in which some
trades were executed while earlier trades were not yet reported. Strategic trade reporting
benefits the insider but is disadvantageous to the counterparties to the insider’s trades.
If each trade were reported immediately, the second and subsequent trades of a series of
insider trades would be executed at prices less favorable to the insider but more favorable
to the counterparties.
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We find that both the occurrence of late filings and the occurrence of strategic trades
are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm, the trade, and the trader. In
particular, our results are consistent with the notion that insiders who are more closely
monitored (and who therefore may be facing higher litigation risk) are less likely to file
their trades late. The probability of observing a strategic trade is larger in firms followed
by fewer analysts as well as for larger trades.
Our event study results reveal that share prices react to the reporting of insider trades.
In cross-sectional regressions, we find that the magnitude of the price reaction does not
decrease with the reporting delay after purchases, and decreases very slowly after sales.
Thus, our results support the notion that market prices are distorted in the period between
the trade and the report. Consequently, delayed reporting of insider trades impedes the
adjustment of prices. Finally, event study CARs are larger after reports of strategic
insider trades compared to the aftermath of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades for both
purchases and sales. Thus, market participants apparently believe that insiders acting
strategically are more likely to possess private information.
Our results support the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by SOX.
They also suggest that strict enforcement of existing regulations is beneficial. Further, our
results lead to the conclusion that countries that currently allow for long reporting delays
(or do not require corporate insiders to report trades in the shares of their firm) should
consider tightening their regulations.
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Chapter 4
Do SEC Detections Deter Insider
Trading? Evidence from Earnings
Announcements
4.1 Introduction
What are the consequences of the detection of illegal insider trading by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)? We hypothesize that detection has an impact on future
insider trading: Individuals with access to material, non-public information update their
subjective probabilities of getting caught when they observe a detection event in their
vicinity and are less likely to exploit private information. Using a unique hand-collected
dataset of 398 insider trading episodes detected by the SEC between 1995 and 2011 this
paper analyzes whether the detection of insider trading by the SEC deters insider trading
activities in the same stock and stocks of industry peers. Insider trading is difficult to
measure because it is not directly observable. In order to measure trading ahead of price-
sensitive announcements we look at abnormal runups prior to earnings announcements.
This measure is likely to be monotonically linked to variations in the ’true’ level of insider
trading. We analyze a firm-quarter panel of 43,646 earnings announcements of detection
targets, their industry peers and control firms in remote industries using difference-in-
differences approach.
The analysis focuses on illegal insider trading, i.e., the trading on material, non-public
information in violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Illegal
trading is to be distinguished from ’legal’ insider trades by corporate insiders which have
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to be registered with the SEC. Legal insider trades are disclosed to the public and are not
necessarily based on material, non-public information. Most developed countries prohibit
trading on material, non-public information based on the premise that it harms other
investors.1 Uninformed market participants lose when trading against market participants
with superior information because the uninformed buy at prices which are too high and
sell at prices which are too low. This idea is, e.g., analyzed in the model by Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). In their model, a specialist, the provider of liquidity, anticipates
these cost, so called adverse selection cost, caused by the presence of informed traders.
The specialist increases the bid-ask spread accordingly to offset these losses, i.e., he sells
at higher prices and buys at lower ones. Uninformed market participants in turn ask
for compensation of these costs which results in higher required returns.2 Bhattacharya
and Daouk (2002) show that the introduction of insider trading rules reduces the cost of
equity and thus provide additional support for the notion that insider trading is costly for
uninformed market participants and ultimately to shareholders.
The phenomenon of insider trading has attracted considerable public attention recently,
in particular in connection with the largest insider trading episode in the U.S.: the pro-
fessional insider trading ring around Raj Rajaratnam, the founder of hedge fund Galleon
Group. Rajaratnam and his accomplices generated about USD 60 million in profits by
trading in advance of the public announcement of price-sensitive information. The preva-
lence of insider trading is actually readily identifiable when there were suspicious trading
activities prior to important announcements. However, from a practical law-making per-
spective, insider trading is very difficult to detect and prosecute. It is difficult to identify
the individuals which have caused the suspicious price movements because of the great
number of traders in the market and market anonymity. Individuals who want to trade on
material, non-public information are also likely to cover up their trading, by, e.g., trading
through accounts of remote friends or relatives. Further, even if it is possible to identify
the traders, it is difficult to prove that a defendant has known the private information and
has also been aware that it is non-public. As a result, there are only very few cases of
insider trading publicly detected and brought to justice. Recently, U.S. prosecutors have
announced to fight insider trading more aggressively, by employing techniques previously
1There is an academic debate of whether insider trading is beneficial or detrimental to welfare. See, e.g.,
Bainbridge (2001) for a discussion of the arguments. Welfare implications of insider trading are not
addressed in the current paper.
2See Amihud and Mendelson (1986) for a theoretical model of this link and Brennan and Subrahmanyam
(1996) for empirical evidence. Easley et al. (2002) find evidence that more trading on private informa-
tion as indicated by the probability of informed trading is associated with higher returns.
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uncommon in the control of white collar crime, such as search warrants or wiretaps.3.
Despite of the substantial public interest in fighting insider trading, little is known of its
systematic determinants. There is empirical evidence on the impact of legislation: E.g.,
the empirical studies by Bris (2005) or Ackerman et al. (2008) investigate how insider
trading activity varies with the enactment and first enforcement of insider trading rules at
the country level. The existing evidence at the country level suggests that insider trading
laws and their enforcement have an impact on the magnitude of insider trading. But how
does the insider trading activity vary within a given legal context? Little is known so far
about the effects detection has on subsequent insider trading activity. In particular, it
is unclear whether SEC actions have spillover effects and thereby lead to reduced insider
trading in neighboring firms. Our paper aims at filling this gap.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature on insider trading and regulation.
It is the first paper to analyze the consequences of the detection of insider trading and
is, hence, complementary to the international studies which analyze the impact of regu-
lation at the country level. Moreover, the paper contributes to the economic literature
on criminality: We investigate the extent to which personal experiences and experiences
in the vicinity of individuals affect their subjective probabilities of detection. Thereby,
we contribute to the debate on the effect of risk perceptions about detection on criminal
behavior.
Earnings announcements offer an attractive case to study trading ahead of price-sensitive
announcements: There are less individuals involved as compared to M&A transactions and
the informed individuals are typically more closely related to the firm which allows for a
more representative measurement of the general level of insider trading in a given stock.
Moreover, quarterly earnings announcements are regular and frequent. This allows for a
comparison of the insider trading activity before and after the detection event. Further,
earnings announcements are available for a large sample of firms. As a consequence, the
sample is not likely to suffer from a selection bias which could be induced by looking
at announcement events which are endogenously chosen such as M&A announcements.4
Lastly, the magnitude of the surprise component can be quantified.
3See, e.g., the speech by U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara to the New York City Bar Association on October
20, 2010
4See, e.g., Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986) or Ambrose and Megginson (1992) for evidence which suggests
that the likelihood to be acquired is endogenous or, e.g., Harford (1999) or Paliwal (2008) for evidence
that the likelihood to acquire is endogenous.
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We test whether runups prior to earnings announcements are lower after there has been
a detection event in the firm while controlling for alternative determinants. We use a
difference-in-differences approach and compare runup changes in the post detection period
of detection targets, their industry peers and firms in remote industries. A detection event
is the first day on which the market has learned from the detection of the case by the
SEC. In a nutshell, we obtain the following results: SEC detection significantly reduces
the runup prior to earnings announcements for firms with a detection event and their
industry peers. More concretely, the runup over the time window of t-5 to t-1 around the
earnings announcement is reduced by 0.7%. The effect on industry peers, the spillover
effect, is strong and statistically indistinguishable from the effect on the detection target
itself. We find weak evidence that the deterrent effect for the detection targets is slightly
more pronounced for episodes which involve information leakage from within of the firm.
These findings remain robust to an alternative measure of insider trading, over different
time windows for the runup calculation and over different subsamples. One may object
that the observed effect is mechanical, because the pre detection runups for treatment
firms include the runup of the insider trading episode. We rule out that the observed
relationship is purely mechanical. We also discuss the limitations of the present analysis.
In sum, the empirical findings lend support to the notion that detection discourages the
exploitation of inside information in the vicinity of the detection target.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the main hypothesis and relates
the paper to the existing literature on the economics of crime and insider trading. Section 3
describes the construction of the dataset and report summary statistics. Section 4 explains
the empirical approach. Section 5 presents the empirical findings, robustness checks are
reported in Section 6 and potential caveats and limitations are discussed in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes.
4.2 Hypothesis and related literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature: First, it is related to the literature
on the economics of crime which deals with the determinants of the subjective probability
of detection. Second, our paper is related to the existing work on the effects of insider
trading legislation. Third, it is related to the empirical literature which seeks to construct
measures which capture illegal insider trading activities. The present section summarizes
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the related literature and sets out how the present paper relates to the existing work.
4.2.1 Probability of detection and economics of crime
The objective of the paper is to test the following hypothesis: The detection of insider
trading in a given stock reduces illegal insider trading activities. Existing work on the
economics of crime provide a theoretical underpinning for this hypothesis. The core of the
argument consists of three parts: First, the propensity of an individual to commit a crime
depends on the probability of detection. Second, when the probability of detection is not
common knowledge, the individual forms beliefs about it based on past experience. Third,
individuals use information from their vicinity when forming and updating expectations
about the probability of detection.
The idea of crime as the outcome of rational choice is mainly shaped by Becker (1968).
According to this cost-benefit view of crime, a rational individual chooses between criminal
and non-criminal behavior by trading off expected benefits against expected costs. The
costs are determined by the severity and the likelihood of punishment. Increases in the
probability of detection and punishment lead to higher expected costs and, hence, to
a lower propensity to commit crime. The hypothesis that variations in the likelihood
of detection and punishment lead to changes in the observed crime rate has also been
empirically tested. E.g., Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001) analyze traffic data from a series
of experiments. The authors investigate an exogenous variation in the likelihood of getting
caught. The introduction of a camera enforcement program to monitor driving through
red light provides for an exogenous increase in the likelihood of getting caught. Analyzing
the consequences of this increase in the probability of detection, the authors find that
individuals are substantially less likely to cross red lights.
In the model by Becker (1968) the probability and severity of punishment is common
knowledge. However, the real world often exhibits great uncertainty with respect to the
true frequencies of crime and detection. This observation applies to insider trading in
particular. Detection and enforcement events of insider trading are infrequent. In addi-
tion, information about the true crime rate are also very opaque, because they are not
directly observable. Further, the SEC investigates secretly, so not much is known about
the sources and methods of investigation. Hence, apart from the notion that the likelihood
of detection is probably small, not much is known about its determinants. Rather than
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the actual ’true’ probability of detection, individual behavior is more likely to respond to
the perceived probability of detection. Several existing papers study how these perceptions
shape the propensity to commit crime. E.g., Ben-Sahar (1997) argues that individuals are
imperfectly informed about detection efforts and the true rate of detection. Enforcement
events contribute to learning, because they help individuals to form more precise expec-
tations about the detection rate. Lochner (2007) provides empirical evidence based on
longitudinal survey data with information about reported perceptions about the probabil-
ity of arrest. His results show that personal experiences with enforcement actions shape
individual perceptions about the likelihood of detection and sanction.
Information is costly and difficult to obtain. As a result, individuals use information from
their close environment rather than ’global’ information. When forming and updating
subjective probabilities of detection, individuals are likely to use personal experiences or
experiences by their vicinity.5
Sah (1991) theoretically analyzes the evolution of the probability of detection over time
as it is shaped by past experiences. His model explains differences across groups which
otherwise face identical economic fundamentals. As argued by Sah, individuals use infor-
mation from their personal experiences and the experiences of their vicinity to form and
update their subjective probabilities of detection. Rincke and Traxler (2011) analyze data
on the compliance of Austrian households with paying TV license fees. They find that
enforcement actions increase the propensity of neighboring households to comply and pay
the fees. Thereby, the empirical evidence in their paper supports the vicinity effect of
detection and enforcement actions.
In addition to updating beliefs about the probability of detection, learning about social
stigma might present an alternative channel over which individuals are affected by detec-
tion and enforcement actions in their neighborhood. Social stigma refers to the reluctance
to interact socially and economically with convicted criminals. Thereby, being convicted
of a criminal act involves costs which go beyond legal penalties such as monetary fines
or imprisonment. The idea is introduced and theoretically analyzed by Rasmusen (1996).
By observing how convicted individuals are stigmatized, individuals learn about the costs
involved with criminal actions such as illegal insider trading which makes them less likely
to trade on private information.
5The ’neighborhood effect’ is analyzed in various alternative economic and social contexts, e.g., by Anesh-
ensel and Sucoff (1996), Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008), Grinblatt et al. (2008), or Kuhn et al.
(2011).
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We hypothesize that the detection of illegal insider trading affects the perceptions of
individuals in the vicinity of the defendant, namely other individuals who are associated
with the firm. Further, we hypothesize that a detection event also impacts insider trading
activities at neighboring firms, i.e., industry peers. When trading off expected costs and
benefits of exploiting private information for profitable trading, individuals with access to
private information take their updated subjective detection probability into account and
are less likely to trade.
4.2.2 Legislation and insider trading
Based on an international sample of 103 countries, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) analyze
the impact of regulation and enforcement of insider trading laws on the cost of equity.
Their test is actually a test of two joint hypotheses: First, insider trading regulation
reduces insider trading activity. Second, more insider trading activity leads to higher
cost of equity. According to the authors, insider trading is costly to uninformed investors
because they lose against informed traders. As a result, investors require compensation
for these anticipated losses and ask for a higher rate of return which should be ultimately
reflected in greater cost of equity. The cost of equity do not change significantly after
the introduction of the prohibition of insider trading. However, they decrease after the
first prosecution of insider trading. This suggests that insider trading activity is sensitive
with respect to enforcement.6 Bris (2005) also analyzes a country cross section. However,
he takes an alternative approach by more directly investigating the impact of regulation
on insider trading activity. His sample consists of 4,541 acquisitions from 52 countries
between 1990 and 1999. He uses abnormal returns and volumes in the days prior to
takeover announcements as a measure of suspicious trading. His study documents that
insider trading enforcement increases both the incidence and the profitability of insider
trading. Bris further finds that tougher laws reduce the incidence of illegal trading activity.
Similar to the study by Bris (2005), Ackerman et al. (2008) study the run ups prior to the
announcements of ca. 19,000 acquisitions in 48 countries from 1990 to 2003. They find
that the enactment of insider trading laws significantly reduces the extent to which the
6In a more recent paper Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) show that the introduction of a law can lead to
higher cost of equity if the law is not enforced. According to the authors, the underlying mechanism is
the following: If there are some individuals who follow the law when is merely enacted and not enforced,
the individuals who are not following the law will violate the law with even greater intensity. However,
this result only applies to environments with a low general level of enforcement, i.e., emerging markets
and not to developed and highly regulated markets such as the U.S.
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information about the pending acquisition is released prior the announcement. However,
in contrast to Bris (2005) they find that the effect of the initial enforcement is small and
statistically insignificant.
4.2.3 Measuring insider trading
How does ’true’ insider trading affect returns and volume? Meulbroek (1992) addresses
this question by looking at illegal insider trading data from the SEC. Her sample consists
of 183 insider trading episodes where individuals were charged with insider trading by
the SEC between 1980 and 1989. She finds that insider trades move prices substantially.
There are abnormal returns of 3% on average on insider trading days. Meulbroek controls
for a potential selection bias. The detection of illegal insider trading may be biased, as
unusual stock behavior might catch the regulator’s interest in the first place. This is why
the sample of detected insider trading cases could be biased in favor of insider trading
cases which significantly affect stock behavior. However, Meulbroek argues many cases
are detected on the basis of referrals which are unrelated to the magnitude of the price
impact, such as referrals by brokers, former employees, fellow conspirators or ex-wives.
These cases are unlikely to suffer from the selection bias as the likelihood of detection
in such cases is independent of the actual price and volume impact of the insider trade.
When analyzing this subsample, the results remain robust.
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) are among the first to empirically analyze runups prior to
price-sensitive announcement. Based on unusual daily returns and weekly volume data
on 192 takeover announcements between 1975 and 1978 they identify suspicious trading
activities prior to takeover announcements. According to their results, 40 to 50% of the
price impact of an acquisition announcement is already incorporated before the public
disclosure.
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) analyze abnormal return and volume behavior prior to 172 M&A
announcements between 1981 and 1985. They draw attention to the problem that runups
prior to price-sensitive announcements could also stem from rational market anticipation
rather than insider trading. They find that unusual behavior prior to M&A announcement
can be partially explained by observable information such as M&A rumors in the press
and the foothold acquisition of the bidder. Their paper highlights the need to control for
the extent to which the announcement is already anticipated by the market, in order to
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obtain a more accurate measure of insider trading.
Acharya and Johnson (2010) analyze a link between insider trading and the number of
individuals who have access to inside information. They argue that there could either be
a positive or a negative effect of the number of insiders on insider trading intensity: More
insiders can lead to a higher likelihood of detection and punishment which could lead to less
exploitation of inside information. Hence, there will be a negative relationship. However,
if there is no connection between the likelihood of detection and the number of insiders,
more insiders will lead to more insider activity. They empirically test the hypotheses
with data on insider activity prior to bid announcements of private equity buyouts. As a
number of insiders they use the number of financing participants of the transaction. As a
measure of insider trading they use unusual behavior in return and volume 5 days prior to
the announcement. They find that more equity participants are associated with suspicious
stock and options trading activities.
To our best knowledge there is only one other paper which analyzes earnings announce-
ments from the angle of information leakages. Cai et al. (2011) investigate whether Wall
Street connections of the firm are associated with increased selective pre-disclosure of
material, non-public information. They analyze whether Wall Street connections lead to
earning announcements being less informative, where they measure the informativeness of
an earnings announcement by the market reactions around the earnings announcements
in the window of t-1 to t+1 around the announcement at t. The main hypothesis of Wall
Street connections leading to more insider trading also implies that there will be higher
runups prior to earnings announcements. The study of the runup as opposed to the market
reaction - the approach we take in the present paper - would even present a more direct
test of their hypothesis. However, it is unclear why the authors do not test this implication
in their paper.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Construction of the dataset
Detection sample: The detection sample is hand-collected from the archive of litigation
releases from the website of the SEC.7 Litigation releases are available from this database
7http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml.
105
starting September 28, 1995. We collect insider trading litigation releases up to Decem-
ber 31, 2011. We search all litigation releases for cases of insider trading, i.e., trading
on material, non-public information which constitutes a violations of SEC Rule 10b-5. A
litigation release typically includes the following information: date of filing of the release,
names of the defendants, the stock in which the defendant has traded, type of information
on which the defendant has allegedly traded (e.g., takeover by another firm), date of the
announcement of the public disclosure of the information (e.g., date of the takeover an-
nouncement), the association of the defendants with the firm, how the defendants learned
from the information and whether the information has been tipped to others. In several
cases, there is also information on the trading dates, the amount of shares or options
traded and trading profits. Where available, we also use the complaints8 to complement
the information.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we are interested in the date where the detection
of the insider trading incidence by the SEC becomes publicly available for the first time.
As a default approach, we use the filing date of the litigation release as the detection
date. The SEC investigates secretly and does not disclose any information on ongoing
investigations. This is why the filing date of the litigation release usually coincides with
the first disclosure of the insider trading case on behalf of the SEC. We run a press
search using Factiva to search for a potential earlier release of the detection. Only in a
few cases, we identify an earlier date. One may object that individuals associated with
the firm are aware of the SEC investigations, because the firm is often asked to provide
internal documents, e.g., information about all employees who have been involved in a
takeover. In those cases, some employees receive earlier notice about the insider trading
detection. In optimum, we would have to include the first date on which firm individuals
become aware of the detection, i.e., the date at which the SEC informs individuals in the
firm about the ongoing investigations in the matter of the insider trade. However, this
information is private to the SEC and we do not have access to this information. Further,
it is likely that only a small circle of individuals in a firm will be informed about the SEC
investigations and this information is likely to spread within the firm in unknown cascades.
Hence, we choose the date on which the information becomes publicly available, although
we are aware that there might be some individuals who have received notice of the SEC
investigations in advance. In some cases, there are several insider trading episodes in the
8In some cases, the SEC publishes the complaints for the insider trading episodes on their website. A
complaint is a legal document which presents the facts and legal reasons for the litigation.
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same firm. Only the first insider trading episode which is detected by the SEC is included
in our sample.
Based on the information manually collected from the SEC website, we classify the insider
trading cases to the following event categories which reveal the type of information on
which the defendants have traded: M&A, earnings, fraud (accounting or financial fraud),
announcements by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, corporate finance measures
(e.g., issue or repurchase of shares), analyst revisions, and other. The category other
includes general business announcements or changes in personnel.
In many cases the stock of the firm is not listed anymore when the insider trading incidence
is detected by the SEC. In several cases this is due to a takeover of the firm or other reasons
for delisting (e.g., such as bankruptcy). If the firm has been taken over by another firm
in the meantime, we include the acquiring firm in the sample. In a later robustness check,
we investigate whether this adversely affects our results. In other cases of delisting, we
exclude the observations from the sample.
Further, we classify the observations according to the source of leakage. Has the informa-
tion been stolen, has the information leaked or is the source unknown? In cases of stolen
information, we require that the defendant did not have access to the inside information
through his job or did not receive any tips but has expropriated the inside information
by illegally gaining access to it, e.g., by hacking into computers. Observations with an
unknown source of leakage refer to the cases where the SEC has frozen accounts subse-
quent to extra-ordinarily large trading volumes in shares or options by one account prior
to the announcement of price-sensitive information. The SEC has done so only in a small
number of cases (see descriptive statistics below).
For the cases of information leakage, we classify the source further. How is the defendant
related to the firm? The defendant has either traded on the information himself or he
has tipped the information to a third party. The source of leakage may be identical to
the individual that also traded on the information. Alternatively, the source of leakage
has tipped the piece of material, non-public information to another party. In many cases,
insider information is tipped to family members of friends, in an attempt to conceal the
insider trading. We differentiate between the following categories: inside leakage, share-
holder, director, professional service firm or other. The inside leakage category includes
individuals which are directly employed by the firm, e.g., CEO, top executive (other ex-
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ecutive members of the board except for the CEO), officer and executive not part of the
management board, or employee. The category of professional service firm consists of
individuals who have a fiduciary duty to the firm and its shareholders by advising the
firm as a management consultant, investment bank or legal advisor. The category other
includes individuals who have received the confidential information due to their employ-
ment with a supplier or a client. Furthermore, we classify the observations as crime of
opportunity or organized crime. An insider trading episode is considered as organized
crime if the defendants have traded in at least two episodes in different stocks. Otherwise,
the observations are classified as crime of opportunity.
Firm characteristics and stock data: COMPUSTAT is used to collect information
about the total assets, market capitalization, return on assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, book-
to-market ratio, R&D expenditures and SIC code. Returns and trading volumes are from
CRSP.
Sample of earnings announcements: We collect information on quarterly earnings
announcements for the firms and corresponding analyst forecasts from IBES from 1993 to
2011. The following data is collected: date of the actual earnings announcement, number
of analyst forecasts, actual earnings announced, mean and median of the analyst forecast
consensus and the standard deviation of the analyst forecasts.
Control samples: Our objective is to compare the post detection change in insider
trading with respect to detection targets with the effects on industry peers and remote
firms. To this end, we select two control samples: a control sample of industry peers and
a control sample of firms in industries in which there was not any detection event over the
sample period. We identify the matched sample of industry peers as follows: From the
universe of COMPUSTAT firms without any insider trading episodes we delete the ones
for which there is no available data on CRSP and where we do not have IBES data on
8 or more earnings announcements. We use the following matching algorithm: For each
insider trading episode in our sample, we select the firms with the same first 3 digits in
terms of SIC code as the detection target. We then choose the 10 firms which are closest
in terms of size in the month of the filing of the SEC detection. Among those, the firm
that minimizes the distance in terms of book-to-market ratio is chosen as the matched
control firm.9 For each matched industry peer we also construct variables which describe
9Later in this paper, we control for a slightly different matching algorithm and more than one matched
control firm.
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the insider trading episode, such as the filing date, the event type of the insider trading
case and the source of leakage by setting the values equal to the corresponding matched
detection firm.
For the construction of the sample of firms in remote industries, we proceed as follows:
Similar to the approach above, from the universe of COMPUSTAT firms without any
insider trading episodes we delete the ones for which there is no available data on CRSP
and where we do not have 8 or more earnings announcement data on IBES. As a next step,
we identify the firms which are in 2-digit SIC code industries which have not experienced
any detection event over the sample period. To each insider trading episode in our sample,
we randomly assign a control firm from this set of firms. The values of variables describing
the insider trading episode are set equal to the value of the matched episodes.
In sum, we have three different groups: the group of firms with an insider trading episode,
a group of matched industry peers and a group of randomly assigned matched firms in
remote industries. In the following analyses we refer to two samples which are defined as
follows: The treatment sample consists of firms with an insider trading episode only. The
vicinity treatment sample consists of firms in the neighborhood of the detection firm, that
is the detection firm itself and industry peers.
In total, many observations from the detection sample are lost due to missing data from
COMPUSTAT, CRSP or IBES. In total we count 1,165 insider trading episodes detected by
the SEC between 1995 and 2011. Restricting attention to the first announcement of insider
trading within one firm, sufficient available information on the episode in the litigation
release and the availability of CRSP data, our sample reduces to 625. The availability
of COMPUSTAT data further reduces the sample to 573. The required availability of
coverage by the IBES database further reduces the sample to 398 cases of insider trading
episodes.
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 breaks down the insider trading episodes in our sample by time and type of
information events. Exploiting foreknowledge of pending M&A announcements is the
most common type of insider trading (35.9%). The second most common type is earnings
announcements (23.1%), followed by announcements of the firm regarding corporate fi-
nancing (15.3%). The average number of days between the event date (the date on which
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the information on which the defendants traded was disclosed) and the detection date
(filing date of the SEC litigation release or if available earlier disclosure in the press) is
877.12 days (median 791.5). Of the 398 insider trading episodes, 298 observations include
information on the original firm and stock in which the insider trading occurred, while in
100 cases, the firm has been acquired. In these cases, we use data on the acquiring firm.10
Table 4.2 displays how the events are distributed across types of leakage sources. Source
of leakage denotes the association between the tipper or trader accused of illegal insider
trading and the firm. In 38 cases, the material, non-public information has been stolen. In
14 cases, the source of leakage is unknown at the time of detection by the SEC. There is
information leakage in 346 cases. 121 of those include leakage of information by employees
of the firm. 57 include leakage of information by shareholders and 21 of directors. In 123
cases, employees of professional service firms traded on non-material, public information
or passed the information along to family or friends. Of the 398 insider trading episodes,
200 are classified as crime of opportunity and 198 as organized crime.
Table 4.1: Distribution of detection events
M&A Earnings Fraud FDA Finance Analyst revision Other Sum
1994 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
1995 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
1996 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 8
1997 1 2 1 3 0 0 1 8
1998 13 7 0 1 0 0 4 25
1999 14 0 1 0 0 0 9 24
2000 21 4 0 0 0 0 7 32
2001 9 4 2 0 0 0 1 16
2002 7 5 1 2 0 0 3 18
2003 8 6 2 1 0 0 1 18
2004 13 5 4 0 2 0 1 25
2005 5 17 1 5 7 0 11 46
2006 8 2 1 3 40 0 1 55
2007 7 14 0 1 11 16 0 49
2008 10 3 0 1 1 0 0 15
2009 15 8 1 2 0 0 7 33
2010 3 10 1 2 0 0 1 17
2011 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Sum 143 92 16 21 61 16 49 398
In percent 35.9% 23.1% 4.0% 5.3% 15.3% 4.0% 12.3% 100.0%
The table reports the distribution of detection events over years and over different types of events on which
material, non-public information has been misused. M&A denotes announcements of mergers and acquisitions,
earnings denotes the announcement of quarterly or annual earnings, fraud denotes the announcement of financial
or accounting fraud, FDA denotes announcements by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Finance denotes
corporate financing policies (e.g., share buyback, capital increase). Analyst revisions refer to the update of analysts
regarding buy or sell recommendations.
10We explicitly address potential differences with respect to the subsample of acquired firms in Section 6.
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Table 4.2: Distribution of the source of leakage
Source of leakage Number of cases
unknown 14
stolen 38
leakage 346
inside leakage 121
CEO 10
top executive 10
officer 57
employee 44
shareholder 57
director 21
professional service firm 123
consultant 29
legal advisor 21
investment bank 73
Other 24
Crime of opportunity 200
Organized crime 198
The table reports the sources of leakage of the material, non-public information which was exploited for insider
trading. The source of leakage is labeled unknown if the SEC does not have information on how the defendants
received access to the material, non-public information. Cases are classified as stolen if the defendant has illegally
gained access to the private information. leakage denotes cases in which the defendants, i.e., the trader or the
tipper, received the information as part of their employment. inside leakage denotes cases in which the trader
or tipper is directly employed by the firm. This category is further broken down: CEO denotes Chief Executive
Officer, top executive other executive board members excluding the CEO, officer includes executives below the
executive board, and employees. shareholder denotes individuals with a substantial stake in the firm (at least 5%).
director denotes non-executive members of the board. The category professional service firm includes employees
of service firms with a fiduciary duty to the firm with the insider trading episode: Consultant stands for management
consultants, investment bank for employees of investment banks who are advising the firm in matters of financing
or mergers and acquisitions and legal advisor denote employees of law firms. An insider trading episode is classified
as crime of opportunity if the defendants have exploited inside information with respect to one firm only. If they
have committed insider trading in at least two different stocks, we classify the episode as organized crime.
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Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics of the firm characteristics for the treatment sample,
(Panel A), the sample of matched industry peers (Panel B) and the sample of randomly
assigned control firms in remote industries (Panel C). A firm with an insider trading
episode has a mean size of total assets of 8,097 million and a market capitalization of USD
7,374 million. The median values are much lower with 1,403 million and 1,589 million
which indicates that the sample is skewed to the right. The mean Tobin’s Q is 2.396,
while the mean book-to-market ratio is 0.472. On average, the firms have a mean return
on assets of 8.7% and R&D expenditures of 6.8%.
The table also reports the differences in means between the sample. Despite of the match-
ing procedure, firms in the industry peer group are significantly smaller as compared to
the treatment sample. They industry peers have a smaller Tobin’s Q, a greater book-to-
market ratio, are less profitable and have less R&D expenditures. There are two potential
explanations for these differences: First, firms with certain characteristics could more
likely to be involved with illegal insider trading activities. Second, if one assumes that
illegal insider trading activities are equally distributed among all types of firms, it could
be the case that the SEC does not treat all firms equally when deciding on the investiga-
tion and prosecution of insider trading episodes, but is biased towards focusing on certain
types of firms. The resources to fund investigation and enforcement are constraint. 11
Investigating the reasons for the observed differences would go beyond the scope of this
paper. In the following analyses, we control for the differences by using firm characteristics
as control variables, including firm-fixed effects in the model and explicitly test how firm
characteristics affect the impact of detection.
Table 4.4 shows summary statistics of the earnings information. On average, there are
10.8 analysts who issue quarterly earnings forecasts for one stock in the treatment sample.
The mean standard deviation of the estimate is 3.1%. The mean absolute surprise ((actual
earnings minus median of the forecasts)/share price) is 0.6%. If the actual earnings exceed
the forecast (positive surprise), the surprise is 0.4%, whereas the surprise is -0.8% if
the actual earnings fall short of the forecast consensus (negative surprise). There are
significantly more analysts covering stocks in the treatment sample as opposed to stocks
of industry peers or firms in remote industries. This difference can be attributed to the
differences in size as shown in Table 4.3, because the number of analysts generally increases
11Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find empirical evidence which points towards SEC enforcement preferences.
According to their results, SEC enforcement is more likely with respect to firms which are geographically
close to SEC offices.
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Table 4.3: Firm characteristics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median 95% quantile 5% quantile
Panel A: treatment sample
Total assets (in USDm) 8,097.306 14,720.860 1,403.257 53,747.250 42.131
Market capitalization (in USDm) 7,373.833 12,155.290 1,588.920 42,380.780 70.814
Tobin’s Q 2.396 1.773 1.719 6.612 0.945
Book-to-market ratio 0.472 0.369 0.378 1.215 0.058
Return on assets 0.087 0.166 0.114 0.302 -0.267
R&D 0.068 0.101 0.023 0.287 0.000
Panel B: industry peer control sample
Total assets (in USDm) 3,990.630 9,994.488 587.018 23,043.000 41.858
Market capitalization (in USDm) 3,527.729 7,691.392 746.515 17,966.620 60.998
Tobin’s Q 2.292 1.664 1.715 5.973 0.917
Book-to-market ratio 0.486 0.367 0.400 1.192 0.076
Return on assets 0.080 0.167 0.115 0.272 -0.283
R&D 0.067 0.098 0.022 0.273 0.000
Panel C: remote firms control sample
Total assets (in USDm) 1,791.924 3,565.729 626.571 7,872.000 62.777
Market capitalization (in USDm) 1,428.141 2,856.751 521.743 5,897.250 51.195
Tobin’s Q 1.782 1.224 1.401 4.093 0.861
Book-to-market ratio 0.622 0.445 0.523 1.632 0.087
Return on assets 0.136 0.093 0.131 0.298 0.001
R&D 0.004 0.022 0.000 0.016 0.000
Difference in means: A vs. B A vs. C B vs. C
Total assets (in USDm) 4106.676*** 6305.382*** 2198.706***
Market capitalization (in USDm) 3846.104*** 5945.692*** 2099.588***
Tobin’s Q 0.104*** 0.614*** 0.511***
Book-to-market ratio -0.014*** -0.150*** -0.136***
Return on assets 0.008*** -0.049*** -0.056***
R&D 0.002*** 0.064*** 0.062***
The table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics of the detection group, the group of industry
peers and the group of firms in remote industries. Total assets is the total book value of the firm’s assets.
Market capitalization is the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the market value of equity and debt divided
by the book value of the firm’s assets. Return on assets denotes earnings before taxes and interest before deprecia-
tion divided by the book value of total assets. R&D is R&,D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets.
The table also indicates the differences in means between the detection group and the industry peers (A vs. B),
the detection group and the group of remote firms (A vs. C) and the industry peer group and the group of remote
firms (B vs. C). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level based on a t-test with
unequal variances.
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with firm size. The dispersion of analysts as measured by the standard deviation of the
estimates is larger for treatment firms as opposed to their industry peers. When we
compare the treatment firms or the industry peers to the firms in remote industries we
find that firms in remote industries seem to have a slightly smaller standard deviation of
analyst estimates.
Table 4.4: Summary of earnings announcements
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median 95% quantile 5% quantile
Panel A: treatment sample
Number of analyst estimates 10.796 8.022 9 26 1
Analyst dispersion 0.031 0.043 0.02 0.12 0
Surprise 0.006 0.015 0.001 0.029 0
Positive surprise 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.020 0.000
Negative surprise -0.008 0.014 -0.002 0.000 -0.055
Panel B: industry peer control sample
Number of analyst estimates 7.852 6.620 6 22 1
Analyst dispersion 0.028 0.041 0.01 0.11 0
Surprise 0.006 0.015 0.001 0.028 0
Positive surprise 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.020 0.000
Negative surprise -0.009 0.014 -0.003 0.000 -0.055
Panel C: remote firms control sample
Number of analyst estimates 5.533 4.504 4 16 1
Analyst dispersion 0.039 0.049 0.020 0.14 0
Surprise 0.007 0.015 0.002 0.034 0
Positive surprise 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.020 0.000
Negative surprise -0.010 0.015 -0.004 0.000 -0.060
Difference in means: A vs. B A vs. C B vs. C
Number of analyst estimates 2.944*** 5.263*** 2.319***
Analyst dispersion 0.003*** -0.008*** -0.011***
Surprise 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
Positive surprise 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
Negative surprise 0.000 0.002*** 0.001***
The table reports summary statistics of the analyst forecasts of earnings announcements for the detection group,
the group of industry peers and the group of firms in remote industries, the industry. Number of analyst estimates
is the number of analysts who issue a forecast for a quarterly earnings announcement. Analyst dispersion is the
standard deviation of the analyst forecasts with respect to one earnings announcement. Surprise is the absolute
value of the difference between the actual earnings minus the median of analyst forecast scaled by the share price.
Positive surprise (negative surprise) is the difference between the actual earnings minus the median of analyst
forecasts scaled by the share price if the difference is strictly positive (negative). The table also indicates the
differences in means between the detection group and the industry peers (A vs. B), the detection group and the
group of remote firms (A vs. C) and the industry peer group and the group of remote firms (B vs. C). *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level based on a t-test with unequal variances.
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4.4 Empirical strategy
4.4.1 Identification of insider trading
The goal of the present analysis is to analyze the effect of detection on subsequent exploita-
tion of inside information in the neighborhood of the detection target, i.e., the detection
firm itself and industry peers. Measuring insider trading activity directly is nearly impos-
sible as this would require knowledge of the information set and transactions of all traders
in a specific stock as pointed out by Acharya and Johnson (2010). Hence, empirical stud-
ies which aim at capturing insider trading activities have to rely on measures which are
known to be monotonically related to insider trading. In the literature section above we
have argued that unusual stock return behavior qualifies as a measure of suspicious trading
activities.
For the purpose of testing the hypothesis that observed detection reduces insider trading
activity, we choose a variable which is likely to be monotonically linked to the ’true’ level
of insider trading. We choose abnormal runups prior to quarterly earnings announce-
ments. Part of the existing literature which analyzes the effects of regulation on insider
trading (e.g., Ackerman et al. (2008) or Bris (2005)) uses abnormal returns prior to M&A
announcements. For the purpose of the present paper, studying earnings announcements
as opposed to M&A transactions is more appropriate for the following reasons: First, we
seek to analyze the effect of detection at the firm level. Information about earnings an-
nouncements are available for many firms. Looking at M&A events, we would encounter
a selection bias because the likelihood of undertaking or undergoing an M&A event is not
exogenous. Second, earnings announcements occur on a quarterly basis, i.e., frequently
and regularly. M&A events are less frequent and regular. In addition, the acquired firms
are often delisted after the acquisition. Hence, we are able to compare insider trading
activity before and after the detection event. Third, many different parties are involved
in and have thus foreknowledge of M&A transactions. In addition to usual firm insiders,
there are individuals associated with the acquirer, alternative bidders, alternative targets,
consultants, investment banks, law firms etc. involved. Thus, it is less likely the case that
the source of leakage stems from within the firms as opposed to earnings announcements,
where the foreknowledge is more concentrated among individuals directly associated with
the firm.
Further, the study by Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) argues that runups can both be caused by
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market anticipation and insider trading. With respect to earnings announcements we can
account for market anticipation by controlling for the analyst forecast consensus. Thereby
we can measure the surprise component of the announcement more precisely.
Similar to the approaches taken by Acharya and Johnson (2010) or Ackerman et al. (2008)
we use runups prior to the announcement date, i.e., abnormal returns as a measure of
insider trading. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are constructed in a period before
the earnings announcement day t. First, we estimate the parameters of the market model
based on the daily returns in the estimation period from t-140 to t-30 by regressing daily
returns on the market premium and a constant.12 The parameters are then used to
calculate expected daily returns for the event period t-20 to t+2. The daily abnormal
return is obtained by subtracting the expected return from the actual return. To obtain
CAR, we sum up the daily abnormal returns over the corresponding event window, where
we use the window from t-5 to t-1 as the standard window of our analysis.
4.4.2 Regression
Our objective is to measure the effect of detection, our treatment, on runups as a measure
of insider trading. To this end, we use a difference-in-differences method. According to
this method, the effect of detection on insider trading is computed as a double difference:
From the difference between the post and pre detection runups of the treatment sample
we subtract the difference between the post and pre detection difference in runups of the
control sample. This approach combines a cross-sectional and a time series perspective.
Thereby, we avoid the potential problem of an omitted time trend which is affecting the
groups simultaneously and sidestep the issue of unobserved heterogeneity between the
groups. Since we would like to differentiate between the treatment effects on the close
versus farther neighborhood of SEC detection, we look at two double differences and
compare the pre-post differences of (1) the treatment group and the control group of
remote firms and (2) the vicinity treatment group and the control group of remote firms.
We run the following regression using data on the treatment sample and the two matched
control samples:
12The factors are obtained from the Data Library of Kenneth French’s website.
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(4.4.1)runupi,t = β0 + β1 · vicinity treatmenti + β2 · treatmenti + β3 · post detectioni,t
+ β4 · post detectioni,t · vicinity treatmenti + β5 · post detectioni,t
· treatmenti + β6 · surprisei,t + β7 · analyst dispersioni,t + β8 ·Xi,t,
where runupi,t is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior to the announcement of the
earnings announcement of firm i in quarter t. It aims at capturing the extent of trading
ahead of the upcoming earnings announcement. For the observations in which the analyst
forecasts fall short of the actual earnings (negative surprises), we reverse the sign of the
abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if the firm was
subject to a detection event or if the firm is a matched industry peer. In other words,
it is equal to 0 for the matched control firms in remote industries and 1 otherwise. The
dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only
if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable post detection is set to 1
if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise.
We control for various other factors which are expected to affect the runup prior to an
earnings announcement. The size of the runup is likely to depend on the information
content of the earnings announcement. Surprise is the absolute difference between the
actual earnings and the median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable controls for
market anticipation and provides for an event-specific measure of asymmetric information
with respect to the information content of the earnings announcement. We also control
for the dispersion of analyst forecasts. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts. The higher the dispersion, the more uncertainty
is there in the market regarding the upcoming earnings announcement. X stands for the
vector of firm- and time-specific control variables. As control variables we use firm size
(natural logarithm of market capitalization), Tobin’s Q, R&D expenditures and return on
assets. We also add firm-fixed effects to the model later. Thereby, we measure how the
regression coefficients are driven by the variation over time within a given firm. When
including firm-fixed effects we have to drop the variables vicinity treatment and treatment
from the model specification because those variables are perfectly collinear to the firm
intercepts. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Except for dummy variables,
all independent variables are standardized.
Table 4.5 displays the conditionals mean estimates from the difference-in-differences re-
gression model. The sum β0+β1+β2+β3+β4+β5 denotes the average runup for firms in
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the treatment group (i.e., detection targets) in the post detection period, while β0+β1+β2
is the average runup for this group in the pre detection period. Hence, the pre-post dif-
ference between those average runups is β3 + β4 + β5. The equivalent pre-post difference
for the control group is β3 (= β0 + β3 − β0). The double difference for the treatment
effect of SEC detection is the difference between those pre-post differences, i.e., β4 + β5.
In an analogous manner, the double difference with respect to the treatment effect on the
farther vicinity of the detection target is β4. The main coefficients of interest are, hence,
β4 and β5. They test the main hypothesis that a detection event deters insider trading
in the neighborhood of the firm. The coefficient β4 captures the extent to which insider
trading is deterred at the detection firm and peers in the same industry. However, the
coefficient β5 tests whether there is an additional deterrent effect at the level of the firm
with the detection event. If there are spillover effects on industry peers, we expect β4 to be
negative and significant. If the deterrent effect for the detection firm is more pronounced
as compared to the effect on industry peers, we expect a negative and significant β5. If a
detection event only impacts subsequent insider trading at the firm level, we expect β4 to
be insignificant and β5 to be negative and significant.
Table 4.5: Conditional mean estimates from the difference-in-differences regression model
Post detection Pre detection Difference
Treatment β0 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 β0 + β1 + β2 β3 + β4 + β5
Vicinity treatment β0 + β1 + β3 + β4 β0 + β1 β3 + β4
Control β0 + β3 β0 β3
Difference treatment - control β2 + β4 + β5 β2 β4 + β5
Difference vicinity treatment - control β1 + β4 β1 β4
This table illustrates the conditional mean estimates of the difference-in-difference regression. This table is based
on Roberts and Whited (2011), p. 39.
4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Impact of detection
Table 4.6 shows the results for the difference-in-differences regressions. Model (1) regresses
runups on the difference-in-differences indicators, the earnings surprise and the dispersion
of analyst forecasts. Model (2) adds control variable, whereas Model (3) additionally
includes firm-fixed effects.
The results of Models (1), (2) and (3) show that a detection event reduces runups only with
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respect to treatment firms or firms in their neighborhood, but not with respect to remote
firms. The coefficient of post detection is insignificant, while the one of post detection ∗
vicinity treatment is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect is
also economically significant: It varies from -0.6% to -0.7%. However, the insignificance
of the variable post detection ∗ treatment indicates that the detection effect on treatment
firms does not differ from the effect on peers. These findings suggest that a detection event
significantly reduces insider trading in the vicinity of the detection target. The spillover
effect on industry peers is apparently strong, as this effect is statistically indistinguishable
from the immediate effect in the same firm. The positive and significant coefficient of the
dummy variable vicinity treatment indicates, that firms with a detection event and their
peers have higher runups on average. However, the insignificant coefficient of treatment
suggests that there is not any significant difference between the detection targets and their
peers regarding the overall level of runups.
In Models (4) and (5) we look at positive and negative earnings surprises separately. A
positive (negative) earnings surprise is an earnings announcement which beats (falls short
of) the analyst forecast consensus which is defined as the median of the forecasts.13 The
runups for negative surprises have been multiplied with (-1), so we expect the independent
variables to affect the runups in the same direction as compared to positive surprises. We
observe that there is a significant deterrent effect with respect to positive surprises, but
there is no effect on negative surprises. The positive coefficient of post detection in Model
(4) indicates that runups of positive surprises are slightly higher for all three groups in the
post detection period. The deterring effect of detection on detection targets and their peers
is -0.9%. According to the results in Model (5) a detection event does not significantly
affect insider trading prior to negative earnings announcements.
Models (6) and (7) show the results with respect to two subsets of the entire sample: Model
(6) tests for differences in the treatment effect of a detection event between the group
of detection targets and their industry firms. Model (7) compares the treatment effect
between the group of detection targets and firms in remote industries. The results of Model
(6) confirm the finding stated earlier that there is no statistically significant difference in
the deterrent effect of detection between detection targets and their industry peers. Model
13The number of observations from (4) and (5) do not add up to the number of observations in Model (3)
because we do not include observations where the variable surprise is equal to zero. In addition, we use
several alternative thresholds to define positive and negative surprises. The results remain robust, when
we use 0.0001 (-0.0001), 0.001 (-0.001), or 0.005 (-0.005) as alternative thresholds to define positive
(negative) surprises.
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(7) shows that compared to matched controls in remote industries, a detection event leads
to significantly smaller runups in detection targets.
The magnitude of the runup is positively related to the variable surprise. The variable size
is inversely related to the magnitude of the runup. A one standard-deviation increase in
the natural log of firm size decreases the runup by between 0.8% and 1.2%. The coefficient
of Tobin′sQ is positively associated with the magnitude of the runup. A one standard
deviation increase leads to an increase in runups by between 0.5% to 0.7%. These findings
are consistent with the notion that runups are higher in firms with higher asymmetric
information. The coefficient of the variable R&D is only statistically significant at the
10% level in Model (3). In all other 5 specifications, the coefficient fails to be significant
at conventional levels. Return on assets is inversely related to runups.
4.5.2 Source of leakage
The strength of the deterrent effect may be affected by the source of leakage. Trading
ahead of earnings announcements is likely to stem from individuals who are closely related
to the firm and have regular access to material, non-public information. We hypothesize
that the deterrent effect is stronger when the caught individuals are closely related to the
firm in which the insider trading occurred. This argument is based on the notion that
individuals use experiences from their vicinity when updating their subjective probabilities
of detection (see arguments in Section 2). Moreover, shareholders might be pressing to
implement measures prohibiting future information leakages when they learn that there
was an internal source of leakage. The regressions in Table 4.7 aim at testing whether the
deterrent effect depends on the source of leakage. We build interaction terms between the
dummy variable for the source of leakage and the variables post detection, post detection∗
vicinity treatment and post detection ∗ treatment.
We include the same control variables as in the previous regressions, however, for the sake
of brevity we do not report the control variables in Table 4.7. Model (1) tests for differences
between the cases where information has leaked as opposed to stolen information. All
coefficients of the interaction terms with stolen are insignificant. Apparently, there is no
significant difference between cases of stolen versus leaked information with respect to
the deterrent effect. Model (2) tests whether there is a difference with respect to insider
trading cases based on leakage from individuals who are employed by the firm (managers or
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Table 4.6: Impact on runups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic Control variables Firm-fixed effects Positive surprise Negative surprise No distant controls No close controls
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t
Post detection (d) -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003* -0.001 -0.006*** 0.001
(-0.73) (0.75) (0.84) (1.69) (-0.46) (-5.39) (0.68)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.001
(-4.21) (-3.92) (-4.51) (-5.78) (-0.19)
Postdetection*treatment -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.007***
(-0.10) (0.68) (0.37) (1.17) (-1.04) (0.37) (-4.19)
Vicinity treatment (d) 0.006*** 0.005***
(3.83) (3.40)
Treatment (d) -0.001 0.002
(-0.40) (1.29)
Surprise 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(17.06) (10.83) (8.41) (5.69) (7.31) (6.01) (7.96)
Analyst dispersion -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(-3.02) (0.21) (0.34) (-0.10) (0.35) (1.47) (-0.26)
Size -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(-19.68) (-11.34) (-9.90) (-5.27) (-10.11) (-9.31)
Tobin’s Q 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(10.90) (11.28) (9.76) (5.91) (10.97) (8.47)
R&D 0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(1.14) (-1.70) (-1.32) (-1.20) (-1.26) (-1.07)
Return on assets -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-5.29) (-4.66) (-4.10) (-2.22) (-4.69) (-4.21)
Obs 44304 43646 43646 23157 15361 29370 31377
R-squared 0.035 0.078 0.149 0.177 0.195 0.155 0.145
Adj. R-squared 0.131 0.145 0.146 0.135 0.128
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. Models (3) to (7) include firm-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except
for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2% level and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior to the announcement of
the earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the observations in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), we
reverse the sign of the abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or if the firm is a matched industry peer of a
firm with a detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable
post detection is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise. Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual earnings and
the median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value
of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets.
Return on assets denotes earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets.
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employees). The deterrent effect on the stock of a detection target is significantly stronger
for cases of information leakage from the inside. The size of the incremental effect is -0.5%
as suggested by the coefficient of the variable post detection ∗ treatment ∗ stolen. In total,
the deterrent effect on detection targets is -1.3% as opposed to -0.8% for industry peers.
However, this difference is only statistically significant at the 10% level.14
Model (3) tests the deterrent effect of cases involving professional service firms. We do
not find any significant impact of the involvement of professional service firm employees
on the deterrent effect with respect to detection targets or their peers. Model (4) tests
whether there are differences between cases of crime of opportunity versus organized crime,
i.e., cases where there has been trading on inside information with at least three different
firms). The findings suggest that there is no significant differences among these two
sources. In sum, there is only weak evidence that the source of leakage has an impact on
the magnitude of the deterrent effect. The deterrent effect on the detection target seems
to be slightly larger for episodes involving inside leakage.
4.5.3 Impact of firm cross-section
The deterrent effect is likely to be stronger for firms with a high ex ante risk of insider
trading. The opportunity to make profits by trading ahead of price-sensitive announce-
ments is larger for firms with high asymmetric information. Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 test
whether the deterrent effect differs with respect to firm characteristics which are likely to
be associated with asymmetric information, i.e., size, R&D and Tobin′sQ.
First, we test whether there is an impact of firm size on the deterrent effect. In Model
(1) of Table 4.8 we interact the difference-in-difference indicators with size, the natural
logarithm of a firm’s market value of equity. Model (2) interacts the indicators with
dummy variables for small and large firms. We construct these dummies as follows: We
sort the observations into terciles with respect to size. The results of Model (1) suggests
that there is not any significant linear impact of the natural logarithm of size on the
deterrent effect. The findings of Model (2) indicate that the runups of small firms are
slightly larger in the post detection period for all firms in the sample, as suggested by the
coefficient of post detection ∗ small. However, the remaining interaction terms with the
14In non-reported results, we break down the source of inside leakage further. We do not find any significant
differences between the impact of employees, top managers, shareholders or directors as the source of
leakage on the deterrent effect.
122
Table 4.7: Source of information leakage and the impact of runups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t b/t b/t b/t
post detection (d) 0.001 0.004* -0.001 0.002
(0.98) (1.92) (-0.48) (1.29)
Post detection*vicinity treatment -0.007*** -0.008** -0.007*** -0.007***
(-4.23) (-2.56) (-3.41) (-3.08)
Postdetection*treatment 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.45) (0.55) (0.29) (-0.01)
Post detection*stolen -0.002 -0.005 0.000
(-0.45) (-1.06) (0.00)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*stolen 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.16) (0.18) (0.13)
Post detection*treatment*stolen -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.48) (-0.57) (-0.42)
Post detection*inside leakage -0.005*
(-1.80)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*inside leakage 0.000
(0.02)
Post detection*treatment -0.001
(-0.24)
Post detection*profservice 0.007**
(2.42)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*profservice -0.001
(-0.32)
Post detection*treatment*profservice 0.000
(0.02)
Post detection*crime of opportunity -0.002
(-1.01)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*crime of opportunity -0.001
(-0.23)
Post detection*treatment*crime of opportunity 0.002
(0.50)
Obs 46646 46646 46646 46646
R-squared 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149
Adj. R-squared 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. All regressions include firm-fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2%
level and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior
to the announcement of the earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the
observations in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), we reverse the sign of the
abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or
if the firm is a matched industry peer of a firm with a detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes
a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable
post detection is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise.
Cases are classified as stolen if the defendant has illegally gained access to the private information. insideleakage
denotes cases in which the trader or tipper is directly employed by the firm. professional service firm includes
employees of service firms with a fiduciary duty to the firm with the insider trading episode (management consulting
firm, investment bank or law firm).crime of opportunity if the defendants have exploited inside information with
respect to one firm only. We also include the following control variables. For brevity, we do not report the variables
in the table. surprise is the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings minus the median of analyst
forecast scaled by the share price. size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the
market value of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled
by the book value of total assets. return on assets denotes earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation
divided by the book value of total assets. Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual earnings and the
median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation of
analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the market value
of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book
value of total assets. Return on assets denotes earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the
book value of total assets. 123
dummies for small and large firms are all insignificant.
Second, we analyze a potential impact of R&D on the deterrent effect. In an analogous
manner to the procedure above, we interact a continuous measure for R&D, the R&D
expenditures scaled by total assets, with the difference-in-differences indicators as well as
binary variables for low and high R&D firms. To this end, we also sort firms into terciles
according to their R&D expenditures. When we include the R&D variables in the analysis,
the treatment effect of detection on detection targets and their peers disappears. In Model
(1) of Table 4.9, the post detection runups are significantly smaller for all firms, i.e., for
detection firms, their peers and firms in remote industry. This effect seems to increase
with the R&D intensity, as indicated by the interaction variable post detection ∗ R&D.
In Model (2), we do not observe any significant impact of the difference-in-differences
indicators or their interactions with R&D. However, in both models the effect of detection
on the post detection runups of firms in the vicinity treatment group disappears when we
include interactions with R&D.
Third, we investigate whether Tobin′sQ affects the deterrent effect. In Model (1) of
Table 4.10 we interact Tobin′sQ with the difference-in-differences indicators. We do not
observe any evidence for a linear impact of this variable on the deterrent effect. Again,
we sort firms into terciles according to their Tobin′sQ and form interaction variables of
the top and bottom tercile with the difference-in-differences indicators. According to the
results of Model (2), the deterrent effect is less pronounced for firms with a low value of
Tobin′sQ. This effect applies to the group of vicinity firms, i.e., the detection targets and
their industry peers. Typically those firms have small growth prospects and, as a result, a
rather low degree of information asymmetry. Apparently, the deterrent effect is smaller in
environments with a rather low level of asymmetric information, because the opportunities
for exploiting asymmetric information are smaller as compared to firms with medium or
high levels of information asymmetry.15
15When we repeat the analyses above by sorting into quintiles instead of terciles, we find similar results.
The results are not reported here but available upon request.
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Table 4.8: Firm size and the impact of runups
(1) (2)
runup (-5,-1) runup (-5,-1)
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t b/t
Post detection (d) 0.001 -0.001
(0.69) (-0.70)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.007*** -0.006**
(-4.38) (-2.56)
Postdetection*treatment -0.000 0.000
(-0.26) (0.13)
Post detection*size -0.002
(-1.20)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*size 0.003
(1.30)
Post detection*treatment*size 0.001
(0.90)
Post detection*small 0.005*
(1.84)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*small -0.005
(-1.23)
Post detection*treatment*small -0.001
(-0.24)
Post detection*large 0.002
(0.98)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*large 0.000
(0.06)
Post detection*treatment*large 0.000
(0.07)
Surprise 0.005*** 0.005***
(8.46) (8.39)
Analyst dispersion 0.000 0.000
(0.33) (0.35)
Size -0.010*** -0.010***
(-11.38) (-11.38)
Tobin’s Q 0.007*** 0.007***
(11.27) (11.20)
R&D -0.002 -0.002
(-1.56) (-1.57)
Return on assets -0.004*** -0.004***
(-4.64) (-4.67)
Obs 43646 43646
R-squared 0.149 0.149
Adj. R-squared 0.131 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. All Models include firm-fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2%
level and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior
to the announcement of the earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the
observations in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), we reverse the sign of the
abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or
if the firm is a matched industry peer of a firm with a detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes
a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable
post detection is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise.
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Small (large) is a dummy variable which is set to 1
if the firm is in the bottom (top) tercile in terms of size. Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual
earnings and the median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard
deviation of analyst forecasts. Tobin′sQ denotes the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value
of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets. Return on assets denotes
earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets.
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Table 4.9: R&D and the impact of runups
(1) (2)
runup (-5,-1) runup (-5,-1)
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t b/t
Post detection (d) -0.004** -0.001
(-2.23) (-0.42)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.002 -0.004
(-1.10) (-1.14)
Postdetection*treatment 0.001 0.002
(0.62) (0.85)
Post detection*R&D -0.009***
(-3.55)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*R&D 0.004
(1.33)
Post detection*treatment*R&D 0.001
(0.30)
Post detection*low R&D 0.003
(0.88)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*low R&D 0.001
(0.19)
Post detection*treatment*low R&D -0.002
(-0.49)
Post detection*high R&D -0.005
(-0.81)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*high R&D -0.001
(-0.14)
Post detection*treatment*high R&D -0.003
(-0.67)
Surprise 0.005*** 0.005***
(8.54) (8.40)
Analyst dispersion 0.000 0.000
(0.28) (0.27)
Size -0.010*** -0.010***
(-11.17) (-11.24)
Tobin’s Q 0.007*** 0.007***
(11.08) (10.82)
R&D 0.000 -0.001
(0.03) (-1.44)
Return on assets -0.004*** -0.004***
(-4.48) (-4.47)
Obs 43646 43646
R-squared 0.150 0.150
Adj. R-squared 0.132 0.132
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. All Models include firm-fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2% level
and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior to the
announcement of the earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the observa-
tions in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), we reverse the sign of the abnormal
return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or if the firm
is a matched industry peer of a firm with a detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of
vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable post detection
is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise. R&D is R&D
expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets. HighR&D (lowR&D) is a dummy variable which is set to 1
if the firm is in the top (bottom) tercile in terms of R&D expenditures. Surprise is the absolute difference between
the actual earnings and the median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to
the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ
denotes the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. Return on assets denotes
earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets.
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Table 4.10: Tobin’s Q and the impact of runups
(1) (2)
runup (-5,-1) runup (-5,-1)
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t b/t
post detection (d) 0.000 0.001
(0.04) (0.82)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.007*** -0.010***
(-3.76) (-4.79)
Postdetection*treatment 0.001 0.002
(0.40) (0.81)
Post detection*Tobin’s Q -0.003
(-1.62)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*Tobin’s Q -0.000
(-0.13)
Post detection*treatment*Tobin’s Q -0.001
(-0.57)
Post detection*low Q -0.000
(-0.22)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*low Q 0.007**
(2.38)
Post detection*treatment*low Q -0.002
(-0.57)
Post detection*high Q -0.000
(-0.03)
Post detection*vicinity treatment*high Q -0.001
(-0.33)
Post detection*treatment*high Q -0.001
(-0.52)
Surprise 0.005*** 0.005***
(8.39) (8.29)
Analyst dispersion 0.000 0.000
(0.35) (0.35)
Size -0.010*** -0.010***
(-10.88) (-10.74)
Tobin’s Q 0.008*** 0.007***
(11.96) (11.28)
R&D -0.002 -0.002
(-1.48) (-1.53)
Return on assets -0.004*** -0.004***
(-4.48) (-4.42)
Obs 43646 43646
R-squared 0.149 0.149
Adj. R-squared 0.132 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. All Models include firm-fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2% level
and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior to the
announcement of the earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the observa-
tions in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), we reverse the sign of the abnormal
return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or if the firm
is a matched industry peer of a firm with a detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of
vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable post detection is
set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise. Tobin′sQ denotes
the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. HighTobin′sQ (low Tobin′sQ)
is a dummy variable which is set to 1 if the firm is in the top (bottom) tercile in terms of Tobin′sQ. Surprise is
the absolute difference between the actual earnings and the median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable
analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm of the mar-
ket value of equity. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets. Return on assets denotes
earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets.
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4.6 Robustness
4.6.1 Fraction as an alternative measure
We use an alternative approach to measure insider trading prior to earnings announce-
ments. As an alternative measure for information leakage prior to the public announce-
ment we calculate the variable fraction as the runup prior to the announcement (CAR(-
10,-1)/CAR(-10,2)), similar to the approach by Ackerman et al. (2008). This variable
seeks to measure the fraction of information which has been impounded into prices before
the announcement relative to the total price effect of the earnings announcements. When
fraction is smaller than 0, we set it to 0 and when it is larger than 1, we set it equal to 1.
The rationale for this robustness check stems from the critique that the observed deterrent
effect may not be due to less insider trading activity, but due to a smaller information
content of earnings announcements in general. Scaling the runup by a measure for the
overall information content, which in our case is approximated by the abnormal return in
the time window from -10 to 2 days around the earnings announcement, addresses this
objections.
Table 4.11 shows the results from the regressions. We use the same model specifications
as before with the difference-in-differences indicators, characteristics of the earnings an-
nouncement and firm characteristics as independent variables. We merely exchange the
dependent variable and use fraction instead of the runup. The coefficient of the variable
post detection∗vicinity is negative and statistically significant. The effect remains robust
to the inclusion of control variables in Model (2) and the inclusion of firm-fixed effects in
Model (3). Post detection the fraction of the market response impounded already before
the announcement is reduced by between -3.6% and -3.1%. This effect prevails for the
stock of the detection firm as well as the stocks of firms in the direct neighborhood, that is
industry peers. There is no significant difference between the direct effect on the detection
and the indirect spillover effect on peers.
4.6.2 Alternative pre-event windows
We use alternative event windows prior to the earnings announcement day to calculate the
runup: (-10,-1), (-3,-1) and (-2,-1). Table 4.12 reports the results of the main regression
with firm-fixed effects for these alternative event windows. In sum, the results remain
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Table 4.11: Information impounded before the announcement
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Pooled Pooled
Dep. var.: Fraction of runup b/t b/t b/t
Post detection (d) -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.041***
(-5.43) (-5.43) (-3.71)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.036*** -0.031** -0.031**
(-2.59) (-2.22) (-2.17)
Postdetection*treatment 0.004 0.002 0.016
(0.29) (0.13) (1.20)
Vicinity treatment (d) 0.023** 0.025**
(2.39) (2.46)
Treatment (d) 0.004 0.013
(0.46) (1.37)
Surprise 0.018*** 0.009*** -0.005
(5.32) (2.67) (-1.59)
Analyst disperson -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.49) (-0.72) (-0.94)
Size -0.019*** -0.101***
(-5.30) (-13.56)
Tobin’s Q -0.004 0.025***
(-1.39) (6.38)
R&D -0.004 -0.017**
(-0.90) (-2.40)
Return on assets -0.015*** 0.004
(-3.85) (0.74)
Obs 46492 45783 45783
R-squared 0.010 0.014 0.079
Adj. R-squared 0.060
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. Model (3) includes firm-fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2% level and
standardized. fraction is defined as CAR(-10,-1) divided by CAR(-10,2). The dummy variable vicinity treatment
is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or if the firm is a matched industry peer of a firm with a
detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there
is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable post detection is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs
after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise. Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual earnings
and the median forecast scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation
of analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the market
value of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the
book value of total assets. Return on assets denotes earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided
by the book value of total assets.
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robust to alternative pre-event windows. The coefficient of the variable post detection ∗
vicinity treatment is statistically significant at the 1% level in all six regressions. The
economic magnitude ranges from -1.1% for the (-10,-1) window to 0.5% for the (-3,-1)
window.
Table 4.12: Alternative pre-event windows
(1) (2) (3)
(-10,-1) (-3,-1) (-2,-1)
Dep. var.: runup b/t b/t b/t
Post detection (d) 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(1.22) (-0.09) (0.80)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(-4.74) (-3.93) (-5.09)
Postdetection*treatment 0.003 0.001 0.002**
(1.18) (0.49) (2.05)
Surprise 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(10.80) (8.67) (8.30)
Analyst dispersion -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.48) (0.01) (-0.46)
Size -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(-9.97) (-11.49) (-12.93)
Tobin’s Q 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(10.81) (12.87) (13.42)
R&D -0.003** -0.002** -0.002***
(-2.04) (-2.14) (-3.45)
Return on assets -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-5.43) (-4.95) (-5.85)
Obs 43645 43649 43650
R-squared 0.153 0.148 0.146
Adj. R-squared 0.135 0.130 0.128
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. All Models include firm-fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2% level
and standardized. The dependent variable runup is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior to the announce-
ment of the earnings announcement over different windows prior to the announcement date at t: from t-10 to t-1,
t-3 to t-1 and t-2 to t-1. For the observations in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative
surprise), we reverse the sign of the abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there
is a detection event in the firm or if the firm is a matched industry peer of a firm with a detection event. The
dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in
the firm. The dummy variable post detection is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event
in the stock or 0 otherwise. Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual earnings and the median forecast
scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation of analyst forecasts.
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the market value of equity and debt
divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets.
Return on assets denotes earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total
assets.
4.6.3 Excluding acquired firms
In several cases, the firm on whose stock the insider trading occurred is acquired by another
firm in between the insider trading event and the detection. Earnings announcement
runups cannot be calculated if the stock has been delisted. Instead, in the analyses above
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we include the acquiring firm in the sample and compare their earnings announcement
runups before and after the detection event. In Model (1) of Table 4.13 we exclude the
cases of acquired firms. The results are very similar to the basic results. The coefficient
of the dummy post detection ∗ vicinity treatment is -0.7% and is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
4.6.4 Excluding M&A or fraud
In Model (2) of 4.13 we exclude the cases from the sample where the insider trade took place
in advance of the announcement of M&A events. Model (3) excludes cases of trading ahead
of the announcement of corporate fraud. The deterrent effect of detection on detection
targets and their peers remains robust to these subsamples.
4.6.5 Alternative control sample
In the basic specifications, we only include one matched control firm for each treatment
firm. In Model (4) we include up to 3 control firms from the same industry (according to
the 3-digit SIC code). From the 10 firms in the same 3-digit SIC code, we pick up to 3
firms (if available) which are closest in terms of book-to-market ratio. The results remain
robust to this alternative specification. In Model (5) we select the matched sample of
industry peers using a slightly altered matching algorithm. We select the closest firm in
terms of book-to-market ratio from the five firms which are closes in terms of size. The
main effect also prevails in this sample.
4.6.6 Minimum number of analysts
Lastly, Model (6) of Table 4.13 only includes earnings announcements in the sample where
there are at least 5 analyst forecasts for the quarterly earnings announcement available.
The precision of analyst consensus as a proxy for market expectations is likely to increase
with the number of analysts who are analyzing the firm and issuing forecasts. The results
remain robust to this subsample. The results also remain robust to different thresholds
which are not reported here, such as 3 or 7 analyst forecasts.
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Table 4.13: Alternative robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excl. acquired Excl. fraud Excl. M&A Up to 3 controls Alternative matching Min. 5 analysts
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t
Post detection (d) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.68) (0.71) (0.69) (0.86) (0.63) (-0.84)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.006*
(-4.07) (-4.21) (-4.61) (-4.75) (-4.25) (-1.73)
Postdetection*treatment -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
(-0.88) (0.45) (0.49) (0.09) (1.06) (0.72)
Surprise 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007***
(7.03) (7.78) (5.70) (10.13) (9.22) (6.39)
Analyst disperson 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.45) (0.55) (0.44) (0.03) (0.04) (0.91)
Size -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(-10.32) (-11.19) (-10.34) (-13.67) (-9.69) (-4.92)
Tobin’s Q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(10.30) (11.26) (9.09) (13.66) (8.68) (6.96)
R&D -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001
(-1.45) (-1.56) (-1.60) (-3.14) (-0.90) (-0.34)
Return on assets -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-3.45) (-4.74) (-3.57) (-5.58) (-4.29) (-3.49)
Obs 35379 43698 29994 64378 40316 22758
R-squared 0.149 0.148 0.146 0.147 0.150 0.156
Adj. R-squared 0.130 0.130 0.127 0.129 0.132 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. All Models include firm-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for
dummy variables are winsorized at the 2% level and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior to the announcement of the
earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the observations in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), we reverse
the sign of the abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or if the firm is a matched industry peer of a firm with a
detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable post detection is
set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise. Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual earnings and the median forecast
scaled by the share price. The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ
denotes the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets. Return on assets denotes
earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets.
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4.7 Discussion
4.7.1 Mechanical relationship
One may object that the observed drop in the post detection runups is purely mechanical
for the following reason: It could be argued that the pre detection runups are greater simply
because they include the insider trading episode. First, a pure mechanical relationship is
unable to explain why we observe a significant drop in the runups of industry peers.
Second, if this criticism holds and the observed relationship was purely mechanical, then
the effect would disappear if we exclude the runups from insider trading episodes from
our sample. Only 23.1% of the insider trading episodes in our sample include earnings
announcements as the event on which material, non-public information has been exploited.
In Table 4.14 we report the results of the difference-in-differences regression in which
we exclude all insider trading episodes involving earnings announcements.16 The results
suggest that the treatment effect on detection targets and their industry peers persists
in this subsample. This finding casts doubt on the objection that the treatment effect is
purely mechanical.
4.7.2 Alternative explanations
The main hypothesis developed in Section 2 is that a reduction in trading ahead of earnings
announcements is caused by the update of subjective detection probabilities of individuals
with access to private information. One could argue that there are alternative factors
which drive the main findings. SEC detection could raise the shareholders’ concerns about
adverse selection costs. As a consequence, they could exert pressure on the management
to improve efforts to prevent the exploitation of inside information. There are two ways
in which firms could respond to those demands: improve the dissemination of information
to the market or improve internal compliance mechanisms.
After a detection event firms may improve their disclosure of information to the market
which leads to more accurate prices to begin with. Under this assumption, the decrease
in the price runups is due to more informative prices. First, although the channel through
16It would actually be sufficient to exclude the runups for the quarterly earnings announcement which
were involved in a detected insider trading episode. However, the SEC litigation releases do not always
provide precise information about the respective quarter. As an alternative approach, we therefore
eliminate all observations (detection firms and also their matched control firms) for which the respective
insider event type is earnings announcements.
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Table 4.14: Impact on runups excluding earnings announcements
(1)
Dep. var.: runup (-5,-1) b/t
Post detection (d) 0.001
(0.58)
Postdetection*vicinity treatment -0.006***
(-3.42)
Postdetection*treatment 0.000
(0.13)
Surprise 0.005***
(7.78)
Analyst disperson 0.000
(0.32)
Size -0.010***
(-9.83)
Tobin’s Q 0.006***
(8.99)
R&D -0.001
(-1.12)
Return on assets -0.004***
(-3.96)
Obs 32446
R-squared
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regression. The Model includes firm-fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables except for dummy variables are winsorized at the 2%
level and standardized. The dependent variable runup (−5,−1) is the abnormal return of the firm’s stock prior
to the announcement of the earnings announcement from t-5 to t-1 prior to the announcement date at t. For the
observations in which the earnings fall short of the analyst forecasts (negative surprise), I reverse the sign of the
abnormal return. The dummy variable vicinity treatment is equal to 1 if there is a detection event in the firm or
if the firm is a matched industry peer of a firm with a detection event. The dummy variable treatment denotes
a subset of vicinity treatment. It is set to 1 only if there is a detection event in the firm. The dummy variable
post detection is set to 1 if the earnings announcement occurs after a detection event in the stock or 0 otherwise.
Surprise is the absolute difference between the actual earnings and the median forecast scaled by the share price.
The variable analyst dispersion is equal to the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Size is the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity. Tobin′sQ denotes the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value
of the firm’s assets. R&D is R&D expenditures scaled by the book value of total assets. Return on assets denotes
earnings before taxes and interest before depreciation divided by the book value of total assets.
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which SEC detection affects insider trading is different, this alternative explanation is
still consistent with the interpretation of less insider trading activity. Second, improved
dissemination of information to the market implies that analysts should make more ac-
curate forecasts. This implication is empirically testable. We compare analyst dispersion
and accuracy of analyst forecasts for the vicinity treatment sample (detection targets and
their industry peers) pre and post detection in Table 4.15. Post detection we observe an
increase of the average number of analyst by 1.3. The difference is statistically significant
at the 1%. We observe a greater dispersion among analysts’ opinions after a detection
event (difference in means: 1.2%). Further, analyst forecasts seem to be less accurate post
detection as suggested by a significant increase in the magnitude of surprises (difference
in means: 0.3%).17 These observations cast doubt on the notion that firms have improved
their communication with the market after a detection event.
Table 4.15: Analyst estimates pre and post detection
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median 95% quantile 5% quantile
Panel A: vicinity treatment pre detection
Number of analyst estimates 7.466 6.628 5 21 1
Std. dev. of estimate 0.026 0.042 0.010 0.1 0
Surprise 0.006 0.016 0.001 0.027 0
Positive surprise 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.019 0.000
Negative surprise -0.008 0.015 -0.002 0.000 -0.052
Panel B: vicinity treatment post detection
Number of analyst estimates 8.814 7.136 7 23 1
Std. dev. of estimate 0.038 0.051 0.020 0.15 0
Surprise 0.009 0.020 0.002 0.048 0
Positive surprise 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.030 0.000
Negative surprise -0.012 0.018 -0.004 0.000 -0.055
Difference in means
Number of analyst estimates 1.347***
Std. dev. of estimate 0.012***
Surprise 0.003***
Positive surprise 0.002***
Negative surprise -0.004***
This table shows descriptive statistics of analyst estimates of quarterly earnings announcement for the sample of
firms with detection events before and after the detection event. Number of analyst estimates is the number of
analysts who issue a forecast for a quarterly earnings announcement. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation
of the analyst forecasts with respect to one earnings announcement. surprise is the absolute value of the difference
between the actual earnings minus the median of analyst forecast scaled by the share price. Positive surprise
(negative surprise) is the difference between the actual earnings minus the median of analyst forecasts scaled by
the share price if the difference is strictly positive (negative). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5% or 1% level respectively based on a t-test with unequal variances.
17When we compare the figures for the treatment group, we find comparable results: The number of
analysts increases by 1.4, the standard deviation of the analyst forecasts increases by 1.2% and the
magnitude of surprises increases by 0.3%.
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Moreover, the firm subject to a detection event could improve efforts to prevent insider
trading through internal policies. Examples for better prevention are limiting the access
to confidential information, requiring pre clearance of any transaction by the compliance
department or increasing awareness by issuing a code of conduct. These actions are likely
to lead to reductions in insider trading activities. The consequences of an update of the
subjective detection probability and improved internal control mechanisms are observa-
tionally equivalent. We could disentangle these two explanations if we had information on
changes in internal compliance mechanisms subsequent to the detection event. This infor-
mation is not publicly available and costly to collect. Based on the analysis in this paper,
we cannot disentangle an update in probabilities from improved compliance mechanisms.
4.7.3 Representativeness
One may object that trading ahead of earnings announcements is not representative for
the general amount of insider trading in a given stock. We do not account for a complete
picture of all insider trading activities in a given firm. Insider trading can take place well
in advance of the announcement of price-sensitive information and it also can take place
with respect to many different types of news events. A comprehensive analysis of insider
trading based on an exhaustive set of news announcements is difficult because of the high
frequency of news production. With respect to many types of those news (such as personnel
changes or investment activities) it is difficult to assess the value implications ex ante and
to construct a proxy for market expectations. Therefore, it is difficult to jointly analyze
all different types of news announcements. Our analysis just captures a small aspect by
focusing on the trading ahead in the 10 days prior to an earnings announcement.
Further, one can criticize that post detection individuals with private information trade
smarter in such a way that they reduce the market impact of their transactions. E.g., the
individuals who seek to exploit private information place their trades in smaller chunks
or over a larger period of time. The observation of smaller runups before earnings an-
nouncement after a detection event may not be due to actual decreases insider trading
but differences in the strategies to exploit insider trading. This potential change in insider
trading strategies cannot be observed. Our results are, hence, limited to the finding SEC
detection reduces insider trading activities prior to earnings announcements.
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4.8 Conclusion
The present paper explores the consequences of the public detection of insider trading by
the SEC. Using runups prior to earnings announcement as a measure of insider trading
activity, we compare insider trading before and after the event of SEC detection using a
difference-in-differences approach. We hypothesize that SEC detection leads to an update
of the subjective probabilities of getting caught among individuals in the vicinity of the
defendants. As a consequence of this update, expected cost of insider trading increase
which reduces the observed level of insider trading.
In sum, we find that post detection earnings announcement runups prior are significantly
lower. Subsequent to detection, runups over the time window of t-5 to t-1 around the
earnings announcement are reduced by 0.7% for firms with a detection event and their
industry peers. We do not find any significant difference between the impact on the de-
tection targets and impact on their peers. There is weak empirical support that the effect
on the detection targets is stronger for cases of inside leakage. This finding corroborates
the hypothesis that individuals base their subjective probabilities on experiences gained
by themselves and their close vicinity. The empirical results support the hypothesis that
individuals with the ability to trade on private information update their subjective de-
tection probabilities after they observe an SEC detection event in their vicinity. As a
result, they are less likely to exploit their possession of material, non-public information.
Our results portray a positive picture of SEC enforcement by indicating that enforcement
actions against insider trading are effective in reducing future insider trading activities.
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